|
NE 7.12: accidental and absolute pleasures
|
Thomas
|
Feb 06, 2007 06:27 PST
|
1152b25-1153a35:
XII. But the following considerations will show that these arguments are
not conclusive to prove (1) that pleasure is not a good at all, nor (3)
that it is not the Supreme Good.
(1) (a) In the first place (i.) ‘the good’ has two meanings: it means
both that which is good absolutely, and that which is good for somebody,
or relatively. Consequently the term ‘good’ has the same double meaning
when applied to men's natures and dispositions; and therefore also when
applied to movements and to processes. Also those processes which are
thought to be bad will in some cases, though bad absolutely, be not bad
relatively, but in fact desirable for a particular person, or in other
cases, though not even desirable generally for the particular person,
nevertheless desirable for him in particular circumstances and for a
short time, although not really desirable. And some such processes are
not really pleasures at all, but only seem to be so: I mean the painful
processes that are undergone for their curative effects, for instance,
treatment applied to the sick.
[It seems that Aristotle is showing the arguments of the anti-hedonists
here, who argue from cases of vice that all pleasures are bad, but he
points out that bad pleasure concerns only particular (unhealthy)
persons, etc... such pleasures can hardly even be called pleasures (they
only appear so the distorted view of a distorted person), because even
"accidental pleasure" restores us to a healthy state, whereas the
vicious person has lost his health completely. So the anti-hedonists do
not start from the case of the normal state of a person, so their
argument is distorted. /Thomas]
[2] Again (ii.) , the good is either an /activity/ /[energeia]/ or a
/state [hexis]/. Now the pleasures that restore us to our natural
/state/ are only accidentally pleasant; while the /activity/ of desire
is the activity of that part of us which has remained in the natural
state : for that matter, there are some pleasures which do not involve
pain or desire at all (for instance, the pleasure of contemplation),
being experienced without any deficiency from the normal having
occurred. That restorative pleasures are only accidentally pleasant is
indicated by the fact that we do not enjoy the same things while the
natural state is being replenished as we do after it has been restored
to the normal; in the normal state we enjoy things that are absolutely
pleasant, but during the process of replenishment we enjoy even their
opposites; for instance, sour and bitter things, none of which are
naturally or absolutely pleasant, so that the pleasures we get from them
are not naturally or absolutely pleasant either, since there is the same
distinction between various pleasures as there is between the pleasant
things from which they arise.
[3] Again (iii.) , it does not follow, as some argue, that as the end is
better than the process towards it, so there must be something better
than pleasure. For pleasures are not really processes, nor are they all
incidental to a process: they are activities, and therefore an end; nor
do they result from the process of acquiring our faculties, but from
their exercise; nor have they all of them some end other than
themselves: this is only true of the pleasures of progress towards the
perfection of our nature. Hence it is not correct to define pleasure as
a ‘conscious process’ ; the term should rather be ‘activity of our
natural state,’ and for ‘conscious’ we must substitute ‘unimpeded.’ Some
thinkers hold that pleasure is a process on the ground that it is good
in the fullest sense, because in their view an activity is a process;
but really an activity is different from a process.
[4] To argue (2) (b) that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things
are detrimental to health is the same as to argue that health is bad
because some healthy things are bad for the pocket. Both pleasant things
and healthy things can be bad in a relative sense, but that does not
make them really bad;even contemplation may on occasion be injurious to
health.
[5] (1) (d) Neither prudence nor any other quality is hampered by its
own pleasure, but only by alien pleasure; the pleasures of contemplation
and study will enable us to contemplate and study better.
[6] (1) (e) That there should be no art devoted to the production of any
form of pleasure is only natural; an art never produces an activity, but
the capacity for an activity. Though in point of fact the arts of
perfumery and cookery are generally considered to be arts of pleasure.
[7] The arguments (1) (b) that the temperate man avoids pleasure, and
(1) (c) that the prudent man pursues freedom from pain, and (1) (f) that
animals and children pursue pleasure, are all met by the same reply. It
has been explained how some pleasures are absolutely good, and how not
all pleasures are good. Now it is those pleasures which are not
absolutely good that both animals and children pursue, and it is freedom
from pain arising from the want of those pleasures that the prudent man
pursue: that is, the pleasures that involve desire and pain, namely the
bodily pleasures (for these are of that nature) , or their excessive
forms, in regard to which Profligacy is displayed. That is why the
temperate man avoids excessive bodily pleasures: for even the temperate
man has pleasures.
|
|
 |
|
