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It's not just about Iran
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Magnu-@aol.com
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Oct 09, 2009 08:07 PDT
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_http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/oct/07/iran-nuclear
-weapons-wmd-enrichment_
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/oct/07/iran-nuclear-weapons-wmd-enrichment)
It's not just about Iran
A WMD-free zone in the Middle East could be the answer to rising nuclear
tensions in the region
* (http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/hans-blix)
* * _Hans Blix_ (http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/hans-blix)
* _guardian.co.uk_ (http://www.guardian.co.uk/) , Wednesday 7 October
2009 22.00 BST
The possibility that Iran is seeking to develop a nuclear weapon and the
reality that it is building a capability for enriching uranium continue to
raise tensions in the Middle East and could push other countries in the
region to move in the same direction. In my view the issue of nuclear weapons is
not really of great importance for today's _negotiations_
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/01/iran-nuclear-geneva-talks) . After all, even if
there were no such ambition now, Iran could change its mind next year and
would then have come closer to a weapon by the progress made in the
enrichment programme.
The conclusion is that it remains desirable to persuade Iran to abandon
enrichment. But we do not know if this would be possible under any
circumstances. Only direct talks will show this, and it is sad that such talks did
not begin much earlier. Several years were wasted by making suspension of
enrichment a precondition for talks. We should give President Obama the credit
for the start of talks – without any guarantee, of course, that a deal will
be reached.
In order to justify harsh punitive measures some may wish to show that Iran
is lying and actually trying to develop a weapon. However, efforts to
shame Iran will not improve the chances of persuading it to abandon its
advanced enrichment programme – the most important objective.
What can be done? To persuade Iran to abandon enrichment, both incentives
and disincentives have been offered. Economic sanctions and military
measures could have dire consequences. They might also rally a majority of
Iranians to support a government they otherwise oppose. Earlier European messages
to Iran have pointed to possible rewards if the country were to abandon its
enrichment programme. But the quid pro quo has evidently not been enough.
This does not mean that "diplomacy is exhausted". Further incentives could
be tried in the direct talks that are now on the agenda. Looking at the
negotiations on a nuclear-free North Korea we find two interesting offers that
appear not to have had parallels in the contacts with Iran. One is an
assurance against attack and subversion; the other is US and Japanese readiness
for diplomatic relations. After 30 years of no diplomatic relations with
the US and more recent recurrent reminders by the US government that all
military options are open to it to stop Iranian enrichment, perhaps offers of
this kind could carry some weight in the negotiations with Iran.
A broadening of the agenda for discussions with Iran has sometimes been
suggested as offering greater possibilities of balancing interests. It is
interesting to note that while Iran said it was unwilling to discuss its
enrichment programme in the recent direct Geneva talks, it was ready to take up
the broader subjects of non-proliferation and disarmament. Discussions of
these items could be used for delay, but they might also offer new openings.
It could perhaps be of interest even to broach the deep-frozen subject of a
Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and add to it the
idea of making the area free of enrichment of uranium and production of
plutonium.
Iran and Egypt were the first, many years ago, to take the initiative of a
nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. All countries in the region –
including Israel – have supported the concept, but for Israel, as the only
nuclear-weapon country in the region, it has always been a remote scheme.
Today, with Iran and perhaps other states in the Middle East moving into
more advanced nuclear activities, the idea might appear in a new light to all
concerned. For Iran, abandoning its enrichment programme within the
framework of a zone could be a contribution to a broader global and regional
disarmament and non-proliferation.
Israel may look at its nuclear weapons capability as a kind of life
insurance against a possible future existential threat. However, this perception
would change drastically if one or more states in the region were to develop
nuclear weapons or move close to weapons capability by programmes for the
production of enriched uranium or plutonium. To avoid having to face such a
situation perhaps Israel would contemplate a zonal agreement under which
all countries in the region – including Israel itself – renounced and
eliminated nuclear weapons as well as nuclear fuel cycle installations.
This Israeli government may be far from this wavelength, but would it
foresee continuing the line of action that began with the _bombing_
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/08/iran.usa) of Iraq's Osirak reactor in
1981, and continued with the 2007 attack on Syrian installations claimed to be
a North Korean designed research reactor, and the threatened bombing of
Iranian nuclear installations?
I do not underestimate the problems of a zonal agreement – for instance
those of verification, or outside assurances about security and the supply of
uranium fuel. Yet the Obama administration, with the support of many
governments, is seeking nuclear disarmament for all – including the original
sinners – and both non-proliferation and disarmament are now on the agenda of
the UN security council. The Middle East looks like a region in need of a
bold broad approach.
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