|
NE 7.14: "change in all things is sweet"
|
Thomas
|
Feb 08, 2007 00:05 PST
|
1154a8-1154b34:
[After having dealt with the anti-hedonist views of some in the Academy
(Speusippus), Aristotle turns to the view defended by Socrates in the
Philebus. Finally Aristotle's own view is that moderate physical
pleasures are good (whereas in the Philebus they are not), and
intellectual ones are superior, although even the philosopher cannot
lead a totally contemplative life because "change in all things is
sweet". Th.omas]
XIV. On the subject of the bodily pleasures, we must examine the view of
those who say that though it is true that some pleasures, which they
call the noble pleasures, are highly desirable, yet bodily pleasures and
those which are the objects of the profligate are not desirable.
[2] If so, why are the pains opposed to them evil? since the opposite of
evil is good. Perhaps the true view is, that the necessary pleasures are
good in the sense that what is not evil is good; or that they are good
up to a point: for though you cannot have excessive pleasure from states
and movements which cannot themselves be in excess of what is good, you
can have excessive pleasure from those which themselves admit of excess.
Now you can have an excess of the bodily goods; and it is pursuing this
excess that makes a bad man, not pursuing the necessary pleasures, for
everybody enjoys savory food, wine, and sexual pleasure in some degree,
though not everybody to the right degree. With pain it is the other way
about: one avoids not merely excessive pain, but all pain; for the
opposite of excessive pleasure is not pain at all, except to the man who
pursues excessive pleasure.
[3] We ought however not only to state the true view, but also to
account for the false one, since to do so helps to confirm the true; for
when we have found a probable explanation why something appears to be
true though it is not true, this increases our belief in the truth.
[Next, common hedonism is discussed, and also anti-hedonism again in
parentheses:]
We have then to explain why it is that bodily pleasures appear to be
more desirable than others.
[4] (1) Now the first reason is that pleasure drives out pain; and
excessive pain leads men to seek excessive pleasure, and bodily pleasure
generally, as a restorative. And these restorative pleasures are
intense, and therefore sought for, because they are seen in contrast
with their opposite. (The view that pleasure is not a good at all is
also due to these two facts, as has been said (a) that some pleasures
are actions indicative of an evil nature, whether it be depraved from
birth, like the nature of an animal or corrupted by habit, as is the
case with evil men, and (b) that others are restoratives of a defective
state and to be in the natural state is better than to be in process of
returning to it. But as a matter of fact the latter sort of pleasures
accompany a process towards perfection, so that accidentally they are good.)
[5] (2) Another reason is that bodily pleasures are sought for, just
because of their intensity, by people who are incapable of enjoying
others (for instance, some deliberately take steps to make themselves
thirsty) : not that there is any objection to this if the pleasures are
innocuous, but it is bad if they are productive of harmful results. The
fact is that some men have no other sources of enjoyment; and also many
are so constituted that a neutral state of feeling is to them positively
painful. (This is because a state of strain is the normal condition of
an animal organism, as physiology testifies; it tells us that sight and
hearing are in fact painful, but we have got used to them in course of
time--such is the theory.)
[6] Similarly the young are in a condition resembling intoxication,
because they are growing, and youth is pleasant in itself; but persons
of an excitable nature need a restorative perpetually, because their
temperament keeps their bodies in a constant state of irritation, and
their appetites are continually active; and any pleasure, if strong,
drives out pain, not only the opposite pleasure. This is why excitable
men become profligate and vicious.
[Once again the distinction between natural (in accord with our true
nature: intellectual contemplation) and accidental (physical) pleasure:]
[7] Pleasures unaccompanied by pain, on the other hand--and these are
those derived from things naturally and not accidentally pleasant--do
not admit of excess. By things accidentally pleasant I mean things taken
as restoratives; really their restorative effect is produced by the
operation of that part of the system which has remained sound, and hence
the remedy itself is thought to be pleasant.Those things on the contrary
are naturally pleasant which stimulate the activity of a given nature.
[Finally, even the prudent person who has reached the level of
contemplation, must not reach a point of asceticism for a balance
between intellectual and physical pleasures is necessary. Th.]
[8] Nothing however can continue to give us pleasure always, because our
nature is not simple, but contains a second element (which is what makes
us perishable beings), and consequently, whenever one of these two
elements is active, its activity runs counter to the nature of the
other, while when the two are balanced, their action feels neither
painful nor pleasant. Since if any man had a simple nature, the same
activity would afford him the greatest pleasure always. Hence God enjoys
a single simple pleasure perpetually. For there is not only an activity
of motion: but also an activity of immobility, and there is essentially
a truer pleasure in rest than in motion. But change in all things is
sweet, as the poet says owing to some badness in us; since just as a
changeable man is bad, so also is a nature that needs change; for it is
not simple nor good [=epieikęs: unflawed (Rowe), decent (Irwin).]
[9] We have now discussed the nature of Self-restraint and Unrestraint,
and of Pleasure and Pain, and have shown in either case in what sense
one of the two is good and the other evil. It remains for us to speak of
Friendship.
|
|
 |
|
