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Mon, 8 Mar 04
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NE-@latvia-usa.org
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Mar 07, 2004 23:07 PST
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NATO ENLARGEMENT DAILY BRIEF (NEDB)
Monday, 08 March 2004, 01:27 EDT
---------------------------------------------
* HOW TO HELP UKRAINE VOTE / NYT / Madeleine K. Albright
(Former US Secretary of state)
* THE WRONG WAY TO SELL DEMOCRACY TO THE ARAB WORLD / NYT /
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Former U.S. National security adviser)
* U.S.-GERMAN REASONS TO RECONCILE / IHT / John Vinocur
* BUSH WANTS BACK IN / UPI / Martin Walker
* THE RUSSIAN BEAR AND ITS FORMER TERRITORIES / WT
/Editorial
* IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE ON TV / Moscow Times / Pavel
Felgenhauer (An independent defense analyst, Russia)
* WEST WATCHES NERVOUSLY AS THE KREMLIN RAISES ITS FLAGS
/FT / Andrew Jack and Stefan Wagstyl
---------------------------------------------
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----------------------------------------------
HOW TO HELP UKRAINE VOTE
New York Times, 8 Mar 04, by Madeleine K. Albright *
* Madeleine K. Albright was the secretary of state from
1997 to 2001.
WASHINGTON ? Democracy in Ukraine is facing a crucial test
as that country prepares for presidential elections in
October. An intimidating, sometimes violent campaign has
already begun, yet Washington has been strangely and sadly
silent about the future of this important American partner.
Just days before I arrived in Kiev last month for a
conference on Ukraine's future in Europe, the
Ukrainian-language version of Radio Liberty, which is
financed by the United States, was forced off its major
outlet. Later, a small radio station was closed after it
began Radio Liberty broadcasts. And just last week the
director of another radio station that was considering
broadcasts of the service died in a suspicious car
accident.
The rest of the electronic media are virtually all
government-influenced, and the future of the only
independent television channel is in doubt. Federal tax
authorities somehow seem to investigate only businesses
that support opposition candidates. Nongovernmental
organizations, especially voter education and mobilization
groups, face continual pressure.
Meanwhile, supporters of President Leonid Kuchma are trying
to push through constitutional amendments that would
enhance the power of the legislature ? which they will
control until at least 2006 ? at the expense of the
presidency, which they would probably lose in a fair
election this October. In this way, even with Mr. Kuchma
out of elected office ? he has said he will not run again ?
someone associated with his administration would continue
to run the country.
The constitutional changes being debated might be justified
under other circumstances, but the legislature, known as
the Rada, has little standing because its Kuchma-aligned
majority emerged under questionable circumstances after a
bitter and unfair election in 2002. It is certainly wrong
for the Rada to grab greatly expanded powers for itself
just before the presidential election, which is the next
significant chance for Ukrainians to have their say on the
direction their government has taken.
The path that Ukraine will now choose has enormous
importance for the United States. Ukraine has been an
important partner since its independence in 1991. It gave
up the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union,
supported efforts to reverse the effects of ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, stopped helping Iran's nuclear
program, closed the Chernobyl nuclear power reactor, and
contributed approximately 1,600 troops to Iraq and hundreds
more to United Nations-backed peacekeeping operations in
Liberia, Kosovo and elsewhere.
In May, when 10 new members are admitted to the European
Union, Ukraine and its almost 50 million people will sit on
the organization's eastern border. It will become even more
important in dealing with Islamic extremism to its south,
the authoritarianism of its neighbor Belarus, and a Russia
whose leaders sometimes express nostalgia for the Soviet
Union.
The United States does not have an interest in who wins
Ukraine's presidency, but we do have a strong stake in how
that victory is obtained. Unfortunately, while our
ambassadors have spoken out with eloquence and courage
about events in Ukraine, the administration has spoken
privately, and from a distance. Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld has been the only senior official to visit Ukraine
recently, and that was to get support for the Iraq war.
President Kuchma made clear to me during our nearly
two-hour meeting last month that he sees the Bush
administration as giving little thought, good or bad, to
Ukraine, except to repeat what it hears from Russia. The
suspicion within the political opposition is that Ukraine's
contribution to the coalition in Iraq was intended to buy
amnesty from the United States. This cannot be true, but
the perception discourages government opponents.
So what should the United States do to encourage democracy
in Ukraine?
First, speak out. President Bush and cabinet officials need
to insist on free and fair elections and they need to do so
soon. This election could well be decided by unfair tactics
long before the balloting begins. Senior officials should
visit Ukraine, and other opportunities will come this June
when leaders of the Group of 8 industrialized nations, the
European Union and NATO meet. Already on the agenda is the
Bush administration's plan for promoting democracy in the
Middle East. Saving democracy in Ukraine belongs on that
agenda, too.
Second, increase support for independent news media and
civil society. This will require a considerable financial
commitment as well as the help of Ukraine's democratic
neighbors, which can provide unbiased media and training
sites for voter mobilization and monitoring efforts.
Third, join our European partners in describing the
alternative futures for Ukraine. A free and fair election,
with whatever result, should elicit trade and visa
concessions from the European Union as well as a road map
to eventual membership in the union, enhanced military
cooperation from NATO, and support for membership in the
World Trade Organization. These measures, and the prospect
of a more stable democracy, would do much to increase
needed foreign investment in Ukraine. As President Kuchma
considers his legacy, an independent and democratic
Ukraine, firmly rooted in Europe and trans-Atlantic
relations, should be his clear preference.
If, however, the elections are fraudulent, Ukraine's
leaders should know that their entry into Western
institutions will slow and that their own bank accounts and
visa privileges will be jeopardized. The same should hold
true if Mr. Kuchma's faction manipulates the Constitution
to its own advantage.
Preserving and expanding the frontiers of freedom around
the world requires constant vigilance. That vigilance is
being tested in Ukraine today, and so are those who claim
to believe in freedom as the universal right of all people.
THE WRONG WAY TO SELL DEMOCRACY TO THE ARAB WORLD
New York Times, 8 Mar 04, by Zbigniew Brzezinski *
* Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser in the
Carter administration, is the author of "The Choice: Global
Domination or Global Leadership."
WASHINGTON ? The Bush administration deserves credit for
its long-term commitment to democracy in the Middle East.
But even a good idea can be spoiled by clumsy execution.
Worse still, the idea can backfire ? particularly if people
come to suspect that ulterior motives are at work.
This is precisely what is happening with President Bush's
"Greater Middle East initiative," which outlines steps the
United States and its partners in the Group of 8
industrialized nations can take to promote political
freedom, equality for women, access to education and
greater openness in the Middle East. Elements of the
proposal include the creation of free trade zones in the
region, new financing for small businesses and help
overseeing elections.
After a draft of the initiative was published last month in
Al Hayat, a London-based Arabic newspaper, Arab leaders
responded swiftly ? and unhappily ? at what they perceived
to be American efforts to impose change. President Hosni
Mubarak of Egypt went so far as to call the proposal
"delusional."
Fortunately, there is still time for the administration to
set things right and rescue this potentially worthwhile
project. But it must move quickly, particularly if it wants
the G-8 to sign on to the plan at its summit meeting in
June.
There is no question that the administration has its work
cut out for it. For starters, the democracy initiative was
unveiled by the president in a patronizing way: before an
enthusiastic audience at the American Enterprise Institute,
a Washington policy institution enamored of the war in Iraq
and not particularly sympathetic toward the Arab world. The
notion that America, with Europe's support and Israel's
endorsement, will teach the Arab world how to become modern
and democratic elicits, at the very least, ambivalent
reactions. (This, after all, is a region where memory of
French and British control is still fresh.) Though the
program is meant to be voluntary, some fear that compulsion
is not far behind.
There are other reasons to be wary of the administration's
plan. Democracy, impatiently imposed, can lead to
unintended consequences. If the Palestinians were able to
choose a leader in truly free elections, might they not opt
for the head of Hamas? If free elections were soon held in
Saudi Arabia, would Crown Prince Abdullah, a reformer,
prevail over Osama bin Laden or another militant Islamic
leader? If not genuinely accepted and reinforced by
traditions of constitutionalism, democracy can degenerate
into plebiscites that only add legitimacy to extremism and
authoritarianism.
Compounding the problem is the suspicion ? not only among
the Arabs but also among the Europeans whose support the
United States is seeking ? that the sudden focus on
democracy has been promoted by administration officials who
wish to delay any serious American effort to push the
Israelis and Palestinians to reach a genuine peace
settlement. That suspicion was fueled by Vice President
Dick Cheney's recent remarks at the World Economic Forum in
Davos, Switzerland. The spread of democracy, Mr. Cheney
said, was "the precondition for peace and prosperity in
Western Europe" after World War II. He went on to assert
that democratic reform "is also essential to a peaceful
resolution of the longstanding Arab-Israeli dispute."
Mr. Cheney's argument that democracy is the precondition
for peace appeared to many to be a rationalization for
postponing any effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Moreover, it ignored the historical reality that
democracy can flourish only in an atmosphere of political
dignity. As long as the Palestinians live under Israeli
control and are humiliated daily, they won't be attracted
by the virtues of democracy. The same is largely true of
the Iraqis under the American occupation.
For the Bush administration's initiative to succeed, it
must be more in sync with regional realities. To that end,
the administration should take the following steps:
First, the program must be devised with Arab countries and
not just presented to them. Egyptians and Saudis will not
embrace democracy if they feel that their religious and
cultural traditions are being slighted. The Europeans
should also be fully engaged, and they should likewise
pursue a dialogue of their own with the nations of the
region regarding the definition and the goals of the
planned undertaking. Any differences in approach could then
be reconciled at the G-8 summit meeting.
Second, the initiative must recognize that without
political dignity derived from self-determination there can
be no democracy. The Germans regained their political
dignity in a relatively short time after the end of World
War II, and that in turn helped them to revive the
democratic traditions of the pre-Nazi era. The program for
Arab democracy will be more successful, and find wider
acceptance, if it is matched by efforts to grant
sovereignty to the Iraqis and Palestinians. Otherwise,
democracy will seem to many in the Arab world to be window
dressing for continued external domination.
Finally, the United States must define the substance of a
peace settlement in the Middle East and then work
energetically to put that agreement in place. Doing so will
give greater credibility to the constructive motives behind
the democracy initiative; it will also show the countries
of the Middle East that there is a shared basis for a
genuine partnership with the democratic West.
The transformation of the Middle East will be a more
complex undertaking than the restoration of postwar Europe.
After all, social restoration is inherently easier than
social transformation. Islamic traditions, religious
convictions and cultural habits must be treated with
patient respect. Only then will the time be ripe for
democracy in the Middle East.
U.S.-GERMAN REASONS TO RECONCILE; SCHRODER AND BUSH FIND
MUTUAL INTEREST
International Herald Tribune, 01 Mar 04 by John Vinocur
Apart from the ruffles-and-flourishes overstatement of a
too grandly named joint declaration -- A German-American
Alliance for the 21st Century -- the White House meeting
between President George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard
Schroder last week opened a pathway to what, at the least,
are more temperate and cooperative trans-Atlantic
relations.
The motor of change was mutual interest. The chancellor
wanted to fix a breach in ties with the United States over
Iraq that, beyond America, compromised Germany's role
within the European Union and sharply diminished its
influence in Eastern Europe. And the president sought help
in Iraq and Afghanistan and in forging a long-term plan to
bring more stability to what both men now call the Greater
Middle East.
The potential for profit appeared big enough on both sides
so that, according to a participant in the talks,
Schroder's often-stated refusal to send German battlefield
troops to Iraq in the event of NATO involvement there never
came up. In exchange, Bush got both a Schroder promise of
"commitment" to a "common agenda of action," and a
statement of "confidence" in America's developing
initiative to modernize the Middle East through cooperation
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European
Union and countries of the region.
Since the reconciliation -- no hugs or linked beer mugs,
but clearly more civility after 18 months of mean-tempered
antagonism -- fit the domestic political agendas of both
men, it contained clearly genuine elements.
Schroder was dealing with the reality of his party's dismal
standing in German public opinion, and a poll last week of
Germans showed that 90.4 percent thought good
trans-Atlantic relations were important (if 71 percent also
felt the United States selfishly and inconsiderately
defends its own interests). He was also trying to readjust
the widespread view at home that his break with America on
Iraq significantly lamed Germany's successful postwar
formula for international relations: equally strong and
balanced ties with the United States and France.
With his job on the line in November and Schroder at his
side, Bush was seen in Germany as wanting to counter
Democratic accusations that his handling of Iraq had
alienated some of the United States' most important allies
-- although a German official accompanying the chancellor
in Washington said he hardly believed deteriorated or
improved European-American relations had much weight as a
vote-getter.
Because Schroder expressed concern that a rise in the
exchange value of the euro against the dollar had hurt
European competitiveness, Bush offered a verbal gesture of
reassurance, saying that he favored a strong dollar, but
without providing further specifics.
And Schroder, in turn, threw more forthcoming details into
the pot: a reaffirmation, in the light of Europe's efforts
to strengthen its own military autonomy, that NATO was "the
anchor of our collective defense." In talking to German
reporters, the chancellor also furnished a line about not
wanting to hear talk of "polarization," a reference to the
French government's vision of a multipolar world in which,
to the distaste of both Republicans and Democrats, a
unified Europe would operate as a counterweight to the
United States.
Still and all, and against the drumroll assertion of a
German-American "alliance" for the new century, big blind
spots were present in circumstances short of a convincingly
common vision. Avoiding the obvious, no mention was made
that nothing as immediate and palpable as a quarter-million
Soviet troops in East Germany exists to reunite the
countries in a sense of risk equally shared.
Indeed, if the White House decided it served no purpose to
beat on what Schroder described as his "red-line" position
on not including German troops in an eventual United
Nations-approved NATO mission to Iraq, German critics
pointed to this as an element of incoherence in Schroder's
rapprochement. The Bush administration could hardly have
had another view.
The argument was that it did not make sense to remain
outside Iraq if Germany wanted to be a world player, and
subscribed to the proposition, advanced by Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer last month, that the "new totalitarianism"
of "jihadist terrorism" was the world's greatest threat to
stability. Following the argument, the German position
would have even less logic if the French, as the Americans
hoped, actually joined the NATO force.
Along this line, Wolfgang Schauble, the Christian Democrat
leader who is widely regarded as the opposition candidate
likely to succeed Johannes Rau as federal president in an
election by the houses of Parliament in May, criticized
Schroder, called for German participation in Iraq, and
said, "Whoever wants part of a multilateral decision
process has to contribute multilaterally to the solution."
"The position of not having anything against NATO
involvement but yourself not wanting to contribute, just
doesn't work," Schauble said last week.
The Bundestag foreign policy spokesman of the chancellor's
Social Democratic Party, Gert Weisskirchen, perhaps seeking
to fit the mood of its rank and file, emphasized that
Schroder would not change his mind on Iraq. Characterizing
the meeting, he said a more rational basis for discussion
of differences had been created, "but it would be
exaggerated to say that there was kind of buddy-buddy
friendship."
Still the meeting was seen as dealing with real issues.
Praise for it came from Volker Ruhe, chairman of the
Bundestag's foreign policy commission, and a former
Christian Democratic defense minister who has called for
Germany to become "the driving force in Europe on the
Middle East."
Following up on the White House declaration's emphasis on
cooperation on the Middle East, Ruhe said the future of the
German-American relationship would be defined in that area
of conflict. "We don't have the natural
shoulder-to-shoulder stance of cold war anymore, so
cooperation has to be demonstrated in other regions. And
the central place is the Greater Middle East."
In this area, Germany has taken a visible step ahead of the
rest of the EU with Fischer's outline at a security
conference in February of a German plan for the region's
modernization. It is compatible in many respects with the
Bush administration's initiative for the Greater Middle
East, particularly in its willingness to involve NATO in
the European-American discussions, and its interest in
setting up cooperative economic structures.
Differences in the German and American viewpoints -- not
discussed in the White House talks -- go to the possible
involvement of Syria and Iran in the process.
In pushing its position forward in collaboration with the
United States, and in emphasizing NATO and the unique
aspect within Europe of its own confident relations with
both the Israelis and Arabs, Germany seemed to have
differentiated itself from the French viewpoint. Last week,
Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin of France, seemingly
upset by the German approach, questioned whether a NATO
involvement would be "a complication" that could be seen
"by certain countries in the region as an aggression."
In what might have been a response to Villepin, Fischer in
an interview with Al Jazeera television justified his use
of the term "jihadist terrorism," insisted that such
terrorism must be fought and defeated, and said that "I do
not understand the fear of many Arab friends" of efforts in
the West to create what he called a real partnership.
During two days in the United States, Schroder used none of
this explicit language.
But his visit to Bush made clear that he wanted to stand as
close as comfortably possible to the Americans in the
evolution of a plan to bring to the Middle East what the
joint White House declaration called "freedom and hope"
instead of "fear and resentment."
With the chancellor's past record on international affairs
as a guide, how close and cooperative that would be in
reality was open to question. It seemed to depend on
Schroder's wobbly domestic political situation as much as
on the United States' judgment of how much support it needs
from its publicly recertified friend in pressing forward
its own vision of the world.
BUSH WANTS BACK IN
UPI, 1 Mar 04, by Martin Walker
The phone lines between officials in Washington and Paris
are busy with cooperative talks and plans for a United
Nations-backed peacekeeping mission in Haiti. Meanwhile on
another floor of the White House, German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder is being hailed by President George Bush as "a
person that can make me laugh, a person who is easy to be
with. And a person who is easy to be with means I've got a
comfortable relationship with him."
We have all come a long way since those bitter and heated
exchanges over Iraq at the United Nations a year ago, when
the rows with the French and Germans threatened to tear the
Atlantic alliance apart. President Bush even used the
phrase his father used when dealing with a previous German
Chancellor, that Washington and Berlin were "partners in
leadership."
It's not just that everybody wants to be friends again, but
that they are acting like allies again. The French and
Germans have troops (and casualties) in Afghanistan, and
are planning to send their Eurocorps to Kabul later this
year. The French are proposing sending troops and their
useful paramilitary gendarmes to Haiti alongside Americans.
The French and Germans and the European Union partners are
taking over peacekeeping responsibilities in Bosnia at the
end of this year, and now they are all talking about NATO
taking over responsibility for the Polish sector of
southern Iraq.
At the same time, Richard Perle has resigned from the
Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, saying that his hard-line
and outspoken views might not be helpful to the president
during in an election year. "I did not want to put them in
a position that they felt they had to respond to the things
I said by virtue of my membership on the Defense Policy
Board," Perle explained.
This takes one of the toughest-minded of the
neo-conservatives, and one of the most outspoken in his
criticism of the French and German allies, out of the Bush
administration's policy loop. And it spares the Bush
campaign the embarrassment of explaining away the policies
advocated in Perle's new book, "An End to Evil; How to Win
the War on Terror."
The book advocates toppling the government of Iran, ending
U.S. support of a Palestinian state, bringing North Korea
to heel through a blockade, breaking ties with the Saudis,
and getting very tough with Syria and China, while telling
the wimpish Europeans to like it or lump it.
Perle's book is co-authored with David Frum, the former
White House speechwriter who is credited with the phrase
Bush will never quite live down about the "axis of evil" --
Iraq, Iran and North Korea -- in his State of the Union
address in January 2002.
At the time, the speech sounded like an agenda for serial
regime change, by military action if need be. It was also
the first clarion call of what became known as the Bush
administration's unilateralism, its readiness to go it
alone in defending U.S. interests without a mandate from
the United Nations and without allies.
Some time between that speech and the bloody and confused
aftermath of the fall of Iraq in the summer of 2003, that
hard-nosed doctrine of muscular American unilateralism was
rethought. The first nation of the axis of evil had proved
a tougher proposition that first thought, and the
diplomatic and domestic political price of going it alone
was deemed too high.
So now we see nations two and three of the axis of evil
getting very different treatment. The control of Iran's
nuclear ambitions has been entrusted to the foreign
ministers of Britain, France and Germany, who late last
year in an unprecedented diplomatic triumvirate persuaded
Iran to bring its nuclear program back within the control
regime of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency.
And North Korea's nuclear menace is being managed by an
even more multilateral group that includes China, Russia,
Japan and South Korea.
In short, Bush's unilateralism is dead. The neo-cons are
out of favor. The Germans are back in the White House. The
French are worthy allies. The United Nations is the first
port of call in a crisis, whether for Iran or Haiti.
Maybe it took drooping opinion polls and an election
campaign, but the Bush administration is coming back into
the world. And the French and Germans are being smart
enough to say "Welcome" instead of "We told you so."
THE RUSSIAN BEAR AND ITS FORMER TERRITORIES
The Washington Times, 5 Mar 04, Editorial
The Russian bear is growling as Americans and Europeans
bolster their commercial and strategic role in the Baltics,
Caucasus and Central Asia. Given Russia's stiffened resolve
to defend its interests in its neighborhood, U.S. and
European policy-makers should think about when and when not
to challenge Moscow.
Russia recently announced its rejection of the terms of the
Conventional Armed Forces Treaty. The treaty was updated in
1999, aimed to establish parity in the conventional forces
that the world's military powers could deploy in Europe.
Under the treaty, Russia is obligated to remove its bases
from Georgia and Moldova. Though Russia never ratified the
treaty, its repudiation of the treaty is new.
But it appears that Russia is trying to have it both ways.
While it has rejected the restraints of the treaty on
itself, it wants its tenets to apply to the Baltic states
that will be joining NATO next month. Such a move would
impose limits on NATO's movements in and deployments of
weapons to these states.
Russia surely wants to strike a deal with NATO on the
Baltics and the Caucasus, but there is also that nagging
question of what Georgia itself wants. Russia and Georgia
have two very different ideas about what the time frame for
dismantling Russian bases should be. If Russia and Georgia
are unable to reach a deal in a reasonable period, the
United States and Europe should lean on Russia to settle
the matter.
Still, the Bush administration should continue to refrain
from vilifying Russia for pursuing its interests. Sen. John
McCain, for example, said recently that Russia "enforced
its stranglehold on energy supplies into Latvia to squeeze
the democratic government of Riga." But Russia had clear
commercial reasons for cutting its oil shipments to the
Latvian port of Ventspils. Once it established an oil
outlet in its own country, Primorsk, it could avert the
transit and other fees it had to pay to export to
Ventspils.
And though countries in Eurasia often complain about
Russian dominance, many receive discounted natural gas and
the rights to live and work in Russia. For the most part,
the competition between Russia, the United States and the
European Union to gain strategic or commercial advantage in
Eurasia will benefit the nations of the region. It seems
reasonable that the will of sovereign countries should
determine where the dominating powers can establish bases
or pursue commercial ventures.
But the countries can also negotiate their respective roles
among themselves. There is ample potential for quid pro
quo. The United States and the European Union can help
bolster the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in the
Baltics and other regions, help keep Islamic fundamentalism
in check in Central Asia, allow Russia to gain the higher
export quotas to an enlarged European Union and make it
easier for the people of Kaliningrad to reach Russia. In
other words, tethering the Russian bear can be largely a
question of old-fashioned horse trading, rather than
confrontation.
IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE ON TV
The Moscow Times, 3 Mar 04, by Pavel Felgenhauer *
* Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst
The strategic military exercises last month were heralded
as the biggest since Soviet times. They were attended by
President Vladimir Putin, who spent several hours aboard
the Arkhangelsk nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea,
together with Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and Navy chief
Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov.
The press pack was taken to sea separately from the
president to cover the great event: Putin, the
commander-in-chief, restoring Russia's military greatness
in the run-up to the election. Of course, Putin seems sure
to win anyway with a landslide, but a display of
Soviet-style military strength would help to drum up some
additional patriotic fervor (and raise the turnout).
The political stakes were high, and to the embarrassment of
all, two intercontinental ballistic missiles got stuck in
their silos when the nuclear sub Novomoskovsk tried to fire
them while Putin and the journalists were watching. The
Novomoskovsk's crew initially did not know what had
happened, since the on-board indicators mistakenly
registered the ICBMs as fired.
This mishap could have ended in a disaster and the loss of
the Novomoskovsk, if the faulty liquid-fuel ICBMs had
exploded in their silos. The Navy top brass at first issued
conflicting reports on what had actually happened. Then
Admiral Kuroyedov, who as Navy chief made many
unsubstantiated statements after the sinking of the Kursk
in 2000, announced that this time everything was OK -- and
that the Novomoskovsk did not in fact intend to fire any
ICBMs. To avoid public embarrassment, Ivanov and the
Kremlin supported Kuroyedov's statement.
The next day, in an attempt to save face, the Navy tried
again with the Karelia, a sister ship of the Novomoskovsk,
being sent to fire two more ICBMs.
But the attempted launch was performed without a proper
investigation of what went wrong on the Novomoskovsk and
ended with another fiasco: One ICBM did leave its silo, but
exploded soon after takeoff. Again all were lucky the ICBM
did not explode on the sub.
The Navy called the explosion a missile "self-destruct" in
an apparent attempt to cushion the blow, but it seems this
additional spin was unnecessary in today's
Kremlin-controlled Russia. While some newspapers reported
the story in full, the two main national television
stations, Channel One and Rossia, did not report it at all,
although the Navy had officially confirmed that an ICBM
exploded. Thus, they deprived the majority of Russians who
rely for their information on Channel One and Rossia of
news about the failed ICBM launches.
Maybe Putin also missed the news, judging by the fact that
only on Monday, two weeks after the missile mishaps, did he
finally order an investigation.
I was asked to comment on the mishap for Center TV and NTV,
who reported the missile failure, but commented very
cautiously on it. Off-air, both channels' news anchors told
me how nervous they were, since Channel One and Rossia had
not reported the failure and there were phone calls from
the Kremlin with instructions to shut up.
I was told that a request to appear on NTV live caused a
squabble between management and the news staff. I was told
the following quote: "If Felgenhauer says anything critical
of Putin live on air, the FSB will come tomorrow and take
over NTV."
The news anchors looked at me in horror as the cameras
rolled, and I similarly at them -- terrified at the
prospect of causing the station's takeover. So I used the
mildest words possible, but since the gist of my comment
was still critical, I do not believe I will be reappearing
anytime soon on national TV.
These days, television bosses have to approve anyone who
appears on screen -- in essence, it is done by the Kremlin.
There exists a blacklist of Putin's "enemies" that are
effectively banished.
I know I am on the list, but it also includes many other
names. A Channel One anchor told me last week that he
wanted to invite Boris Nemtsov to present a liberal
viewpoint on a political talk show, but this was forbidden,
because Nemtsov had recently criticized Putin.
The appointment last month of Putin's press secretary
Alexei Gromov to the Channel One board of directors was
another sign of increasing censorship.
Of course, it's not all bad. One can always repent,
publicly kiss a Kremlin bottom and be taken off the
blacklist. After all, anyone may appear on Russian TV to
say how wonderful life is under Putin and how high our
ICBMs fly.
WEST WATCHES NERVOUSLY AS THE KREMLIN RAISES ITS FLAGS:
RUSSIA IS FLEXING ITS MUSCLES IN RELATIONS WITH ITS
NEIGHBOURS, REPORTSTEFAN WAGSTYL AND ANDREW JACK
Financial Times, 3 Mar 04, by Andrew Jack and Stefan
Wagstyl
The nomination ofMikhail Fradkov as Russia's next prime
minister will do little to soften the Kremlin's
increasingly assertive foreign policy, especially in the
countries of the former Soviet Union.
Mr Fradkov, a long-serving diplomat whose name was put
forward on Monday by President Vladimir Putin, will bring
to the post considerable experience of international
relations. But he will also arrive with a history of close
ties with the security services. While his personal views
are not known, he is a member of the siloviki, the current
and former members of the security services, headed by Mr
Putin, who now dominate the Kremlin.
This group has presided over increasing state control in
political and economic affairs. In foreign policy, its
members have taken a tougher approach to Russia's
neighbours.
Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, insists the
country has legitimate interests to protect and is right to
challenge US attempts to increase its influence, for
example in Georgia.
In a recent meeting with foreign journalists, Mr Ivanov
said: "Our political scientists are very concerned at how
the US has created a circle around Russia. We have a
national strategy and interests in the former Soviet Union.
They reflect historical links that we are developing. They
should not be seen as a re-establishment of Soviet
relations . . . The main interest of Russia is to create
around (the country) a security zone."
The country is also concerned about the 20m ethnic Russians
living in surrounding states and about its expanding
economic interests, notably investments by energy companies
such as Gazprom, the gas monopoly, and UES, the electricity
giant.
However, the US and the EU are worried about Russia's
motives. The European Commission last month accused Russia
of "assertive" behaviour towards neighbours. A senior
American official told the FT there were parallels between
developments in domestic policy and increasing
assertiveness towards former Soviet neighbours.
The arguments date back to the 1990s, when a crisis-torn
Russia was forced to accept the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the eastward expansion of Nato and the European
Union. In the past year, led by an effective president and
fuelled by economic recovery, the Kremlin has raised flags
on several fronts.
It began with a dispute last year with Brussels over access
to the Kaliningrad exclave, which will be surrounded by EU
territory when Poland and Lithuania join the union in May.
This was followed by a border row with Ukraine in the Sea
of Azov; arguments with Washington over the triumph in
Georgia of Mikheil Saakashvili, the new US-oriented
president; and a clumsy one-sided Russian effort to end the
long-standing division of the troubled state of Moldova.
These disputes have been compounded by Russian attempts to
influence the deployment of Nato forces in the Baltic
states, all ex-Soviet republics. Russia last month
threatened to pull out of the Conventional Forces in Europe
treaty, a key east-west accord.
The Kremlin has also raised last-minute objections to the
EU's eastward expansion, complaining of threats to Russia's
economic interests. Brussels wants to extend to its 10 new
members the existing partnership and co-operation agreement
(PCA) covering EU-Russia relations. Moscow has demanded the
accord be renegotiated.
Finally, Moscow has demonstrated the political value of its
domination of regional energy supplies by briefly cutting
off the main gas pipe to the west which crosses Belarus.
The move was aimed at putting pressure on Minsk in a
payment dispute, but it caused a political storm in Poland.
Some of these rows will settled but others will rumble on.
New disputes could also emerge, for example, over Ukraine,
where Viktor Yushchenko, a leading candidate to succeed
President Leonid Kuchma in elections this autumn is seen as
a threat because he has strong US backing.
Mr Putin will almost certainly try to prevent these rows
affecting global relations with the US and leading European
states, including France, Germany and the UK. He knows the
west dominates the international community to which he
wants to belong. He also appreciates the US-led
anti-terrorism war which serves Moscow's interests by
targetting terrorist threats on Russia's southern borders.
However, the siloviki and others who want to play tough
have plenty of scope. Mr Fradkov's appointment, which is
due to be confirmed later this week by the Duma, is
unlikely to stop them.
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