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Japan Times: Bush Arms Control "Mockery"
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Progressive Portal
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Jan 20, 2002 14:24 PST
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[EDITORIAL in the Japan Times, Jan. 17, 2002. Thanks to Lori C. for
forwarding it to us. The editorial may also be read on the Japan Times
Web site at:
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?ed20020117a1.htm ]
MR. BUSH'S NUCLEAR SLEIGHT OF HAND
Last year, U.S. President George W. Bush proposed deep cuts in the U.S.
nuclear weapons arsenal, a decision that was promptly echoed by Russian
President Vladimir Putin. While the move was roundly applauded, there
were concerns over the U.S. president's reluctance to codify the
decision in a treaty. It has become apparent why: Mr. Bush's "cuts" are
not real. He is not proposing to destroy excess warheads; he wants to
store them, so that they are available in an emergency. Worse, his
government wants to be ready to resume testing of those weapons.
Coming on the heels of the decision to withdraw from the Antiballistic
Missile Treaty, it appears as if the U.S. has decided to dispense with
arms control altogether. This move, coming as India and Pakistan stare
each other down over the Line of Control and as the U.S. warns other
governments of the danger of nuclear proliferation, makes no sense. It
makes a mockery of arms control and disarmament and buttresses charges
of U.S. unilateralism.
At their November summit, the two presidents agreed to deep cuts in
their nuclear arsenals. Mr. Bush pledged to trim his country's bloated
stockpile of warheads by nearly two-thirds, from 6,000 to between 1,700
and 2,200 over 10 years. Mr. Putin promised a reduction to similar
levels. It was assumed that neither man acted from the purest of
motives: Mr. Bush was acting to take the sting out of his forthcoming
decision to quit the ABM Treaty. Mr. Putin had little choice: His
country's arsenal was decaying and the Russian military could not
sustain the huge number of weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union.
There was a sense that something was amiss when Mr. Bush showed
reticence about codifying the reductions in an arms control treaty.
After all, American conservatives have made verification the foundation
of their arms control regimes.
Details of the cuts and the number of warheads will be worked out in
negotiations that began this week in Washington and are expected to
yield an agreement in time for a summer summit between the two
presidents. But those talks began under a shadow when details of the new
U.S. nuclear-force posture were revealed. They explained Mr. Bush's
wariness: Pentagon officials say the administration does not intend to
destroy excess weapons. Rather, it will keep a substantial number of
warheads as a "responsive capability" and hold them in reserve.
This news is the third blow to hopes for a nuclear-free world. The
initial blow was the historic decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty,
the first time any nation has withdrawn from an arms control agreement.
The second was the report that the U.S. wants to shorten the amount of
time it will take if it wants to resume testing of its weapons. While
the administration has said that it has no plan to conduct such tests,
it is hard to see the logic of such a move if testing is not anticipated
at some point in the future -- a blow to the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, which the U.S. never signed but said it would abide by.
Coming after a year of shrugging off virtually every multilateral
commitment that has been proposed, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the Bush administration has decided to free itself from
any restraint on its action. It is a singularly shortsighted policy.
First, it alienates allies and friends, such as Japan, who believe in
arms control and continue to work toward a nuclear-free world. It
undermines trust in the U.S. and raises doubts about its ability to lead
through example. Second, it undermines President Putin, who looks like
he has been played for a fool. Mr. Putin has made some bold choices in
recent months, and while his room for maneuver has been constricted, he
has not had to side with the U.S. as he has chosen to do. And yet,
rather than being rewarded, Mr. Bush has undercut his Russian
counterpart and damaged his credibility within Russia.
Third, and perhaps most critically, the policy undermines the logic of
arms control and international nonproliferation regimes. It is difficult
for any other government to accept the utility of arms control regimes
when the world's leading nuclear power withdraws from its own
commitments or when it refuses to put its weapons beyond use. That is
not the message to be sending India and Pakistan as they continue to
bristle at each other, and as the U.S. tries to dissuade countries like
North Korea of the utility of building their own bombs. It destroys the
bargain implicit in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (and the one
behind its renewal), by which nonnuclear powers give up their
nuclear-weapons aspirations in exchange for a commitment by nuclear
powers to move toward disarmament. Most important, it highlights the
utility of nuclear weapons -- a foolish and dangerous position when the
world should be working to rid itself of these abominations.
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