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Mon, 1 Mar 04; Op-eds, analysis
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NE-@latvia-usa.org
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Feb 29, 2004 22:39 PST
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NATO ENLARGEMENT DAILY BRIEF (NEDB)
Monday, 01 March 2004, 01:29 EDT
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* THE U.S. AND EU HAVE TO COME TOGETHER / IHT / Ivo Daalder
and Michael Levi (Brookings Institution)
* THINKING BEYOND NATO / In the National Interest / E.
Wayne Merry (AFPC)
* MEND THOSE FENCES / FT
* A GERMAN PLAN FOR MIDDLE EAST /CSM / Editorial
* THE WAYWARD LOGIC OF EUROPE'S NEIGHBOR ? FT / Quentin
Peel
* COLD WAR NOSTALGIA / WT / (UPI & WT)
* PECULIARITIES OF A NON-STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP / In the
National Interest / Yevgeny Verlin (Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
Russia)
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THE U.S. AND EU HAVE TO COME TOGETHER
International Herald Tribune, 27 Feb 04, by Ivo Daalder and
Michael Levi *
* Ivo Daalder is senior fellow, and Michael Levi is science
and technology fellow, in foreign policy studies at the
Brookings Institution in Washington.
Iran's nuclear program
WASHINGTON Early next month, the International Atomic
Energy Agency's board of directors will once again meet to
consider how to respond to new evidence that Iran has
continued to hide significant elements of its nuclear
program. Although the board may agree to refer the issue to
the UN Security Council, the United States and Europe still
differ on how best to respond to Tehran's continuing
violation of its nonproliferation obligations.
The trans-Atlantic partners urgently need to coalesce
around a long-term strategy for confronting Iran. Such
agreement is needed to effectively deter Iranian violations
and to keep the prospect of a diplomatic resolution open.
It is needed for a second reason too: This dispute has all
the makings of repeating the disastrous fissures that
developed over Iraq, except this time Britain appears to be
siding with its European partners against the United
States. That would be tragic for many reasons, not least
because in this particular case there is absolutely no
difference between the two sides on the ultimate objective.
Everyone - Europe and the United States as well as
Australia, Canada, Japan and even Russia - knows that the
consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear power are
exceedingly grave.
Tehran's long-range missiles would put much of Europe
within reach of a possible nuclear strike. Neighboring
states might respond by acquiring deterrent capabilities of
their own. And Israel, which has long seen Iran as a
serious threat, might decide to strike preemptively, as it
did against Iraq in 1981.
To prevent such a dangerous spiral, Iran's nuclear weapons
development must be halted. It is not enough that Tehran
sign on to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty , as it has
done. Nor is it sufficient only to allow additional
inspections by the IAEA.
As long as Iran has the inherent capability to produce
nuclear weapons materials, be it by enriching uranium or
reprocessing plutonium, it will have the option of
following in the footsteps of North Korea - withdrawing
from the nonproliferation treaty, ousting the inspectors
and finishing a bomb.
Only when the key weapons-material-production parts of the
nuclear fuel cycle have been dismantled and destroyed can
there be any confidence that Tehran will not become a
nuclear power.
Europeans and Americans agree on this goal. Now they need
to agree on a common strategy to get there.
The first step must be an agreement to refer the issue to
the Security Council, which should warn Iran that its
continued failure to fulfill all its nonproliferation
obligations constitutes a threat to international peace and
security.
Next, the United States and Europe should agree on a common
strategy that combines Europe's preference for carrots with
America's preference for sticks. They have to agree on a
clear set of benchmarks and deadlines for Iran to give up
its enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Tehran's
compliance would lead to the economic and technology
cooperation that European leaders promised last fall.
At the same time, the United States and Europe would have
to draw red lines that Tehran could not cross. And they
would have to reach a clear understanding on the kinds of
coercive actions they would take in the event of further
noncompliance - from economic sanctions through,
ultimately, the destruction by force of Iranian nuclear
facilities.
The high costs of U.S.-European disagreement over how to
deal with Iran are all too obvious. It should not be beyond
the capability of U.S. and European diplomats to forge a
common strategy.
THINKING BEYOND NATO
In the National Interest, 25 Feb 04, by E. Wayne Merry *
* E. Wayne Merry is a former State Department and Pentagon
senior official and currently a Senior Associate at the
American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, dc.
http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue8/Vol3Issue8Merry.html
The Iraq conflict ignited transatlantic tensions smoldering
since the end of the Cold War. Although politicians in both
Europe and America profess to regret the obvious split
within the once-sturdy Atlantic Alliance, the United States
and its people clearly perceive their security needs very
differently than do most of Europe?s governments and its
populations. nato is not the solution to this split; it is
the heart of the problem. The continuing existence of this
Cold War relic stands in the way of the necessary evolution
of European integration to include full responsibility for
Continental security. In the 21st century, Europe can
neither become a responsible power center nor a competent
partner for the United States so long as Europeans remain
dependent on a non-European power for their security?or
even for the appearance of their security.
The core dynamic of the European Union is integration and
the sharing of former national prerogatives. This dynamic
has progressed quite far in many areas but remains inert in
defense policy because nato has remained the primary
security instrument for most eu members. The Alliance,
however, is not a mechanism of European defense
integration, nor has it ever been. nato is a mechanism to
integrate American power into Europe. Yet its very success
has inhibited significant military integration within
Europe. Despite a number of showcase combined units, like
the Danish-German-Polish Corps or the Baltic Peacekeeping
Battalion, there is no aspect of public policy in Europe
today as rigidly organized within national parameters as
defense.
The consequence is grotesque: a European defense
establishment in which the whole is significantly less than
the sum of its parts. Many of the parts are excellent, with
Europe fielding high quality units and capabilities that,
in some cases (such as paramilitary units), are superior to
those of the United States. Yet, except for Britain and
France (and increasingly even for them), the lack of scale,
the fragmentation and duplication, and the sheer waste of
resources within European defense establishments vitiate
what could be the world?s second-strongest concentration of
military power. That Europe fields two million personnel in
uniform is not an achievement but the heart of the problem.
Half the number?even one-quarter?properly led, equipped and
trained in modern operational skills, would produce a whole
much greater than the disparate national parts deployed
today.
The problem is not really one of money, and the United
States has done ill service by so often measuring
?burden-sharing? in financial rather than operational
terms. True, most European countries spend far less of
their national income on defense than does the United
States, but this is a doubly false comparison. First, the
aggregate of European defense spending is vast and dwarfs
the resources available to any power center on earth other
than the United States. Without spending another euro,
Europe has a combined military budget beyond the dreams of
Russian, Chinese, Indian or other military planners.
Second, America spends defense money in ways Europe need
not, as Europe has no pretensions to be a global military
power with the attendant?and costly?instruments of global
force projection.
The problem in Europe is that the bulk of defense spending
has little to do with defense, but is allocated to create
direct and indirect employment and to retain a pattern of
redundant, if ineffective, ?balanced? national force
structures. To spend more money in this context would
produce little in the way of additional usable capability.
The obvious answer is greater integration of European
defense efforts and forces. The leading edge of this
process today is integration of Europe?s defense
industries, where there has already been considerable
progress under the force of necessity from reduced
acquisition budgets, as in the creation of the European
Aeronautic Defense and Space multinational conglomerate.
There is nothing novel about multilingual and cross-border
defense cooperation in Europe. If European units can
cooperate within nato, they have the talent to do so within
a European rubric. The challenge lies in outgrowing the
heavy hand of American tutelage and learning to do things
without always asking for American guidance. That this can
be done was shown in the Balkans where Italian- and
Belgian-led operations in Albania and Eastern Slavonia
performed as well as, if not better than, U.S.-led
missions, while the non-U.S. peacekeeping districts in
Bosnia and Kosovo are well-run without Americans. The
necessary next step is to expand this experience to a
broader European context.
To any citizen of Europe, the basic stake is huge. European
integration cannot attain maturity without full
responsibility for Europe?s defense. Much of the public
skepticism within Europe about the developing pace of
integration stems precisely from a widely-held
understanding that a United Europe is a sham so long as it
remains subordinate to the United States in the most
fundamental area of public policy. It is therefore wrong to
wait until other major integration issues are resolved. The
building of a union does not proceed in neat and distinct
stages, but in a synergism of parallel developments in many
fields. Security policy cannot be placed into a desk drawer
while a European constitution is on the table. Indeed, the
creation of a common European security system to replace
nato?and incorporating much that nato has built over the
years?will go a long way toward persuading its citizens
that ?Europe? is a genuine concept worthy of their support
and participation.
European capabilities already far exceed European
self-confidence. Europe will remain inferior to the United
States in power projection and logistics, but that would
only be important if Europe were to emulate America?s
global role. Europe played that game once and lacks the
will to repeat it; nor would the Continent?s weak
demographics support it. Nonetheless, a ?Europuissance?
able to maintain continental stability, participate
successfully in peacekeeping operations and project power
into regions proximate to Europe is well within Europe?s
grasp. None of these duties requires the global air and sea
lift, the bombardment capabilities or the scale of
America?s military establishment. What they do require is
European self-confidence and a willingness to proceed
without looking always over the shoulder for instructions
from Washington.
Many Europeans admit they want to maintain nato so that the
Americans will pay a large share of Europe?s security
costs. This is a classic problem of welfare dependency?the
mentality of the dole. Few refuse a subsidy, even when they
recognize they would be more independent and productive
without it. Free money has a narcotic effect on
governments, especially finance ministers, but narcotic
dependency is widely recognized to be unhealthy, producing
lethargy and leading to gradual deterioration of the
organism. The reality stands in sharp contrast. Europe has
a larger population than America, a total economy of
comparable size, a modern industrial and technological base
often very competitive with America?s (and certainly beyond
those of any other part of the world), and a vast wealth of
relevant military and political experience. The notion
that, somehow, Europe is ?not ready? for security
independence is nonsense.
There is no need to bemoan the passing of nato. Alliances
are not pyramids, but pragmatic undertakings, like business
partnerships. It is almost a truism of history that
alliances die after achieving victory. The Atlantic
Alliance was a remarkable success among military pacts. Not
only did it maintain cohesion longer than most alliances,
but it fulfilled its most optimistic agenda in full?with
minimal violence or destruction. But all human activities
have their term, and the supreme wisdom in public policy is
knowing when not to press a policy too far.
MEND THOSE FENCES: BUT THE US AND GERMANY CAN DO SO ONLY ON
A NEW BASIS
Financial Times, 26 Feb 04
The US and Germany cannot escape the fact that their
dispute over Iraq marked a turning-point in their
relations. For the first time in more than 50 years Germany
publicly and flatly opposed the US on an important foreign
policy issue. It was also fuelled by President George W.
Bush's rancorous claim that Gerhard Schroder, the German
chancellor, had betrayed him by using anti-US rhetoric to
get re-elected. The very idea that anti-Americanism was a
vote-winner for a mainstream German political party was a
novelty. So when US and German leaders meet tomorrow, they
will have plenty of fence-mending to do. But the two
countries will come together again only if they learn the
right lessons from their clash over Iraq, and if each
appreciates the considerable residual usefulness of the
other.
This usefulness is residual because it can never match the
special US- German relationship of the cold war. During
that long struggle both countries stayed true to each
other. Germany never allowed itself to be seduced by its
close French partner into disloyalty to the US or Nato,
while the US - under Mr Bush's father - in effect brought
unification to Germany in the face of opposition from the
Soviet Union, and even France and Britain. Now US security
concerns have moved on beyond Europe and Germany has become
almost a normal country, no longer in need of special
protection at home or inhibited from joining allies in
peacekeeping abroad.
Mr Bush should realise that most Germans remain profoundly
allergic to anything that smacks of unilateral military
invasions. However, armed with moral and political cover
from multilateral institutions, Germany is proving
remarkably ready to shoulder its share of the security
burden. It is fielding 10,000 peacekeepers, mainly in the
Balkans and Afghanistan, incidentally freeing US troops up
for other tasks.
Mr Bush is also under pressure from his Democratic rivals
to use 2004 to mend the diplomatic fences he splintered in
2003. Germany is the obvious place to start. In contrast to
France, US public opinion is well-disposed or at least
neutral to Germany. So it should be. Mr Schroder is helping
the US cope with the war's aftermath by training Iraqi
police outside the country and has offered to forgive some
Iraqi debt.
For Mr Schroder, his visit to Washington this week is an
opportunity to rebalance a foreign policy that has fallen
too much in thrall to France. This is partly the Bush
administration's fault for jointly demonising Berlin and
Paris over Iraq. But Mr Schroder might reflect on how his
predecessor, Helmut Kohl, managed for 16 years to combine
close partnerships with France and the US. His budding
trilateral relationship, with Tony Blair as well as Jacques
Chirac, may also help provide balance.
There can be no going back to the old US-German ties. But
there is still the basis for a solid relationship between
the two countries.
A GERMAN PLAN FOR MIDDLE EAST
The Christian Science Monitor, 26 Feb 04, Editorial
There's a saying among those who follow US-German
relations: The Americans do the cooking, and the Germans do
the dishes.
Certainly that's been the case in the Balkans and
Afghanistan, where Germany has provided substantial aid and
peacekeeping forces after American-led wars. In postwar
Iraq, it's again cleanup time. And true to form, the
Germans are ready to plunge their hands into the sudsy
water - not just of Iraq, where they are offering police
training and other nonmilitary help, but of the Middle
East.
Earlier this month, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
called for a new US-European initiative to encourage
democratic reform in the Middle East. The idea has been
well received in Washington. It dovetails nicely with the
administration's long-term goals for the region, and is
expected to be discussed when German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder lunches with President Bush Friday.
Considering the unusual deep freeze that characterized
White House relations with Berlin (as well as Paris) over
the Iraq war, the idea of revived US-European ties to
jointly tackle reform in Iraq and the larger neighborhood
is welcome. As Mr. Fischer recognizes, failure in Iraq has
"consequences for us all." And Bush must realize the US
needs the finances, troops, skill, and connections of all
of Europe - and not just a few allies - to carry out his
Middle East vision.
Fischer's plan starts with the doable. He suggests that two
existing and separate programs that now connect NATO and
the European Union to bordering Mediterranean countries be
coordinated and ramped up. These partner countries include
those in Northwest Africa, plus Egypt, Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian territories.
Think of it as an informal enlargement of NATO and the EU
southward, in which cooperation on security, rule of law,
economic development, and cultural and civil issues would
be enhanced. He even ventures a free-trade zone by 2010.
But these two existing programs don't extend far enough
geographically, leaving out everything west of Syria,
including Iraq and Iran. Indeed, Washington is keen to have
NATO troops take on a peacekeeping role in occupied Iraq.
Fischer pushes the geographic limit by suggesting a
"declaration" of reform-minded principles signed by the
EU/NATO/Mediterranean countries, plus the members of the
Arab League, and Iran. That's far more ambitious than
building up existing programs, but worth exploring.
Any number of political boulders could crush the developing
dynamic behind this US-European "enlargement" into the
Mideast. An Arab perception of Western paternalism is one.
So is the unsolved Israeli-Palestinian problem, as well as
the intransigence of antireformists in the region. And one
has to wonder whether the EU, preoccupied with 10 new
members in May, has the attention span to devote to a big,
out-of-area project.
Berlin's willingness to leave the war behind, and advance
the idea of modernizing the Middle East, should be an
example for France. At the same time, the White House needs
to forgive and forget as it repairs ties with European
heavyweights, who will be essential to forward steps in the
Middle East.
THE WAYWARD LOGIC OF EUROPE'S NEIGHBOR
Financial Times, 26 Feb 04, by Quentin Peel
The sacking of Mikhail Kasyanov, the Russian prime
minister, by Vladimir Putin, the president, on Tuesday
seems to have come as a surprise to some normally
well-informed observers.
Prices on the Moscow stock exchange, where foreign
investors own two-thirds of the shares, fell by up to 5 per
cent on the news. Yet it was only a matter of time before
Mr Kasyanov, a survivor from the end of the Boris Yeltsin
era, was dumped. Mr Putin has been steadily weeding out
such figures from his entourage and Mr Kasyanov - close to
the Yeltsin "family" and several of the Russian oligarchs
who still dominate the economy - was one of the last
hanging on.
But what is predictable in Russia's murky political
manoeuvring remains nevertheless illogical to many outside
observers. Here is a president cruising towards a crushing
victory in the elections in little more than two weeks, and
he suddenly sacks the government that has carried out all
his policies. It is strange. He scarcely needs to curry
more favour with the voters. If he wanted a new prime
minister, surely he might have waited for the decent
moment, once the votes had been cast?
Not Mr Putin. He seems hell-bent on securing a landslide of
almost Soviet-era proportions: at least 80 per cent in
favour, preferably more. So out goes the unpopular Mr
Kasyanov, just to remind doubters that the man in the
Kremlin is the only one who matters.
The truth is that Russia continues to confuse and confound
the world. Its politics remain obscure and its electoral
processes unlike any other. No one can doubt that Mr Putin
is the most popular candidate for the presidency, yet quite
why this unremarkable bureaucrat and former middle-ranking
KGB officer should enjoy such adulation is a mystery.
It certainly seems to confuse them in Brussels, where the
European Union is trying to sort out a coherent policy
towards its neighbour. It is high time it did so, with
barely two months left before enlargement, when 10 new
member states will join the EU, including three Baltic
republics that used to be part of the USSR and four more
that used to be vassals of the Soviet empire inside the
Warsaw Pact.
The trouble is that Mr Putin is playing old cold war games
of brinkmanship, refusing to extend the existing
partnership agreement with the EU to include the new member
states without concessions.
At the Munich security conference this month, Sergei
Ivanov, the defence minister and a close associate of Mr
Putin, seemed to threaten to scrap the conventional forces
in Europe (CFE) treaty because of new Nato bases in Poland
and the Baltic republics.
On the EU side, too many European leaders have been trying
to forge special relationships with the Kremlin. Tony Blair
was first, rushing to St Petersburg to attend the opera
with Mr Putin. Gerhard Schroder has been blatantly playing
the German card, exploiting Mr Putin's specialisation in
German affairs at the KGB. Both soft-pedalled on
criticising Russia's military repression in Chechnya.
Jacques Chirac was more outspoken until he saw a chance of
winning Russian support for his opposition to US policy in
Iraq and other issues. Then he abandoned criticism of the
Chechen war overnight. And, most blatant of all, Italy's
Silvio Berlusconi abused his EU presidency last year to say
nice things to Mr Putin about Chechnya and human rights,
contradicting the EU line.
It plays into the hands of those in Moscow who believe the
best way to deal with the EU is to divide and rule. But
there is extra bitterness in Russia's dealings with Europe.
It is not just Chechnya, although there is anger that
neither the US nor the EU recognises that campaign as part
of the global "war" on terrorism. It is also that the EU
and Nato have somehow "stolen" Latvia, Lithuania and
Estonia and should pay for it. That was compounded by a
double defeat for Moscow in what it regards as its real
back yard: Georgia and Moldova.
The anger is not particularly logical. Russia did
everything to undermine Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia
while he was president. But when he was overthrown and
replaced by the pro-US Mikhail Saakashvili in November, the
Kremlin discovered it quite liked Mr Shevardnadze after all
- and anyway wanted to dictate his replacement.
Moldova was more blatant. There the Kremlin had decided on
a plan to end the conflict between the Moldovan government
and the Russian-speaking enclave of Transdnestr and all but
forced Chisinau to sign, when both Europeans and Americans
persuaded the Moldovans to drop it. The plan would have
given the enclave (a haven for organised crime) an
effective veto in the state.
Moscow cannot really remonstrate with the US, so its
bitterness is focused on Brussels and EU enlargement. The
nonsense of any stand-off is that EU enlargement is good
for Russia. It will make the Union more enthusiastic about
engagement, boosting trade relations and co-operating on
policies from energy to the environment, security and
transport links.
But engagement means being realistic about differences as
well as common interests. Both sides talk of "shared
values", when there is not much they share, at least in
terms of human rights, democracy, the freedom of the press,
the rule of law, and so on. Mr Putin's Russia is a long way
from embracing the same standards as the EU and, for that
matter, the developed world. A sensible relationship will
have to be built on recognising that fact.
mailto:quenti-@ft.com
COLD WAR NOSTALGIA
Washington Times, 27 Feb 04, by Arnaud de Borchgrave *
* Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor in chief of United Press
International and editor at large of The Washington Times.
Did Romania become a member of NATO under the false
pretense of having joined the ranks of democratic nations?
Even the European Union is beginning to have doubts about
Romania's bona fides. Bulgaria yes, Romania no, said the
latest vote of the European Parliaments Foreign Affairs
Committee.
Romania is dragging its feet on meeting the EU's
economic, political and human rights criteria for
membership. Unreconstructed "Securitate" agents -- the late
Communist dictator Nikolai Ceaucescu's KGB-type secret
police and its network of informers -- can still be found
at every level of the Romanian political establishment.
The EU's shot over Bucharest's bow came from Baroness
Emma Nicholson, a British Liberal member of the European
Parliament. She is responsible for Romania on the Foreign
Affairs Committee.
"Implement genuine reform now or accession to EU in
2007 is impossible," the European Member of Parliament
said. The Foreign Affairs Committee said the Romanian
government had failed to implement the rule of law by
refusing to limit the all-encompassing powers of the
Justice Ministry (202 of its 345 employees are former
communist apparatchiks). It was also berated for the
continuing ill treatment of detainees at police stations
and the harassment and intimidation of journalists.
The Romanian Supreme Court ruled in 1999 in favor of
the rehabilitation of the highest-ranking intelligence
officer ever to have defected from East to West during the
Cold War. The rank of general and his confiscated
properties were to be restored. But the government not only
continued to ignore the decision, but also instructed its
ambassador to the United States to state flatly that Gen.
Ion Mihai Pacepa, who is still living under cover in the
United States, could come home a free man.
Clearly an Orwellian untruth. Not only has Romania's
President Ion Iliescu ignored the Supreme Court ruling, but
also added insult to injury when he said sarcastically,
"Only Ceaucescu can restore Pacepa's rank." Ceaucescu and
his wife were captured while fleeing the anti-communist
revolution, and executed after a brief trial on Christmas
day 1989.
One of Romania's principal newspapers, Romania Libera,
asked, "Is it right and moral for Pacepa to be treated as a
traitor by those Securitate officers who served Ceaucescu's
regime down to its dying breath, and who are now at the top
of Romania's democratic structure?"
Radio Free Europe recently decided to cancel its
programs for six former Soviet bloc countries recently
invited to join NATO. A last-minute change retained the
Romanian language service. The reason, according to a
ranking RFE executive (not for attribution), "is Iliescu's
idiotic reaction to the ongoing Pacepa affair." A wealthy
Romanian has now filed suit against both the president and
the prime minister "because they refuse to carry out the
Supreme Court decision to rehabilitate Gen. Pacepa."
Not to be outdone, the Securitate establishment,
evidently nostalgic for their glory days of the Cold War,
decided to wheel into action the heavy artillery of
disinformation. Bucharest editors were told about a secret
dossier that was never made public, even in the days of
Ceaucescu. Pacepa defected to the United States because he
was about to be exposed as a "liquor and cigarette smuggler
and a homosexual."
Gen. Pacepa, with a new identity, and a U.S. passport,
has been under the protection of the federal government
since his 1979 defection. As deputy head of the Romanian
intelligence service, he was the highest-ranking communist
intelligence officer to have chosen freedom during the Cold
War. The information he brought the CIA was judged at the
time to the best ever obtained on communist intelligence
networks.
That is what his former colleagues find hard to forgive
and forget.
PECULIARITIES OF A NON-STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
In the National Interest, 25 Feb 04, by Yevgeny Verlin
* Yevgeny Verlin is the assistant international editor for
Nezavisimaya Gazeta (http://www.ng.ru). He is also a
contributing editor to In the National Interest.
The unexpected dismissal this past Tuesday of Prime
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov by President Vladimir Putin led
to a near-universal shocked reaction in Moscow and caused a
new splash among bewildered observers charting the course
of relations between Russia and the West.
At this time, when America is engaged in its quadrennial
struggle between two national "clans" and two "versions" of
democracy, Russia slowly but surely is returning to a
half-monarchial form of government. Putin limited himself
to a 100-second announcement of this step on state
television.
This surprising decision by Putin will only further
illustrate a new tendency in Western publications to view
Russia with a critical eye. Consult some of the headlines
over the past week: "America Risks Trying to Tame the
Russian Bear" (Times of London), or "The Riddle of Russia"
(New York Post), or "Russia: Hooligan with a Broken Club"
(The Globe and Mail). In these headlines, the sense of
caution and uncertainty speaks of growing concerns about
Russia and calls for keeping one's distance. This opinion
has been growing in the West, ever since the "YUKOS
affair", the managed elections in Chechnya and now
throughout all of Russia and with the radius of freedom
steadily shrinking. The freedom of the press is now down
to one channel with some limited programming and a dozen or
so really independent newspapers with perhaps a million
subscribers in toto.
Now both presidents face re-election this year. The
elections, separated by more than half a year, are
different in their internal characteristics and in the
influence that the results will have on the globe. And of
course, Putin will undoubtedly win re-election, with
between 85 and 90 percent of the vote, whereas Bush
basically needs to struggle for every vote against the
likely Democratic candidate John Kerry. But both presidents
have some similarities--especially weaknesses. Both
presidents need to establish the democratic legitimacy of
their administrations (Bush in the eyes of the whole
country, Putin in the eyes of the Russian elite). Both are
worried about the sustained growth of the economy (Bush
about the fundamentals of the U.S. economy, Putin about
continued high oil prices). Both find themselves hostage to
"quagmires" (Bush in Iraq, Putin in Chechnya).
And in foreign affairs, both Russia and the United States
have increasingly chilly relations with the other major
players on the world scene. Both are concerned about the
complexity of their relationship with a unified Europe.
Both are attempting to find a common language--each in
their own way--with China and the Islamic world. Both face
weak and unstable "backyards" (their respective southern
peripheries). And both states are trying to increase the
loyalty of their allies by utilizing both economic and
military levers as primary sources of influence.
And, interestingly enough, both presidents have taken pains
to demonstrate their support of the military and to
underline their own roles as commanders-in-chief, to send
the message to their respective electorates that each one
is the only one at this critical time capable of protecting
and safeguarding the country. (Putin, for example, took
two commanding steps; one was to dismiss the government and
to rid himself of a politically independent prime minister,
the other was to order a strategic missile training
exercise). It's not important whether U.S. servicemen or
Moscow subway commuters are subject to terrorist attack,
that the American vision for postwar Iraq is up in the
clouds, or that two out of the three missile tests this
past week were complete fiascoes. No, both men are seeking
to persuade their respective national audiences that, in
the end, the terrorists will be defeated and "we will be
victorious."
How military issues can form part of a pre-election PR
campaign was demonstrated this past Saturday on Alexei
Pushkov's Postscriptum program. Pushkov sang Putin's
praises; once again, the Kremlin is paying attention to
strengthening Russia's nuclear shield. In his words, Putin
balanced the missile test failures with his announcement at
the Plesetsk testing facility that Russia will soon possess
a weapons system capable of defeating an American
missile-defense shield. So having failed to capture
terrorists or prevent attacks in Moscow, Putin acted in his
usual way, in the spirit of the old joke, "Beat your own,
so that strangers will fear you."
This much is clear, in response to America, "Russia's
strategic partner," exiting from the ABM Treaty two years
ago, Moscow, as it promised, will find the means to ensure
that the "threat of imminent response won't be an empty
doctrine." Former defense minister Andrei Kokoshin,
speaking on this program, raised the issue that Putin has,
only for the second time in his presidency, discussed the
need for Russia to develop a new strategic weapons system,
committing the country to renovating its
military-industrial complex so that Russia could produce a
new generation of strategic missiles better able to reach
targets at higher speeds with greater precision. Putin
himself has stressed that the next generation of strategic
weaponry is not designed to be a weapon to threaten
America. But, as the specialists on this program
explained, Russia, having developed a system capable of
thwarting an American anti-ballistic missile
defense--having clearly stated it would seek to do this in
advance of America's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty--has
now shown that America's umbrella would be useless in
warding off "mosquitoes."
So, the consensus on Postscriptum was that Putin's
announcement was a successful pre-election gambit not only
for Russia, but with implications for America as well.
After all, the Democrats strongly criticized Bush for
burying the ABM Treaty. President Bush promised to create
a reliable anti-missile shield against "rogue states", but
this premise has basically been politically defeated as
Moscow predicted. In other words, Russia has made
America's missile shield useless before it has even been
created.
Moreover, the relationship between the two nuclear
superpowers is balanced once again.
Furthermore, there is another issue for the U.S. to
consider. It may be a very unlikely event that Russia
would share its anti-NMD technology with China--the state
the U.S. considers its likely strategic competitor in the
21st century--but to prevent that from happening, the U.S.
would be better off seeking cooperation rather than
competition with Russia.
In other words, the United States should seek mutual
understanding with Russia. And simple cooperation on a
variety of unrelated issues is possible, rather than an
overall strategic partnership. Cooperation is feasible to
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
to combat terrorism and to stabilize global energy markets.
American democracy, in principle, cannot be a friend to an
authoritarian regime which does not share the basic values
of the Western world. But a tactical partnership is quite
possible. And in pursuing the latter, no one in the United
States, at least no one in the current administration, is
anxious to press the questions of Russian democracy.
Even if Putin receives 99 percent of the vote and it is
obvious to everyone in the West the depth of the farce of
"managed democracy" in Russia, the Bush Administration is
limited to "recalibrating" its official rhetoric. Bush
needs to show results, that on the "Russian front" things
are normal, that partnership with Russia is successful in
achieving vital American interests. In other words,
President Bush held "hostage" to his engagement with the
current boss in the Kremlin. In order to have some visible
successes of his partnership with Russia--in the struggle
with terrorism or combating proliferation, for example,
getting Russia to join the Proliferation Security
Initiative, the White House has to give ground to the
Russians in accommodating their own priorities.
In short, relations between Moscow and Washington remain
ambivalent. This ambivalence is increasing as the
presidential elections in both countries approach. Neither
Bush nor Putin are eager to admit to the general public in
their countries that they made a mistake when the "looked
each other in the eye" for the first time.
http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue8/Vol3Issue8Verlin.html
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