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Re: Politics I 2 1253a7-18
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Paul Bullen
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Nov 01, 2006 02:30 PST
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| | "Man is more of a political animal than any bee or other social
animal; for nature does nothing in vain, and man alone among
animals has speech. Voice can indicate what is painful or pleasant,
and so it is present in other animals as well; for their nature
goes as far as to perceive what is painful and pleasant and to be
able to indicate these things to each other. But speech serves to
reveal what is beneficial and harmful and hence also what is just
and unjust; for it is peculiar to the human animal to be able to
perceive what is good and bad, what is just and unjust, and the
like. Sharing in these things is what makes a household and a
polis." (Aristotle, Politics I 2 1253a7-18)
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Here is a further revision, without looking at the Greek:
"Man is more political than any bee or other social animal; for
nature does nothing needlessly and man alone among animals has
speech. Mere voice can indicate what is painful or pleasant and so is
present in other animals too; for their nature extends to the
perception of pleasure and pain and the ability to indicate these
things to each other. But speech serves to reveal what is beneficial
and harmful and hence what is just and unjust; for it is peculiar to
the human animal to perceive what is good and what is bad, what is
just and what is unjust--and so on. Sharing in these makes a
household and a polis." (Aristotle, Politics I 2 1253a7-18)
Assuming Aristotle is being clear and understandable in this passage,
my "translation" still falls short since it is not clear what
Aristotle's argument is beyond a certain point. Going further may
require looking at the Greek. And it may require the resolution of
ambiguity on the basis or reasoned analysis of what Aristotle could
reasonably be taken to be saying on the basis of what he says
elsewhere. For example, why do being able to perceive what is
beneficial and what is harmful--as opposed to what is painful and
what is pleasurable--entail the ability to distinguish what is just
from what is unjust? In fact, how is pain and pleasure opposed to
benefit and harm? These are probably answerable, but not just on the
basis of staring at the Greek within the four corners of one passage.
--Paul
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