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Fw: pattern of causes of ebusiness failure
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Chris Macrae
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Jan 06, 2002 01:52 PST
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Angela - love your insight. Sets a gold standard for other efailurists to
emulate.
It also links into the dynamics of a model for intangibles & network
valuation
we're working on. Is there an ethics egroup I can join to tap into a rich
stream
of human values sense?
Thanks. Chris Macrae
----- Original Message -----
From: "Angela Gunn" <hers-@agunn.com>
To: <wcbn-@easynet.co.uk>
Sent: 06 January 2002 1:46 AM
Subject: Re: pattern of causes of ebusiness failure
| | <sent privately, as Topica and my dorsai.org address are not getting along
today>
One letter a week like that? That ought to teach you to open your mail
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<g>.
| | Okay, I'll take a shot on an obvious aspect:
The Greeks ascribed failures to hubris, and many commentators chalk up the
Net bust to impaired fiscal vision. I'd suggest that one of the answers to
"what happened" -- there are *so* many answers -- lies exactly between. A
lot of consumer-oriented Web sites died when they were unable to
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articulate
| | *why* potential consumers ought to incorporate the Net into lives that
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were
| | already operating fairly smoothly. For instance, it's not enough to say
that you're going to deliver groceries, however cheaply and with however
many free incentives thrown in; these companies counted on online grocery
purchasing being so obviously attractive that customers would
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substantially
| | change their buying habits, many of which involve running down the
supermarket aisles in slippers five minutes before the store closes.
(Speaking from experience unfortunately.) Stupid behavior? Yes. Did
homegrocer.com compel me to visit their site, create an account, remember
my password, trust the warehouse produce-choosers' judgment, and most
importantly plan ahead? Did they offer more value that did
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brick-and-mortar
| | options to procrastinate *and* scrutinize the produce section hoping for
culinary inspiration *and* maybe pick up a candy bar on my way through the
checkout line? Nope. My supermarket continued to be my most compelling
shopping venue; it didn't require passwords, planning, or even -- contrary
to hoary Net myth -- that I not shop in my pajamas. (Ironically, this too
was predicted in one aspect of the Net boom -- on the B-to-B side I
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believe
| | we called it 'just-in-time' purchasing.) Expecting people to change their
behavior was serious hubris (in this case perhaps a failure of youth,
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since
| | the dot-boom's fabled cadre of 22-year-olds were rather more likely to
adapt basic buying behaviors than the Net population, destined to grow
ever-older and ever-poorer as the technology spread). The investors who
tulip-traded stocks based on that expectation suffered from impaired
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fiscal
| | vision. The collision between the two was a killer.
Hope this helps, or at least amuses --
Angela (Gunn)
ethics columnist, Yahoo! Internet Life
www.agunn.com
At 08:38 AM 1/5/2002 +0000, you wrote:
| | To efailures egroup cc friends
Over the nearly 2 years we've been together sharing observations of
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failed
unique
| | | | resource, with a tone far more mature than some of the sensationalist
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dotcom
| | | | postmortem webs .
I would like to ask you for a favour. Over the next fortnight , could
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you
| | | | file a one para listing on what you feel we have learnt were the causes
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of
| | | | efailures. My reason for asking is that almost every week someone
corresponds with me saying that the only lesson anyone needs to remeber
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is
| | | | to have a revenue model that's profitable from day 1 or within a
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measurable
| | | | deadline. I accept that's a moral goal of any sincere business plan. But
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I
| | | | think there were many other root causes of dotbombing. To say the only
lesson is to have a revenue model would be a betrayal of many of the new
economy productivity possibilities that true fans of the internet feel
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and
| | | | around which many people worked very long hours. So if you believe there
were any other lessons than having a revenue model please help me
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compile
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