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To War or Not to War, That is the Question
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Alpha-Omega
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Jul 30, 2003 16:58 PDT
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To War or Not to War, That is the Question
Stratfor Intelligence Summary - 2-18-2003
Summary
Even as recent weekend demonstrations increased pressure for the United
States to avoid a war in Iraq, the pressure on Washington to go to war
is mounting. The United States has deployed the bulk of its military
strike force in the Persian Gulf region, but it cannot keep it there
indefinitely. Given weather conditions, the war must conclude in April.
The preference to begin the war under moonless skies means that an
attack is possible around March 1 or at the end of March -- which
wouldn't leave enough time for the operation. Since simply walking away
from Iraq is impossible for the United States and Saddam Hussein is not
likely to fall by himself, the pressure for war in the next two weeks is
heavier than the pressure against war.
Analysis
The United States has had a bad few days.
It had appeared that Franco-German insistence that weapons inspections
continue, despite reports of limited cooperation on Baghdad's part and
the presence of some weapons that clearly were proscribed, was on the
way to being managed. The behavior of French and German leaders (not to
mention Belgians) on beginning a NATO planning process on behalf of
Turkey had put the United
States in an excellent position. Their vetoes in the 16-3 vote on the
issue made those countries look totally rigid and unreasonable; more
important, it made them appear to be isolated and unilateral, while the
United States appeared to have broad support and to be acting
multilaterally. France's inflexibility within the U.N. Security Council
was being turned against it.
Then the United States ran into a set of public relations setbacks. The
American media in particular portrayed the outcome of the Feb. 14
Security Council meeting as a broad repudiation of the U.S. position.
While anti-French sentiment intensified in the United States and polls
showed growing support for going to war without a second U.N.
resolution, the weekend arrived with the
sense that, for better or worse, the United States was relatively
isolated. The problem hadn't been solved, but then it hadn't worsened
much either.
The weekend was another story. Reports of worldwide demonstrations
against a war dominated the global media. Though a total of 2.5 million
demonstrators -- the number that has been estimated globally --
represents an infinitesimal fraction of the world's population, it was
sufficient not only to energize the
media into an obsessive focus but to shake up policymakers and military
officials alike.
The nightmare for U.S. policymakers and military leaders is a repeat of
the Vietnam War. For the serving military in particular, which maintains
a group memory of that conflict, fighting a war without public support
remains the one thing that none of them wants to do. In a scene redolent
of Vietnam, where
Richard Nixon crushed the dovish George McGovern in an election that
hinged on the war -- but in which the persistence of public
demonstrations created the impression of overwhelming opposition to the
war -- policymakers and the military suddenly were hit by the specter of
a Vietnam that was unpopular even before it began. The situation was
even worse for Tony Blair in the United
Kingdom, where the demonstrations were massive and the polls held
little comfort.
The anti-war demonstrations were effective, but it is not clear that
they have redefined the situation. The problem that the United States
has now is, in the first instance, military: It has deployed the bulk of
its striking power to the Middle East; it cannot leave it there
indefinitely. A host of other problems,
apart from the fact that other potential trouble spots cannot be dealt
with effectively while this force is concentrated in the Persian Gulf,
also are rearing their heads. For example, the U.S. military depends on
reservists. It is one thing to mobilize reservists for war and quite
another to mobilize, deploy and then have them do nothing. It is
politically difficult. It is also
difficult to keep five carrier battle groups in position indefinitely --
they need maintenance and rotation.
The weather window also is closing in, and this is not a trivial
problem. By the end of April at the latest, the temperatures in Iraq
will be rising, particularly in the south, into the 90s daily. Apart
from chemical warfare suits -- which are unbearable in such weather and
merely wretched in other weather -- other systems degrade rapidly as
heat rises. The United States must
conclude this war by about April 15 or else postpone until the fall.
Some have argued that the United States can solve the problem by
fighting only at night. True, so long as Saddam Hussein cooperates and
doesn't attack during the day.
There is another constraint: the moon. During the opening days of
operations, U.S. aircraft will knock out Iraq's electronic air defense
system. They cannot knock out the optical system -- human eyes. On a
moonless night, it is hard to see, but with a full moon, it is quite
possible to see and to fire at aircraft. Even more important, the United
States will be carrying out extensive special operations on the nights
surrounding the start of war. One of the advantages of the U.S. military
is that it "owns" the night: Its equipment and training are optimized
for night fighting. But with moonlight, a great deal of the invisibility
upon which U.S. special ops depend disappears.
The next moonless night, or night when the moon rises after 4 a.m., will
be Feb. 27. The moon re-emerges on March 4. The United States does not
want to attack in mid-month, with the full moon. The next open window
will come at the end of March. If the weather sets a terminus date of
about April 15, that will allow for only a two-week operation before
problems might begin to arise from the weather.
The United States therefore appears to have these military choices.
First, launch the attack in the Feb. 26-March 4 period. Or launch the
attack in mid-March, under much less advantageous conditions. It could
launch the attack at the end of March, hoping that the operation ends
quickly and that summer heat
doesn't come early. Or it could postpone the invasion, bring the troops
home and redeploy in the fall -- or simply leave them in the region for
the summer.
Postponing the invasion is not a likely strategy:
1. This would make the United States appear weak and indecisive in the
view of the Islamic world. It would generate greater confidence in Osama
bin Laden's analysis of the weakness of U.S. forces, increase recruiting
for al Qaeda and undermine the entire psychological basis of the
American strategy.
2. It would not generate any increased support for the United States in
general. Those who demonstrated against the war are, in general, opposed
to the United States on a host of issues, of which Iraq is merely the
most salient. The idea that abandoning the war would generate
substantial support for the United States is dubious. Moreover, the
value of such support is unclear.
3. U.S. allies in the region -- such as Kuwait, Qatar and Oman, which
have risked a substantial amount by participating in the war buildup --
would be left in a highly exposed state, both from external threats and
internal instability. The United States would be regarded as a highly
unreliable ally.
4. Hussein, rather than being contained, would perceive that there was
no effective limit on his behavior and would begin to exploit his
opening.
Here, then, is the U.S. problem. Washington must have regime change in
Iraq. Regardless of whether the United States would like to build a
broad coalition, it is running out of time on the diplomatic process. If
the process continues much past March 1, the option of war will begin to
disappear and the pressure on Iraq will diffuse. The United States
either will spend the summer off-balance, with its forces concentrated
in the Persian Gulf and idle, or it will withdraw. It is unlikely that
it would be able to redeploy in six months, given the new political
configuration in the region.
It is no accident that a French proposal suggests another report from
chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix on March 14. The French, in this
apparently innocent proposal, know they are undermining the U.S.
military option. It is also no accident that the United States is
insisting that Feb. 28, when Blix is
scheduled to give his next report, is the date that Washington is
insisting on as the final decision point. If France wins, the United
States either has to fight the war under less-than-optimal conditions or
postpone the attack. President George W. Bush is not going to start a
war at a time when his commanders are saying that it might entail
additional risk. If anything went wrong, the president couldn't survive
that call.
So the situation is this. The United States no longer can avoid war,
even if it wanted to -- the situation has gone too far down the road.
Washington is running out of time to wage the war. The best time to go
will be the end of February and the beginning of March; later is
possible, but this option increases the risk of casualties and failure,
and the benefit of delay is primarily diplomatic. If France opposes on
March 1, it will oppose on March 15. At the same time, the situation in
Europe has improved over the past 24 hours. French President Jacques
Chirac's assault on Eastern European states for siding with Washington
undermined his standing as the voice of reason -- while the revelation
that the German government knew about Iraqi stockpiles of smallpox
months ago undermines Berlin's claim that it needs proof of a material
breach. To that extent, the public relations war is not entirely
hopeless for the United States.
In a sense, Washington already has delayed too long. The United States
has been talking about this war since last spring. It has allowed
opposition to the war to gel. Paradoxically, the very thing the
Europeans have accused the United States of -- haste and unilateralism
-- is about the only thing the United States isn't guilty of; the Bush
administration has taken nearly a year and endless diplomacy to come to
this point. In doing so, it has lost the diplomatic initiative that it
held after the Sept. 11 attacks. It also has lost any possibility of
strategic surprise.
The only other options? -- a coup in Baghdad or Hussein's resignation --
has been dramatically reduced as a possibility by the events of the last
few days. Hussein, who consistently appears to believe that Europe would
save him in the end, as well as believing that the United States really
is afraid of taking
casualties, now seems more convinced than ever that, if U.S. forces take
casualties, the Europeans will rush in with a cease-fire proposal and
Washington -- under pressure from a public unwilling to bear the burden
of war and of an anti-U.S. alliance rising up -- will accept it.
Meanwhile, the possibilities for a negotiated settlement have declined
dramatically. Indeed, if the diplomatic struggle continues, another
window of opportunity will not open. It is doubtful that the global
anti-war demonstrations encouraged potential coupsters in Baghdad to
take risks. Moreover, the arrest of the commander of the Iraqi military
(who is Qusai Hussein's father-in-law) signals that Hussein is beginning
the traditional process of shuffling his staff -- arresting some of them
and shooting others prior to a crisis, in order to disrupt any covert
plans that Washington may think it has in place.
The United States therefore is in a situation in which it cannot avoid
war, in which diplomatic complexity remains substantial, and in which
the enemy, Iraq, is fully alerted and prepared. Unless Washington's core
assumption is true -- that the Iraqi army will collapse under first
assault -- the circumstances for
this war are not particularly auspicious.
On the other hand, if the United States wins a quick and relatively easy
victory, the events leading up to this conflict will not be long
remembered. Few will recall, for example, the acrimony -- domestic and
international -- that ripped the United States prior to the 1991 war.
Success solves many problems. Given that the United States is now in a
position from which it cannot easily retreat -- indeed, from which it
does not want to retreat -- a complete and rapid military victory is the
only solution to its problems. Or so the reasoning in Washington goes.
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