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[jft-@mailaka.net] McDonald's Subcontrary Blunder
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Errancy Archive
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Nov 30, 2006 06:04 PST
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-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [errancy] McDonald's Subcontrary Blunder
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2006 13:30:33 -0600
From: Farrell Till <jft-@mailaka.net>
Reply-To: erra-@iierrancy.com
TILL
I remember once reading a political column in which the writer said in
reference to the mess into which George Bush had gotten our country in Iraq
that the first rule of hole-digging is that when one finds himself in a
hole over his head, he should stop digging. Bush, of course, has refused
to do this, and so the hole that he is in keeps getting deeper and deeper
because of a mindset that just won't let him admit that he is wrong. This
gives him a mind that is fertile for religious fundamentalism that makes
him no different from the likes of Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, James
Dobson, D. James Kennedy, and their Muslim counterparts Osama bin
Laden, Ayman al-Zwarihiri, and other Islamic extremists. When one's mind
is wired to prevent him from thinking that he could possibly be wrong, he
often finds an outlet for his personality in some kind of religious
fundamentalism.
McDonald, who has said that he would vote for Bush if he could run again
has shown that he just can't let himself observe the first rule of
hole-digging, because he keeps digging away even though he has been shown
overwhelming evidence that he is wrong in thinking of himself as a skilled
logician. When I saw the post quoted below, I immediately stopped working
on PART FIVE of my replies to his third smoke screen in order to show just
how uninformed McDonald is in the theories of Aristotelian logic, which he
entered the Mary-Magdalene debate obviously thinking that he could use to
score a quick victory. He only thing he accomplished, however, is to
remove all doubt that he is a logical buffoon.
This was especially shown in his reply to my post quoted immediately below.
| | Till
| | Why don't you...
1. Post on the Errancy list which of the two disputed narratives is I
|
and
| | which is O?
2. Post the contraries from which I and O were derived?
3. Explain how complex narratives that were not written in universal,
categorical sentences could be subcontraries?
4. Explain how both of your alleged subcontraries could be true when it
isn't possible for you to prove that resurrection from the dead is real
(existential)?
|
|
Let's look now at McDonald's attempt to answer some of these questions,
with the emphasis on "some," because he didn't answer them all. He didn't,
for example, answer #3, which asked him to explain how complex narratives,
consisting of several sentences not written in categorical language, could
be subcontraries or #4, which asked him to explain how his alleged
subcontraries could be shown to be true when the subject of both would have
to be resurrection from the dead, which cannot be existentially proven true.
| | McDonald:
I have already done that much. The only thing I didn't do was to copy the
diagram of the Square of Opposition out of Copi's book in the post and I didn't
do that because I wasn't able to. However, if you will read my fourth
rebuttal part 3 you will see that I had already done what you asked, long
before you
asked it. However, I will copy it for you. Here it is:
Copy of what I said about the square of opposition and which position goes
where.
After showing the traditional square of opposition Copi states:
“Here are some examples. If an A proposition is taken as premiss, then
according to the Square of Opposition, then one can validly infer that the
corresponding O proposition (i.e., the O proposition having the same
subject and predicate terms as that of A) is false. And from the same
premiss one can immediately infer that the corresponding I proposition is
true. Of course from the truth of an I proposition, the truth of its
corresponding A proposition does not follow, but the falsehood of its
corresponding E proposition does.
|
TILL
As I will show and Andre Artus and Doug Krueger have already shown, to have
A and E contraries and I and O subcontraries, they must be stated in
universal, categorical sentences, such as "all S are P," "no S are P,"
"some S are P," and "some S are not P." The resurrection narratives of
Matthew and John both consistent of several sentences, none of which is
written categorically; therefore, these narratives cannot be forced into
the Aristotelian square of opposition.
McDONALD
| | The traditional Square of Opposition provides the basis for a considerable
number of such immediate references. Given the truth or falsehood of any
one of the four standard form-categorical propositions, the truth or
falsehood of some or all of the others can be inferred immediately.
|
TILL
As I have pointed out several times now, the "traditional square of
opposition" as Copi apparently applied it is flawed in that it fails to
recognize the existential element. I pointed out in a post last night that
Stephen Barker's *Elements of Logic" recognized this flaw by saying, "'I'
says that there is at least one S that is P, while 'O' says that there is
at least one S that is not P; both these sentences will be false if there
are no S's at all." Since McDonald is trying to apply the traditional
square of opposition to narratives that claim a resurrection from the dead,
he must, in addition to showing how these narratives can be forced into
categorically written I and O sentences, prove that resurrection from the
dead is real (existential).
He can't escape this obligation by quibbling that he isn't obligated to
prove anything since he is not the affirmant in the debate, because the
moment that he makes an assertion--as he has done in the subcontrary
matter--he is obligated to defend that assertion.
McDONALD
| | The immediate inferences based on the tradition Square of Opposition may
be listed as follows:
A being given as true: E is false, I is true, O is false.
E being given as true: A is false, I is false, O is true.
I being given as true: E is false, while A and O are undetermined.
O being given as true: A is false, while E and I are undetermined.
A being given as false: O is true, while E and I are undetermined.
E being given as false: I is true, while A and O are undetermined.
I being given as false: A is false, E is true and O is true.
O being given as false: A is true, E is false and I is true” (Introduction
to Logic, p. 192).
|
TILL
These statements are applying the Aristotelian square of opposition to
categorically written statements in which A would be "all S are P" or "all
X are Y," etc. and E would be "no S are P" or "no X are Y," etc. The I
subcontrary would be "some S are P" or "some X are Y," etc., and O would be
"some S are not P" or "some X are not Y," etc. Since the gospel narratives
in question are not categorically written, they cannot be A or E or I or O
premises.
Surely McDonald isn't so mentally handicapped that he can't see that.
McDONALD
| | Now what I want to do is to put Matthew’s and John’s accounts on the
Square of Opposition and look at them logically and see what the outcome is.
Let’s say Matthew’s account is A and John’s account is E, thus A is true
while E is false. But that would mean that Matthew’s account is true and
we couldn’t have that, could we. [sic] While I is true and O is false.
|
TILL
Andre Artus showed the absurdity of this in a post sent yesterday, so I
will just quote him.
| | Jerry, Jerry, Jerry. Before you can "put Matthew's and John's accounts on
the Square of Opposition" you need to make sure that you are dealing with
CATEGORICAL statements with the SAME subject and predicate terms.
Then you have to analyse the first statement to determine where it should be
placed on the square. That is, you look at the statement to see whether it
is A, E, O, or I form. You cannot just go "Let's say Matthew's account is
A".
|
One would think by now that McDonald has seen that many of the members of
this forum--unlike McDonald's usual Church-of-Christ audience--are familiar
with Aristotelian logic, and so he would stop making a fool of himself by
trying to apply it as he did above. His mindset, however, just won't let
him observe the first rule of hole-digging, so he just keeps digging away
long after he has found himself in over his head.
The A form in the traditional square of opposition (which I will from now
on refer to as SoO) is always categorically stated as "all S are P" or "all
X areY" or some other categorically stated parallel. For the sake of
showing the absurdity of McDonald's use of the SoO, I will use "all S are
P" to compare the A contrary to Matthew's resurrection narrative. In that
comparison we would have the following.
A contrary in the SoO = all S are P.
Matthew 28:1-10 as an A contrary = "After the Sabbath, at dawn on the first
day of the week, Mary Magdalene and the other Mary went to look at the
tomb. There was a violent earthquake, for an angel of the Lord came down
from heaven and, going to the tomb, rolled back the stone and sat on it....
They [the women] came to him, clasped his feet and worshiped him. Then
Jesus said to them, "Do not be afraid. Go and tell my brothers to go to
Galilee; there they will see me."
For the sake of brevity, I left out seven verses of Matthew's narrative
where the ellipsis [...] appears. As anyone can see from what I did quote
from the narrative, it was not in any sense categorically stated. In fact,
there is not a categorically written sentence anywhere in this narrative.
How, then, could it be the A contrary in McDonald's "argument"?
McDonald has boasted over and over that he always replies "thoroughly" to
everything I say, so let's hope that in his "thoroughness," he will explain
to us how Matthew's narrative could be made into an A contrary as
categorically stated as "all S are P."
After arbitrarily saying that Matthew's account is A without even trying to
show how it could be, McDonald went on to say that "John's account is E."
In the SoO, however, the E contrary is "no S are P," so let's compare this
categorically stated E contrary to "John's account."
E contrary in the SoO = no S are P
John 20:1-20 as an E contrary = Early on the first day of the week, while
it was still dark, Mary Magdalene went to the tomb and saw that the stone
had been removed from the entrance. So she came running to Simon Peter and
the other disciple, the one Jesus loved, and said, "They have taken the
Lord out of the tomb, and we don't know where they have put him!" So
Peter and the other disciple started for the tomb.... Mary Magdalene went
to the disciples with the news: "I have seen the Lord!" And she told them
that he had said these things to her.
The same problem is obvious here. "No S are P" is a categorical statement;
John's narrative, which I quoted above only in part, is not categorically
stated. How, then, could it be the E contrary in McDonald's "argument"?
McDonald has boasted over and over that he always replies "thoroughly" to
everything I say, so let's hope that in his "thoroughness," he will explain
to us how John's narrative could be made into an E contrary as
categorically stated as "no S are P."
McDONALD
| | Let’s say that Matthews account is E and John’s account is A, but you have
the same problem only this time Matthews account is false while John’s
account is true and we can’t have that either. While I is false and O is true.
|
TILL
McDonald has the same problem here. Just as my rebuttal above showed (in
"charted" form) that Matthew's account can't be an A contrary and John's
account can't be an E contrary, because they are not categorically stated,
the reverse would be true. Neither account is categorically stated, so
they could not be either A or E contraries.
McDonald has boasted over and over that he always replies "thoroughly" to
everything I say, so let's hope that in his "thoroughness," he will explain
to us how Matthew's and John's narratives, which are not categorically
stated, could be made into either A or E contraries.
McDONALD
| | Matthew’s account is I and it is true and John’s account is E which is false.
|
TILL
McDonald has the same problem here. In the traditional SoO, "some S are P"
is the I subcontrary, but Matthew's account is not categorically stated, so
how could it be an I contrary? I have shown above that John's account
cannot be an E contrary, because it too is not categorically stated.
Am I dreaming, or is McDonald really ignorant enough to pursue this kind of
argumentation?
There, of course, is another problem, which I have previously stated. This
is the existential aspect of Aristotelian logic. Even if McDonald could
somehow--and I can't see how he could possibly do so--show by undeniable
logic that Matthew's account qualifies to be an I subcontrary, he could not
declare it "true," as he did above, until he proves that its subject,
resurrection from the dead, is existential. To do that, he would have to
show that resurrection from the dead actually happens.
McDonald has boasted over and over that he always replies "thoroughly" to
everything I say, so let's hope that in his "thoroughness," he will explain
to us how Matthew's narrative, which was not categorically stated, could be
made into an I subcontrary like "some S are P" and then show us how, even
if it could be construed as a subcontrary, it could be "true" when its
subject, i.e., resurrection from the dead, can't be proven to be existential.
McDONALD
| | While A and O are undetermined.
|
TILL
Say what? How can A and O be undetermined? If there is an I subcontrary,
like "some S are P," the A contrary can be easily determined. It would be
"all S are P." Likewise, if there is an E contrary, like "no S are P," O
can also be easily determined. It would be "some S are not P."
Since McDonald has arbitrarily declared that Matthew's account is an I
subcontrary, he should be able to tell us what A contrary he derived it
from. Let's hope that in his "thoroughness," he will not forget to do
this. In the same way, if he is going to arbitrarily declare that John's
account is an E contrary, he should be able to tell us what its subcontrary
is. Let's hope that in his "thoroughness," he will not forget to do this.
McDONALD
| | Matthew account is O which is true and John’s account is A which is false
|
TILL
The same problem is present here. How could Matthew's account, which was
not categorically written, be an O subcontrary like "some S are no P? How
could the uncategorically written account in John be an A contrary?
Even if McDonald could perform some kind of verbal legerdemain that would
logically show that the ten verses in Matthew's narrative were
categorically written and therefore qualify as an O subcontrary, he could
not declare that it is "true" until he solved the existential problem and
proved that the subject of this imaginary O subcontrary is existentially real.
Let's hope that in the "thoroughness" of his replies to this post, he will
"thoroughly" show us how all of these problems can be made to disappear.
McDONALD
| | while E and I are undetermined.
|
TILL
As I showed above, in a properly stated SoO, if the E contrary is known (no
S are P), then the I subcontrary can be easily determined (some S are not
P), and if the A contrary (all S are P) is known, the I subcontrary (some S
are P) can be easily determined. In his "thoroughness," then, McDonald
should tell us what the E contrary and the I subcontraries are, because if
Matthew is a real A contrary, its I subcontrary would be as easy to
determine as deriving the "some S are P" subcontrary from the "all S are P"
contrary. Likewise, if John's account is an O subcontrary, determining its
E contrary would be as easy as determining that "no S are P" is the
contrary of the subcontrary "some S are not P."
McDonald may be able to step behind a pulpit and fool an audience
of Church-of-Christ yokels who wouldn't know an A contrary from a hole in
the ground, but I think he has seen by now that it won't work on people who
have studied logic.
I wonder if he really believes this nonsense himself?
McDONALD
| | Matthew’s account is A which is false and John’s account is O is true,
while E and I are undetermined.
|
TILL
What I have said several times above applies here. Matthew's account
cannot be an A contrary, because it was not categorically written, and
John's account cannot be an O subcontrary, because it wasn't categorically
written either. If, however, Matthew's account is a true A contrary like
"all S are P," determining its I subcontrary would be as easy as deriving
"some S are P" from the A contrary in this example. Likewise, if John's
account is a true O subcontrary like "some S are not P," determining its E
contrary would be as easy as seeing that "no S are P" would be the contrary
of the O example just stated.
Is it at all possible for McDonald to be as ignorant as he appears?
McDONALD
| | Matthew’s account is E which is false and John’s account is I which is true,
|
TILL
Since Matthew's account was not categorically stated, how could it be an E
contrary like "no S are P"? If John's account was not categorically
written, how could it be an I subcontrary like "some S are P"? Let's hope
that in his "thoroughness," McDonald won't forget to answer these questions
"thoroughly."
While he is "thoroughly" explaining the above, let him also, in his
"thoroughness," explain to us how his arbitrary I subcontrary could be
true, since its subject, i.e., resurrection from the dead, has not yet been
proven to have any existential realness.
McDONALD
| | while A and O are undetermined.
|
TILL
As I have now shown above (repeatedly), in the traditional SoO, if the I
subcontrary, "some S are P," is known, then it is easy to determine that
the A contrary would be "all S are P." Likewise, if the E contrary, "no S
are P" is known, then it easy to determine that the O subcontrary would be
"some S are not P." Let McDonald in his "thoroughness" explain to us
"thoroughly" what its O subcontrary would be if Matthew's account is an E
and what its A contrary would be if John's account is an I subcontrary.
McDONALD
| | Matthew’s account is I which is false and John’s account is A which is false,
|
TILL
McDonald has the same problem here. How could Matthew's account, which
wasn't categorically written, be an I subcontrary like "some S are P"?
If Matthew's account is an I subcontrary, then what A contrary was it
derived from? McDonald cannot say that its A contrary is "undetermined,"
because if I am given an I subcontrary like "some S are P" or "some X or
Y," I can immediately determine that their A contraries would be "all S are
P" and "all X are Y." What, then, is the A contrary of McDonald's
arbitrary I subcontrary in his example above. Likewise, if John's 20-verse
narrative, which certainly wasn't written categorically, is an A contrary,
how could Matthew's narrative possibly be its I subcontrary. In the
traditional SoO, the A contrary is "all S are P," and its I subcontrary is
"some S are P." Exactly how, then, does McDonald get that Matthew's
account could be an I subcontrary of John's A contrary?
Can McDonald possibly be this ignorant?
McDONALD
TILL
In the traditional SoO, the E contrary is "no S are P," and its O
subcontrary is "some S are not P." In existential matters, they would both
be true. For example, if we make "S" Swedes and "P" polygamists, the E
contrary would be "no Swedes are Polygamists," and its O subcontrary would
be "some Swedes are not Polygamists." If, then, it could be established
that polygamy does not occur at all in Sweden, then both E and O would be
true. That would be because the SoO in this example was dealing with
existential entities.
Now let's make "S" satyrs, which were mythological creatures that don't
exist, and "P" purple. Now the E contrary would be ""no satyrs are
purple," and its O subcontrary would be "some satyrs are not purple." In
this case, both E and O would be existentially false. Likewise, as long as
the subject of McDonald's imaginary contraries and subcontraries is
resurrection from the dead, which cannot be proven to be existential, he
cannot claim that any of his contraries and subcontraries are true.
McDONALD
| | Matthew’s account is O which is false and John’s account is A which is
true, E is false and I is true.
|
TILL
What I have said repeatedly above applies here, so there is no need to keep
beating a dead horse. I will ask, however, what the E contrary and the I
subcontrary are in this example. Before, he would tell us, for example,
that "Matthew’s account is A which is false and John’s account is O is
true, while E and I are undetermined," but now after identifying Matthew as
an O subcontrary, he was apparently able to determine what its E contrary
was. If not, how could he know that E is false? Likewise, after
identifying John's account as an A contrary, he was able to determine what
its I subcontrary would be. If not, how could he know that I is true?
Maybe now, in his "thoroughness," he will write out his contraries and
subcontraries instead of just arbitrarily declaring that Matthew is A and
John is O, etc.
Maybe pigs will fly someday too.
McDONALD
| | 1. Now Matthew cannot be A and John be E because A is true and E is false;
they are contradictories.
|
TILL
First, McDonald needs to show us how Matthew's and John's narratives, which
were not written in categorical language, could be A or E or I or O. The
SoO that he is trying to force these biblical narratives into uses
universal, categorical sentences. Matthew's and John's accounts just don't
qualify.
Do you suppose that McDonald is so ignorant that he just can't see this? Do
you suppose that he also cannot see that he is arguing from an assumption
of inerrancy when he says that Matthew can't be A and John E, because that
would make them contradict each other?
McDONALD
| | Now if Matthew is A its subaltern (the other side of the issue) which is I
is true, E’s subaltern is O which is false, again contradictory.
|
TILL
Why doesn't McDonald write these out for us? Let him write out A as
clearly and precisely as "all S are P" and then write out just as clearly
its subaltern. Let him also write out in clear language E and its subaltern.
McDONALD
| | 2. Matthew cannot be E and John be A because E is true and A is false
because, again they are contradictory therefore opposed as one is true and
the other is false.
|
TILL
As I showed repeatedly above, Matthew's and John's narratives can be
neither A nor E, because they are not categorically written as are real
contraries like "all S are P" and "No S are P." I suppose readers also
noticed that McDonald is again trying to argue by assuming biblical
inerrancy. He excludes Matthew from being E and John A, because if they
were actual contraries, one would have to be true and the other false, and
he couldn't have that, could he?
McDONALD
| | E’s subaltern is O which would be true and A’s would be I which is false;
contradictory.
|
TILL
In McDonald's scenario, what is E and what is its subaltern O? Why didn't
McDonald state his E and O in categorically specific language? Well, he
didn't, because he knows that Matthew's and John's accounts cannot be
forced into his SoO mold.
McDONALD
| | 3. Matthew cannot be I and John be E because they are categorically
opposed; they are contradictory to each other.
|
TILL
As I have shown, Matthew cannot be I and John cannot be E, because neither
of them was categorically written. Notice that McDonald continues to argue
on the assumption of biblical inerrancy. If Matthew were I and John E,
they would be contradictory, and he just can't have that, can he?
McDONALD
| | Their subalterns A and O are undetermined.
|
TILL
Why can't they be determined? If I am given the I subcontrary "some S are
P," I can immediately determine that its A contrary would be "all S are
P." If I am given the E contrary "no S are not P," I can immediately know
that its O subcontrary would be "some S are not P."
Why, then, can't McDonald determine the subalterns in his scenario? Let's
hope that in his "thoroughness" to answer everything I say in my rebuttals,
he will "thoroughly" answer this question.
McDONALD
| | Though the other side of the issue is undetermined this one will not work
as it puts them in categorical opposition to each other.
|
TILL
Does McDonald mean here that the subalterns can't be determined? If so,
why not? I have shown above that if any part of the traditional SoO is
known, say, the I subcontrary "some S are not P," the entire square can be
constructed by determining that the E contrary of O would be "no S are P,"
and by then determining that the A contrary of E would be "all S are P,"
and its I subcontrary would be "some S are P." The fact that McDonald
frequently said in his post that some A's, E's, I's, or O's can't be
determined is a tacit admission that he either doesn't understand the kind
of logic he is trying to use or else he is being deliberately deceptive.
Is he again arguing from an assumption of inerrancy by rejecting anything
in his Matthew and John SoO that puts the two accounts into "categorical
opposition to each other"?
McDONALD
| | 4. Matthew cannot be O and John be A because O is true and A is false and
they are categorically opposed; they are contradictory to each other.
|
TILL
Matthew can't be O and John can't be A for the simple reason that they were
not categorically written and not because one would be true and the other
false. McDonald continues to argue from an assumption of inerrancy.
McDONALD
| | Their subalterns E and I are undetermined.
|
TILL
If their subalterns cannot be determined, then neither Matthew's account
nor John's account can be forced into McDonald's SoO, because in a true SoO
if A is known, then E, I, and O can be determined. Likewise, if O is
known, then A, E, and I can be determined.
Let McDonald answer these questions.
1. What is the subaltern of "all S are P"?
2. What is the subaltern of "no S are P"?
3. What is the subaltern of "some S are P"?
4. What is the subaltern of "some S are not P"?
He should be able to answer these easily, so now let him try answering the
following in specifically written categorical statements.
1. If Matthew's account is an A contrary, what is its subcontrary?
2. If John's account is an E contrary, what is its subcontrary?
3. If Matthew's account is an I subcontrary, what is its A contrary?
4. If John's account is an O subcontrary, what is its E contrary?
The point has been made, so there is no need to waste further time on this.
McDONALD
| | Again the subalterns are in categorical opposition to each other even
though it is not determined which is true and which is false.
|
TILL
See my comments above. If any part of a true SoO is known, all other parts
can be easily determined, so when McDonald says that some parts of his
square can't be determined, he is admitting that the gospel narratives
cannot be forced into a SoO.
McDONALD
| | 5. Matthew cannot be A and John be O because A is false and O is true thus
making them categorically opposed; they are contradictory to each other.
|
TILL
Matthew can't be A and John can't be O for the simple reason that they were
not categorically written and not because one would be true and the other
false. By rejecting this possibility because of the contradiction that
results, McDonald continues to argue from an assumption of inerrancy.
McDONALD
| | Their subalterns E and I are undetermined; the same thing.
|
TILL
See my comments above, which apply here. If A is known, then I can be
determined, and if O is known, then E can be determined. If not, why not?
Let's hope that McDonald in his "thoroughness" will answer this question
"thoroughly."
McDONALD
| | 6. Matthew cannot be E and John be I because E is false and I is true;
thus making them categorically opposed; they are contradictory to each other.
|
TILL
Ditto!
McDONALD
| | Their subalterns A and O are undetermined; the same idea.
|
TILL
Why can't they be determined? If I is known in a properly drawn SoO, then
A can be determined, and if E is known, then O can be determined. If not,
why not?
McDONALD
| | 7. Matthew might be I and John be A because I is false and A is false,
which makes them contrary to each other,
|
TILL
Matthew cannot be I or A or E or O, because it wasn't written
categorically. John cannot be A or E or I or O for the same reason.
McDONALD
| | but their subalterns E and O are both true which makes them sub-contraries
[sic].
|
TILL
What, then, are their subalterns. Let McDonald write them out in specific,
categorical language.
McDONALD
| | 8. Matthew cannot be O and John be A because O is false and A is true;
|
TILL
Matthew cannot be O or A or I or E, because it wasn't written
categorically. John cannot be A or E or I or O for the same reason.
McDONALD
| | thus making them categorically opposed to each other; they are
contradictory to each other.
|
TILL
McDonald is still rejecting any possibility that makes the two accounts
contradictory; thus, he continues to argue from an assumption of inerrancy.
McDONALD
| | Their subalterns are E which is false and I which is true.
|
TILL
What are these subalterns? Let McDonald write them out for us in specific,
categorical language. He cannot dodge this responsibility by saying that
they can't be determined, because, as I have repeatedly said, in a
traditional SoO if A is known, then I can be determined; if E is known then
O can be determined; if I is known then A can be determined, etc.
McDONALD
| | So which number does Matthew fit into? Well according to Till’s writings
it can only fit into number 7:
|
TILL
According to my "writings," it can fit into none of them, because Matthew's
account wasn't written in universal, categorical sentences. If McDonald
can't see that, he needs to enroll in a logic course.
McDONALD
| | Matthew might be I and John be A because I is false and A is false.
|
TILL
Neither one can be I or A or E or O, because they were not written in
universal, categorical sentences.
McDONALD
| | He says that they are both false statements.
|
TILL
I consider them both false, because they both claim that a resurrection
from the dead occurred, and there is no scientific or empirical evidence
that will prove that resurrections from the dead occur.
If I am wrong about this, let McDonald present the evidence that will prove
me wrong.
McDONALD
| | But their subalterns (the other side of it is) E and O are both true—the
sub-contrary [sic].
|
TILL
What are these subcontraries? Let McDonald post here an SoO that puts
Matthew's and John's narratives into categorical language that specifically
states A, E, I, and O. All he has done so far is talk about "the other side
of it" and to claim that some subalterns cannot be determined, and he does
this because he knows that Matthew's and John's narratives cannot be forced
into a traditional SoO.
McDONALD
| | However, he wants to put it, there is going to be opposition according to
the square of opposition.
|
TILL
There is indeed opposition in the two resurrection narratives in that they
contain elements that are inconsistent with each other, but John's and
Matthew's narratives cannot be forced into a traditional SoO for the simple
reason that this square requires contraries and subcontraries to be written
in universal, categorical sentences. Until McDonald shows us how this can
be done with the resurrection narratives, his "argument" will remain
utterly stupid.
McDONALD
| | If the two statements are not so related to each other they would not be
opposed to each other they could not be measured on the square of opposition,
|
TILL
Here is an example of McDonald's sloppy writing. I had to read this three
times before I finally figured out (I think) what he was trying to say. I
think that he meant what is conveyed below in a rewritten version of his
sentence.
| | If the two statements are not so related to each other [that] they would
not be opposed to each other, they could not be measured on the square of
opposition....
|
If this is not what McDonald meant, he will have to explain himself, but I
will take the time to mention here something that I have previously pointed
out many times. McDonald's writing is so ambiguous and flawed at times
that he really shouldn't waste so much time trying to convince us that he
is linguistically qualified to argue [quibble] semantically, as he has so
often done.
If I understood him correctly above, he is trying to take us back to his
attempt to make me claim that the two narratives are not inconsistent
unless I say that they are opposites. I will reply to that by reminding
him that I am waiting to see him reconcile the two biographical paragraphs
below.
| | Farrell Till was born February 28, 1932, on a cotton farm in Northeastern
Arkansas. He started school at the age of six in a one-room school house
near Paragould, where he was taught by his mother's sister Helen
Wallace. His family moved across the state line to Dunklin County,
Missouri, where he attended high school and graduated from Wardell High
in 1951.
On August 7, 1934, Farrell Till was born in a hospital at Hayti,
Missouri. He started school at the age of five in Wardell, Missouri,
until he transferred to Hall School, a two-room school near the farm
where his father raised rice. At this school, he was taught by his
mother's sister Iva Wallace. After finishing the five grades in this
school, he transferred to Wardell High, where he graduated in 1952.
|
These two narratives are obviously inconsistent (irreconcilably), but they
just as obviously "oppose" each other in the sense that they make
statements that cannot be reconciled without drastically rewriting both of
them. This has been my position all along on Matthew's and John's
resurrection narratives. They are not "opposites," in the sense that one
says the exact opposite of the others as in the "all S are P" and "no S are
P" contraries, but they do oppose each other in the sense that they
depicted Mary Magdalene in different ways that cannot be reconciled.
I will repeat here something I said in a post earlier today in reference to
the biographical paragraphs quoted below.
| | Now let's suppose that John Doe wrote the first paragraph and John Brown
wrote the second. If someone then said, "Doe's biographical account of
Farrell Till is irreconcilably inconsistent with Brown's," would this mean
that he was saying that Doe's account is the opposite of Brown's? Would
he mean that one of the accounts would have to be true and the other false?
|
Let's hope that in his "thoroughness" in replying to me, McDonald will
"thoroughly" answer these questions.
McDONALD
| | but if they are so related and both are false they can be measured on the
square of opposition and they would be opposed to each other.
|
TILL
As I showed and showed and showed above, they cannot be "measured" on the
SoO, because an SoO requires A, E, I, and O to be written in universal,
categorical language, and the two gospel narratives in dispute were not so
written.
Can McDonald possibly be so ignorant that he just can see that?
McDONALD
| | Till’s proposition says that they are “irreconcilably inconsistent.”
|
TILL
Yes, it does, and I have repeatedly shown that, as I have defined this
expression, it is perfectly legitimate to apply to the two resurrection
depictions of Mary M, and application of the term to the two resurrection
narratives does not mean that one has to be true and the other false.
McDONALD
| | It does not say that they are irreconcilably inconsistent with the truth;
it says that they are irreconcilably inconsistent with each other.
|
TILL
Which would mean that at least part of the Bible is errant, and showing
that is always my purpose in debating biblical inerrantists. Establishing
errancy in part of the Bible was what I intended to accomplish by
successfully defending my proposition. McDonald has tried to distort the
meaning of my proposition into something I never intended, as if someone as
linguistically inept as he often shows himself to be, would know better
than I what the wording of my proposition meant.
McDONALD
| | In other words, one or both may be false, but they cannot both be true.
|
TILL
My position is that they are both false, but the purpose of my proposition
was to establish errancy in the Bible and not to establish whether either
narrative in its entirety was false.
McDONALD
| | However, if they are both false one will be denying the authenticity of the
other.
|
TILL
If both are false, they will both destroy the credibility of the claim that
a man died, literally, and later returned to life. My purpose in proposing
my proposition, however, was not to debate the historicity of the
resurrection but, as I noted above, to establish that there is errancy in
the Bible. If McDonald wants to debate the historicity of the
resurrection, I will gladly do that later AFTER WE HAVE AGREED ON SOME
GUIDELINES THAT WILL PREVENT HIS TAKING US DOWN VARIOUS OFF-TOPIC TANGENTS
AS HE HAS DONE IN THIS DEBATE.
McDONALD
| | Where does this occur between Matthew’s and John’s accounts? Where do
they deny or negate each other.
|
TILL
With reference to the depictions of Mary Magdalene, which is the only
subject of the proposition, they don't negate each other. They simply
present inconsistent depictions of her on resurrection morning, a fact that
kicks the props right out from under the claim of biblical inerrancy.
McDONALD
| | In other words, in order for them to both be false and so related to each
other that they are irreconcilably inconsistent one of them must be
claiming to be true while claiming that the other is not true;
|
TILL
I have repeatedly shown that this is not true. Let's go back to my
examples above.
John Doe says that the moon is made of cream cheese; John Brown says that
the moon is made of milk chocolate. The one statement is not the opposite
of the other, yet any reasonable person would agree that both are
false. Hence, it just isn't true that irreconcilable inconsistency in two
statements requires one to say that one is true and the other false.
Is McDonald so simplistic that he just can't see this?
Let's look again at the two biographical paragraphs requoted above.
| | Farrell Till was born February 28, 1932, on a cotton farm in Northeastern
Arkansas. He started school at the age of six in a one-room school house
near Paragould, where he was taught by his mother's sister Helen
Wallace. His family moved across the state line to Dunklin County,
Missouri, where he attended high school and graduated from Wardell High in
1951.
On August 7, 1934, Farrell Till was born in a hospital at Hayti,
Missouri. He started school at the age of five in Wardell, Missouri,
until he transferred to Hall School, a two-room school near the farm
where his father raised rice. At this school, he was taught by his
mother's sister Iva Wallace. After finishing the five grades in this
school, he transferred to Wardell High, where he graduated in 1952.
|
We attributed the first paragraph to John Doe and the second to John Brown.
The two paragraphs are irreconcilably inconsistent, but that doesn't mean
that they are "opposites" in the sense that "all S are P" and "no S are P"
are opposites. Since the paragraphs are about me, I know that they both
contain some true and some false information. Hence, irreconcilably
inconsistent documents, stories, records, etc. can both be false, and the
fact that they are irreconcilably inconsistent doesn't have to mean that
one is true and the other false.
Is McDonald really so intellectually simple that he just can't see this?
McDONALD
TILL
Yes, my position is that both accounts are wrong in that they make
outrageously ridiculous claims that one would have to be hopelessly
gullible to believe, but as I said above, the purpose of my proposition was
not to debate the historicity of the resurrection or any other unlikely
elements in the narratives (such as the appearance of angels) but to show
that they depicted Mary Magdalene inconsistently. Hence, there is at least
some errancy in the Bible.
McDONALD
TILL
I am not sure that I understand what "this" is. The best I can tell, he
was asking where in the two accounts one of them claims to be true and
where one claims to be false. If that is what he meant, the answer is that
neither account makes overt claims of truth and certainly neither makes a
claim of falsity. I am sure that the writers of these documents expected
their readers to think that both were true. McDonald is apparently trying
to make some dubious "argument" here that I must claim that one account is
true and the other false, but the absurdity of this line of reasoning has
been exposed so many times now that nothing else needs to be said about it.
Will McDonald now turn to debating the ONLY relevant issue left in this
debate: DID MATTHEW INTEND THE WORD "APOKRITHEIS" IN MATTHEW 28:5 TO CONVEY
A DELAY LONG ENOUGH FOR MARY MAGDALENE TO LEAVE THE SCENE, GO DO EVERYTHING
THAT JOHN ATTRIBUTED TO HER, AND RETURN TO THE SCENE BEFORE THE ANGEL SPOKE
TO "THE WOMEN"?
If Matthew meant to convey this, then surely some biblical translators
recognized his intention, so why won't McDonald quote for us translations
that so rendered the word "apokritheis"? The answer is simple: he won't
because he can't.
Farrell Till
The Skeptical Review Online
http://www.theskepticalreview.com
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