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NE 8.1: is all friendship of the same kind?
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Thomas
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Feb 09, 2007 00:48 PST
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I. Our next business after this will be to discuss Friendship. For
friendship is a virtue, or involves virtue; and also it is one of the
most indispensable requirements of life. For no one would choose to live
without friends, but possessing all other good things. In fact rich men,
rulers and potentates are thought especially to require friends, since
what would be the good of their prosperity without an outlet for
beneficence, which is displayed in its fullest and most praiseworthy
form towards friends? and how could such prosperity be safeguarded and
preserved without friends? for the greater it is, the greater is its
insecurity.
I.[2] And in poverty or any other misfortune men think friends are their
only resource. Friends are an aid to the young, to guard them from
error; to the elderly, to tend them, and to supplement their failing
powers of action; to those in the prime of life, to assist them in noble
deeds
--When twain together go --
for two are better able both to plan and to execute.
I.[3] And the affection of parent for offspring and of offspring for
parent seems to be a natural instinct, not only in man but also in birds
and in most animals; as also is friendship between members of the same
species;and this is especially strong in the human race; for which
reason we praise those who love their fellow men.4 Even when traveling
abroad one can observe that a natural affinity and friendship exist
between man and man universally.
I.[4] Moreover, as friendship appears to be the bond of the state; and
lawgivers
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seem to set more store by it than they do by justice, for to promote
concord, which seems akin to friendship, is their chief aim, while
faction, which is enmity, is what they are most anxious to banish. And
if men are friends, there is no need of justice between them; whereas
merely to be just is not enough--a feeling of friendship also is
necessary. Indeed the highest form of justice seems to have an element
of friendly feeling in it.
I.[5] And friendship is not only indispensable as a means, it is also
noble in itself. We praise those who love their friends, and it is
counted a noble thing to have many friends; and some people think that a
true friend must be a good man.
I.[6] But there is much difference of opinion as to the nature of
friendship. Some define it as a matter of similarity; they say that we
love those who are like ourselves: whence the proverbs ‘Like finds his
like,’ ‘Birds of a feather flock together,’ and so on. Others on the
contrary say that with men who are alike it is always a case of ‘two of
a trade.’ Some try to find a more profound and scientific explanation of
the nature of affection. Euripides
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writes that ‘Earth yearneth for the rain’ when dried up, ‘And the
majestic Heaven when filled with rain Yearneth to fall to Earth.’
Heracleitus
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says, ‘Opposition unites,’ and ‘The fairest harmony springs from
difference,’ and ‘'Tis strife that makes the world go on.’ Others
maintain the opposite view, notably Empedocles
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who declares that ‘Like seeks after like.’
I.[7] Dismissing then these scientific speculations as not germane to
our present enquiry, let us investigate the human aspect of the matter,
and examine the questions that relate to man's character and emotions:
for instance, whether all men are capable of friendship, or bad men
cannot be friends; and whether there is only one sort of friendship or
several. Those who hold that all friendship is of the same kind because
friendship admits of degree, are relying on an insufficient proof, for
things of different kinds also can differ in degree. But this has been
discussed before.
[Aquinas explained the last phras: "he rejects an error of some
philosophers who thought there was only one kind of friendship because
all species of friendship are to be compared according to more and less.
Thus we say that honorable friendship is greater than useful friendship.
But Aristotle says that they have not accepted the adequate explanation
that even those things that differ specifically receive more and less
inasmuch as they agree generically. For example, we may say that white
has more color than black, or by analogy that act is more excellent than
potency, and substance than accident."
Bodéüs notes that "same kind" could refer to Lysis 220a, that is not
unlike the ascension of the Symposium towards the love of the Good:
"And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to
us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but the
truly dear is that in which all these so called dear friendships terminate.
That, he said, appears to be true.
And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the
sake of any other or further dear.
True.
Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further
object. May we then infer that the good is the friend?"
Th.]
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