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NE 7.11: 3 opinions on pleasure
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Thomas
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Feb 04, 2007 10:07 PST
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1)anti-hedonism: pleasure cannot be Good
2)some pleasures are good (essentially intellectual ones, philosophy!)
3)pleasure is good, but not the supreme good
1152b1-24:
XI. It is also the business of the political philosopher to examine the
nature of Pleasure and Pain; for he is the master-craftsman, and lays
down the end which is the standard whereby we pronounce things good or
bad in the absolute sense.
[2] Moreover this investigation is fundamental for our study, because we
have established that Moral Virtue and Vice are concerned with pleasures
and pains, and most people hold that pleasure is a necessary adjunct of
Happiness, which is why the word denoting 'supreme bliss' is derived
from the verb meaning 'to enjoy.'
[3] Now (1) some people think that no pleasure is a good thing, whether
essentially or accidentally. They argue that Good and Pleasure are two
distinct things.
[Philebus 53c: "Socrates: Here is another point. Have we not often heard
it said of pleasure that it is always a process or generation and that
there is no state or existence of pleasure? There are some clever people
who try to prove this theory to us, and we ought to be grateful to them."]
(2) Others hold that though some pleasures are good, most are bad.
[cf Philebus: 13b: Socrates: "For you say that all pleasant things are
good. Now no argument contends that pleasant things are not pleasant;
but whereas most of them are bad and only some are good, as we assert,
nevertheless you call them all good, though you confess, if forced to it
by argument, that they are unlike."]
(3) There is also a third view, that even if all pleasures are good,
nevertheless pleasure cannot be the Supreme Good.
[Rackham notes: "Of these three views, the first is that of Speusippus,
Plato's successor as head of the Academy; the second is that of Plato's
Philebus; the third, which appears at the end of the Philebus, is that
of Aristotle in Book 10 below."]
[4] (1) To prove that pleasure is not a good at all, it is argued that
(a) Every pleasure is a conscious process towards a natural state; but a
process can in no case belong to the same order of things as its end;
for example, the process of building cannot be a thing of the same sort
as the house built.
(b) The temperate man avoids pleasures.
(c) The prudent man pursues freedom from pain, not pleasure.
(d) Pleasures are a hindrance to prudent deliberation, and the more so
the more enjoyable they are; for instance, sexual pleasure: no one could
think of anything while indulging in it.
(e) There is no art of pleasure; yet with every good thing there is an art
which produces it.
(f) Children and animals pursue pleasures.
[5] (2) To prove that not all pleasures are good, it is argued that
(a) Some pleasures are disgraceful, and discredit the man who indulges
in them.
(b) Some pleasures are harmful, for certain pleasant things cause disease.
(3) To prove that pleasure is not the Supreme Good, it is argued that it
is not an end but a process.
These then, more or less, are the current views.
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