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Tue & Wed, 16 -17 Mar 04; Op-eds
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NE-@latvia-usa.org
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Mar 16, 2004 22:01 PST
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NATO ENLARGEMENT DAILY BRIEF (NEDB)
Wednesday, 17 March 2004, 01:30 EDT
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* CHANGE IN SPAIN / NYT / Editorial
* REWARDING TERROR IN SPAIN / NYT / Edward N. Luttwak
(CSIS)
* SOCIALIST SPAIN A BLOW TO U.S. / CSM/Peter Ford
* TIME TO SAVE AN ALLIANCE / WP / Robert Kagan (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace)
* MAKE THE RIGHT CHOICES ON RUSSIA / WT / Saulius Kuprys
(President, Lithuanian American Council Inc. and Joint
Baltic American National Committee Inc.)
* THE MOTHER OF ALL ZERO-SUM GAMES / WSJE / Vladimir Socor
(IASPS)
* GEORGIA TARGETS CONSOLIDATION / WT/ Editorial
* ADZHARIA NEEDS COOL HEADS / MT / Pavel Felgenhauer
(Independent defense analyst, Russia)
* UZBEKISTAN - A REPRESSIVE REGIME / IHT / Andrew
Stroehlein ( International Crisis Group)
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CHANGE IN SPAIN
New York Times, 16 Mar 04, Editorial
The terrorist bombings in Madrid last week were undoubtedly
the main factor in Sunday's upset of the incumbent Popular
Party, which supported the American invasion and occupation
of Iraq. The victorious Socialists, like most Spaniards,
did not. If Al Qaeda organized the bombings, as now seems
to be the case, the outcome may be seen by some as a win
for the terrorists. We disagree.
Certainly, the events in Madrid have been a major blow to
the Bush administration's strategy of inducing democratic
governments to endorse its military operations even in the
teeth of overwhelming opposition from their own people. But
the war on terror will go on, perhaps stronger than ever.
The Popular Party expected that its impressive economic
achievements would cause the Spanish people to overlook
Prime Minister José María Aznar's unpopular decision to
support the invasion of Iraq and send a symbolic detachment
of Spanish troops to aid in the effort. Thursday's
terrorist strike ? Western Europe's worst in more than half
a century, with 200 dead and 1,500 wounded ? scrambled the
political calculus. Sunday's vote became an expression of
national pride and mourning. Spaniards who might not
otherwise have voted turned out in large numbers and voted
against a government that they opposed before the bombs
went off. Others may have turned against the government
over its early emphatic insistence that the bombings had
been the work of Basque, rather than Islamic, terrorists.
Either way, it was an exercise in healthy democracy, in
which a change of government is simply that, and not a
change of national character.
It is possible to support the battle against terrorism
wholeheartedly and still oppose a political party that
embraces the same cause. The Spanish people, who have
suffered under the violence of Basque terrorists for years,
undoubtedly feel a redoubled commitment to fight on and
avenge the innocents who died in Madrid. That did not make
them obliged to keep Prime Minister Aznar's party in power.
Here in the United States, as much as the White House would
like the elections to be about fear and national
insecurity, they are a choice between two men and two
political philosophies ? not a referendum on terrorism.
The Socialists, under José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, ran on
a platform of withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq unless a
United Nations-led force takes charge after June 30. Mr.
Zapatero now has an opportunity to use his new mandate to
pressure Washington to seek U.N. help. The Bush
administration has already learned it needs the United
Nations. That, like the defeat of Mr. Bush's allies in
Spain, should help the president to realize what it really
takes to win a permanent international war against violent
outlaws like Al Qaeda. The peaceful nations of the world
are all in this together, and they must work as partners.
Mr. Zapatero, for his part, cannot view his victory as a
mandate for isolationism, an option that is simply not
available to any member of the European Union. It is
instead a summons to join Europe and the United States in
the kind of intense and broadly based cooperation that can
provide the most sustained and effective answer to the
tragedy of Madrid.
REWARDING TERROR IN SPAIN
New York Times, 16 Mar 04, by Edward N. Luttwak *
* Edward N. Luttwak is a senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
It must be said: Spanish voters have allowed a small band
of terrorists to dictate the outcome of their national
elections. This is not how democracies are supposed to
react when they are attacked by fanatics. Americans were
visibly united and hardened by Sept. 11; the Italians
overcame deep political differences to unify in their
determination to crush the Red Brigades; Israeli cohesion
has only been increased by decades of terrorism. When
threatened by a violent few, democratic political
communities will normally react by enforcing the will of
the many.
For many years, this has been the Spanish answer to the
Basque separatist movement. But it was not the response to
last week's bombings.
Before the attacks, the polls forecast a victory for
Mariano Rajoy of the Popular Party, for the very good
reason that he was the chosen successor of Prime Minister
José María Aznar, who has led Spain on the path of
modernization and prosperity with almost universally
acknowledged success. Three days before the elections, Mr.
Rajoy seemed to be headed for victory over José Luis
Rodríguez Zapatero, leader of the Spanish Socialist
Workers' Party, who campaigned on a pledge to withdraw the
1,300 Spanish troops stationed in Iraq if the United
Nations did not assume control of the occupation. Mr.
Zapatero's call was not merely to avoid more casualties,
but to affirm that the Iraq war was an act of imperialist
aggression that Spain should never have supported.
Even those who view the Iraq war as a strategic error for
the United States ? and I'm one of them ? cannot take
seriously the Zapateros of Europe, who seem bent on
validating the crudest caricatures of "old European"
cowardly decadence. It was an act of colossal
irresponsibility for the Socialists and the Spanish news
media to excoriate the Aznar government for asserting that
ETA, the Basque separatist movement, was probably behind
the attacks.
Were the Socialists certain Al Qaeda was involved? No, but
saying so made it easier to convince voters that the bombs
had been placed by Muslims angry that Spain had sided with
the United States in the war ? and that the only way to
make things right would be to get out of Iraq.
Whatever their motivation, the Socialists' argument was
fundamentally flawed. Osama bin Laden and other Islamists
had identified Spain as a priority target years before the
Iraq war. Under Muslim law, no land conquered by Islam may
legitimately come under non-Muslim rule. For the fanatics,
Spain is still Al Andalus of the Middle Ages, which must be
re-claimed for Islam by immigration and intimidation. Even
if the bombs were placed by Islamists, the idea that Spain
was attacked solely because of Mr. Aznar's support for the
Iraq war is simply wrong.
And even if ETA is found to be responsible ? something that
seems increasingly unlikely given the direction of the
investigation ? the damage has been done. The Spanish
political community has failed the test of terrorism ? it
has bowed to the violence of the few. Weakness tends to
invite further attack. In this regard, Spain is vulnerable.
It still rules the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the
North African coast, which Islamists view as Christian
colonies on Muslim soil. Having seen what bombs can do,
they might be tempted to see if a few more explosions can
induce the Spanish to withdraw. Similarly, ETA may well
decide that another massacre or two will persuade the
Spanish government to accept its demands.
Paradoxically, Mr. Zapatero can redeem Spanish democracy
only if he repudiates the popular mandate he received and
announces that there will be no withdrawal from Iraq
because of any act of terrorism, Muslim or Basque.
What will the rest of Europe do? For politicians in
countries like Italy, with both strong anti-American
movements and troops in Iraq, the risks are obvious. Any
politician who invokes Madrid to demand a withdrawal from
Iraq will be inviting terrorist attacks to prove his point.
What's more, it's unlikely that this strategy will work
politically. The Spanish literally had no time to reflect
between the Madrid bombings and the election. With more
time, other nations are more likely to react as democracies
usually do: by rejecting terrorists and their deluded
causes.
SOCIALIST SPAIN A BLOW TO US
INCOMING PRIME MINISTER ZAPATERO HAS SIGNALED HE WILL PULL
SPANISH TROOPS FROM IRAQ.
The Christian Science Monitor, 15 Mar 04, by Peter Ford
Just when it seemed that European nations had made their
peace with Washington and among themselves over Western
policy in Iraq, the Socialist Party's upset victory in
Spain's general elections Sunday has thrown many diplomatic
assumptions into doubt.
The defeat of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar's Popular
Party, a strong supporter of US policy in the Middle East,
is a blow to America's hopes of rallying Europe behind its
vision for the region. It is likely to pose problems, too,
for US allies on the Continent such as British leader Tony
Blair and Italian premier Silvio Berlusconi, who are
expected to come under renewed pressure from skeptical
electorates.
"This changes all the equilibriums in Europe," says Sergio
Romano, an influential Italian commentator on foreign
affairs. "Spain is no longer America's main partner on the
European mainland. It is definitely bad news for
pro-American governments in Europe, and for sectors of the
left that have tried to hold radical pacifists at bay."
Incoming Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero quickly
reassured voters and foreign governments that his country
would remain a firm combatant in the war on terrorism,
following last week's deadly train bombing in Madrid. "My
most immediate priority is to fight all forms of
terrorism," he told supporters Sunday night.
The election results, punishing Mr. Aznar for his perceived
manipulation of the bombing investigation, and rewarding
Mr. Zapatero's outspoken opposition to US policy, "will
strengthen those forces in Europe that have questioned US
strategy toward the greater Middle East," says Steven
Everts, an analyst at the Centre for European Reform in
London. "It will shift the balance."
Across the Continent Monday, Europeans observed three
minutes of silence to remember the 200 victims of
Thursday's bomb attacks. In Brussels, European Union
officials held a vigil, while in Germany, thousands of auto
workers put down their tools. Passengers at London's
Heathrow, Europe's busiest airport, stood quietly as all
takeoffs were halted. In Paris cafes, patrons fell silent
as sirens wailed and church bells rang.
A call to take stock
Miguel Angel Moratinos, widely tipped to be Spain's new
foreign minister, did not mince words Monday as he set out
the incoming government's position to France Inter, a
French radio station.
"We need some self-criticism" over Iraq policy, he stated
in an interview. "European leaders and international
leaders should meet immediately to take stock, to be clear
about the consequences of this blind policy that is leading
the Middle East and the West into a dead end. It has to be
changed."
Zapatero told the Cadena Ser radio station Monday that he
would withdraw Spanish troops serving in Iraq by June 30th.
"The Spanish troops will come back," he said. "Mr. Blair
and Mr. Bush must do some reflection ... you cannot
organize a war with lies."
Mr. Moratinos nuanced that stance, repeating the
Socialists' campaign pledge that the troops would withdraw
if there were no new United Nations mandate authorizing
their presence. Spain is due to take over command of 9,000
troops in central Iraq on July 1st.
A troop withdrawal in the wake of the train attacks, now
believed to be the work of Al Qaeda, would risk drawing
accusations that Spain was appeasing terrorists. A
videotaped statement purporting to be from Al Qaeda and
claiming responsibility for the bombings said it was "a
response for your collaboration with the criminals Bush and
his allies. This is how to respond to the crimes you have
caused in the world and specifically in Iraq and
Afghanistan."
Polish Prime Minister Lezsek Miller, who has sent 2,400
soldiers to Iraq, told reporters Monday that he would keep
them there.
"Revising our position on Iraq after terrorist attacks
would be to admit that terrorists are stronger and that
they are right" to continue such attacks, he said.
Spanish Socialists, however, angrily reject such charges.
"No one can ever negotiate with terrorists, and pulling the
troops out cannot be seen in terms of any kind of
negotiation" says Salvador Clotas, a Socialist Party
eminence grise. "It is the fulfillment of an electoral
promise made independently of this terrible tragedy. The
Socialist Party was always against the war."
Zapatero "will have to be really careful" in his handling
of the question, suggests Mr. Everts. "Saying you want a
greater UN role is not giving in to Al Qaeda, but he will
have to make that argument in a delicate and specific
manner."
The new government, adds Dr. Romano, "will definitely try
to avoid a crisis with America, but some kind of softer
disengagement" from Spain's close alliance with Washington
"will probably take place."
That, says Jose Ramon Montero, a politics professor at the
Autonomous University of Madrid, means that Zapatero "will
return to Europe ... and take a similar position to France
and Germany, leaving Blair and a few exceptions like
Berlusconi on their own."
Changed mood across Europe
That shifting balance of power, says Everts, "means the
question of Western troops in Iraq will have to be
rethought, and the conditions attached to any NATO role
will be looked at more carefully. The United Nations will
have to be much more front and center. The elections were
only in Spain, but they signify a change of mood" across
Europe.
On other issues, too, the new Socialist government is
likely to realign Madrid with the nations US Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously dismissed last year as
"old Europe," Spanish analysts say.
"Aznar has played a confrontational role with France and
Germany," says Professor Montero, alienating the two
countries at the heart of the European Union by torpedoing
a European constitution over Spain's voting rights in a
reformed EU, among other things. "Zapatero will play a more
prominent role ... with new initiatives on the table to
look for a consensus."
* Lisa Abend and Geoff Pingree contributed to this
report from Madrid.
TIME TO SAVE AN ALLIANCE
The Washington Post, 16 Mar 04, by Robert Kagan *
* Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, is the author of "Of
Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World
Order."
The terrorist attack in Madrid and its seismic impact on
the Spanish elections this past week have brought the
United States and Europe to the edge of the abyss. There's
no denying that al Qaeda has struck a strategic and not
merely a tactical blow. To murder and terrorize people is
one thing, but to unseat a pro-U.S. government in a nation
that was a linchpin of America's alliance with the
so-called New Europe -- that is al Qaeda's most significant
geopolitical success since Sept. 11, 2001.
The unhappy reality is that a significant number of Spanish
voters seem to have responded to the attacks in Madrid
exactly as al Qaeda hoped they would. They believed their
government's close cooperation with the United States, and
specifically with the Bush administration in Iraq, had
brought the wrath of the terrorist organization on them,
and that the way to avoid future attacks was to choose a
government that would withdraw from Iraq and distance
itself from the United States. Other European peoples and
governments have quietly flirted with this kind of thinking
in the past, and not just recently but throughout the
1990s. But Spaniards have now made this calculus public. If
other European publics decide that the Spaniards are right,
and conclude that the safer course in world affairs is to
dissociate themselves from the United States, then the
transatlantic partnership is no more.
Already there are statements by top European leaders that
have the ring of dissociation. In a clear swipe at U.S.
policy, European Commission President Romano Prodi
commented in the wake of the Madrid attacks: "It is clear
that using force is not the answer to resolving the
conflict with terrorists." Terrorism, he said, "is
infinitely more powerful than a year ago." So apparently
Prodi accepts al Qaeda's logic, too.
In the coming days and weeks, Europeans will close ranks
with Spain and express common European solidarity against
al Qaeda terrorism. But there is a real danger that many
Europeans will not extend the solidarity across the
Atlantic. Some may argue, at least implicitly, that
separation from the United States is one effective,
nonviolent defense against future terrorist attacks.
Needless to say, that would be a disaster for the United
States. The Bush administration needs to recognize it has a
crisis on its hands and start making up for lost time in
mending transatlantic ties, and not just with chosen
favorites. The comforting idea of a "New Europe" always
rested on the shifting sands of a public opinion, in Spain
and elsewhere, that was never as favorable to American
policy as to the governments. The American task now is to
address both governments and publics, in Old and New
Europe, to move past disagreements over the Iraq war, and
to seek transatlantic solidarity against al Qaeda.
John Kerry has an important role to play now, too. The
temptation for Kerry and his surrogates to use events in
Spain to bolster their arguments against President Bush's
foreign policy may be irresistible. But Kerry should think
hard before he pushes the point too far. After all, he
could be president next January. If Europeans respond to
the attack in Spain by distancing themselves from the
United States, a divided and dysfunctional West will be his
inheritance. Like Bush, Kerry should move the transatlantic
conversation beyond the Iraq war to the common war against
al Qaeda.
But the problem is not all on the American side, and
neither is the solution. Responsible heads in Europe must
understand that anything that smacks of retreat in the
aftermath of this latest attack could raise the likelihood
of further attacks. Al Qaeda's list of demands doesn't end
with Iraq. The attack in Madrid was not just punishment for
Spain's involvement in Iraq but for involvement with the
United States in the war on terrorism. Al Qaeda's statement
taking credit for the bombings in Madrid condemned Spain's
role in Afghanistan, too. Al Qaeda seeks to divide Europe
and the United States not just in Iraq but in the overall
struggle. It seeks to convince Europeans not only that the
use of force in Iraq was mistaken but that the use of force
against terrorism in general is mistaken and futile -- just
as Prodi is arguing. Are Europeans prepared to grant all of
al Qaeda's conditions in exchange for a promise of
security? Thoughts of Munich and 1938 come to mind.
The incoming Spanish government has declared its intention
to move away from the United States and back to the "core
of Europe," meaning France and Germany. Presumably Jacques
Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder will welcome their new ally in
Old Europe. But presumably they also know that dissociation
from the United States in the wake of the Madrid bombings
will be a disaster for Europe. If the United States cannot
fight al Qaeda without Europe's help, it is equally true
that Europe can't fight al Qaeda without the United States.
If Europe's leaders understand this, then they and Bush
should recognize the urgency of making common cause now,
before the already damaged edifice of the transatlantic
community collapses.
MAKE THE RIGHT CHOICES ON RUSSIA
The Washington Times, 15 Mr 04, letter by Saulius Kuprys *
* MR. SAULIUS KUPRYS is President of Lithuanian American
Council Inc.and Joint Baltic American National Committee
Inc.
We were quite taken aback by your editorial "The Russian
bear and its former territories" [March 5], which seems to
apologize for some Russian policies toward its neighbors.
By "former territories," The Washington Times would
relegate the Baltics to a Russian sphere of influence. It
bears repeating that the Baltic states were restored
independence in 1991. The countries were illegally occupied
and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, something that was
never recognized by the United States. Russia refuses to
this day to recognize the illegality of these Soviet
actions.
Fortunately, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will be joining
NATO by the end of this month and the European Union on May
1. The countries have worked hard to join the West and
deserve to be part of the trans-Atlantic alliance, even
though the price can be heavy. The first Baltic soldier to
sacrifice his life, an Estonian, died in a bomb blast in
Baghdad at the end of February. The Baltics are expected to
"behave," according to higher international standards.
Should we not have the same expectations of Russia? Or do
we look the other way?
It would be counterproductive to suggest that the United
States "refrain from vilifying Russia for pursuing its
interests." What happens when Russian interests conflict
with the interests of other independent countries in the
region? Or U.S. interests?
Sen. John McCain's straight talk should be commended. In
Riga, Latvia, he recently expressed his concerns about
democracy slipping in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Many
opposition leaders from the latter two countries were
witness to that message. Both Belarus and Ukraine have
critical elections this year, which could make or break
authoritarianism there.
There is a clear choice between Western-style democracy and
systems more sinister. Russia, too, faces this choice.
THE MOTHER OF ALL ZERO-SUM GAMES
The Wall Street Journal Europe, 12 Mar 04, by Vladimir
Socor *
* Mr. Socor is a Bradley senior fellow of the
Washington-based Institute for Advanced Strategic &
Political Studies, publishers of the Policy Briefings
series on Eurasia.
On the heels of closely managed parliamentary elections
that put Russia's legislature -- the State Duma -- in his
pocket, President Vladimir Putin is about to be reelected
Sunday in another parody of an election. The Kremlin has
recruited amenable candidates to stand in these elections,
persecuted the independent ones, practically monopolized
the television networks, and thus molds public opinion
almost as in olden days.
However, such an accumulation of
discretionary power has direct consequences not only on how
Russia is governed, but also on how it behaves
internationally. Mr. Putin and his team are clearly stating
that restoration of dominance in the "former Soviet space"
is the top priority in their foreign policy. The leadership
is under no public pressure to pursue such a policy;
opinion surveys show that this is far from being among the
main desires of Russian voters. But the same surveys do
show that empire-rebuilding would sit well with a growing
number of Russian voters; such is the result of active
opinion-molding by the Kremlin.
Against this background, it's even more peculiar that NATO
-- the great alliance of democracies -- is considering the
possibility of inviting the restorer of Russian autocracy
to NATO's upcoming summit. A debate is under way, and a
decision one way or the other might emerge in the next few
weeks.
Certain Western chancelleries would like
for their own political reasons to stage a public-relations
spectacular with Mr. Putin at the alliance's summit in
Istanbul in June. Taking advantage of this situation, Mr.
Putin has developed a bold agenda for the upcoming event.
That the Kremlin should have an agenda for a summit of
NATO is in itself an unprecedented development. Mr. Putin's
diplomats are broadly hinting that the Russian president
would graciously attend, on at least two conditions:
The first is that the allied summit should call for speedy
ratification of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces
in Europe (CFE, covering heavy weaponry) and accession to
it by the three Baltic states, with the aim of restricting
allied defensive deployments in the Baltics. At the same
time, Mr. Putin wants the alliance to tolerate Russia's
own, continuing violations of the CFE Treaty in the South
Caucasus into the future.
Mr. Putin's second condition is that NATO -- and the West
generally -- should tolerate only a partial fulfillment, or
even nonfulfillment, of Russia's commitments to withdraw
its troops from Georgia and Moldova. Known as the Istanbul
Commitments, these were signed at the OSCE's Istanbul
summit in 1999, along with the adapted CFE Treaty, as two
parts of one package. NATO has always said that
ratification of the CFE Treaty and Baltic accession to it
are linked to Russia's compliance with the Istanbul
Commitments. By now, however, Moscow rejects the notion
that it has made "commitments" on base closure and troop
withdrawal. Instead, it insists that those are negotiable,
and demands wide-ranging exemptions, as well as Western
acceptance of verification loopholes.
Russian diplomats are quite clear about the Kremlin's wish
list in the run-up to the NATO summit. There are five main
items on that list:
? First, Russia seeks an extension of seven years for the
Russian military bases in Georgia, at Batumi and
Akhalkalaki (Russia also retains smaller military
installations elsewhere in Georgia, including two in
Tbilisi itself). Moscow wants a bilateral treaty that would
legalize those bases for the duration, aiming to create the
appearance of host-country consent.
In truth, a seven-year or even a five-year term would be
farcically long for relocating the roughly 4,000 Russian
military personnel to Russia next door. It would also be
dangerously long, leaving sufficient scope for mischief
down the road.
For their part, Georgia and its partners in NATO should:
a) adhere to the position that three years are amply
sufficient for the troop withdrawal; b) insist that any
treaty include specific binding provisions about troop
withdrawal (not merely about the duration of the
functioning of those bases, as Moscow wants); c) sign the
treaty in a credible international framework (not the OSCE)
that could monitor compliance and penalize noncompliance;
and d) obtain guarantees of immediate ratification by Mr.
Putin's pocket Duma, or alternatively avoid any requirement
for parliamentary ratification because it would enable the
Kremlin to procrastinate for as long as it chooses.
? Second, Moscow seeks to retain indefinitely the sprawling
military base at Gudauta in Abkhazia, a Russian-controlled
secessionist area of Georgia. Under the Istanbul
Commitments, this base was to have been closed in 2001.
Instead, it is being used by Russia's "peacekeeping" troops
that guarantee Abkhazia's secession. Russia wants NATO
countries to confine themselves to a one-time, German-led
inspection there, ostensibly to verify whether the heavy
weaponry was removed from Gudauta under the CFE Treaty. The
real task for Georgia's NATO partners, however, is to
ensure implementation of the Istanbul Commitments by having
Gudauta closed or alternatively transferred legally to the
Georgian side.
? Third, the Russian side wants NATO to close its
collective eyes to the "white spots" -- where
Russian-supplied heavy weaponry is deployed in violation of
the CFE Treaty. Pudically known in bureaucratic parlance
as "unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment," that
Russian-delivered weaponry is massively deployed in
Karabakh, especially in the ethnically cleansed Lower
Karabakh districts, deep inside Azerbaijan proper (this
even as Moscow claims to be a mediator between Armenia and
Azerbaijan).
Such arsenals also are deployed in Georgia's Abkhazia and
South Ossetia breakaway areas, and in Moldova's
secessionist Trans-Dniester region. The OSCE recognizes the
problem, but claims, all too blithely, that it can not
perform verification on-site, let alone enforce compliance
with the CFE Treaty in those areas. NATO, however, can not
afford to act as the OSCE does on this matter.
? Fourth, ahead of NATO's summit, Russia seeks
international acceptance of the continuing presence of its
troops in the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova. Under the
1999 Istanbul Commitments, those troops were to have been
withdrawn completely and unconditionally by December 2002;
but this was not done.
Meanwhile, Moscow reports figures (2,000 or less) that
patently understate the number of Russian troops there;
wants at least some of those troops to stay on indefinitely
as "peacekeepers;" and moreover, wants NATO and the OSCE to
tolerate the continuing existence of the 8,000-strong
Trans-Dniester army, a Russian force in all but name, now
on the border of the enlarged NATO. The allies should have
no part in such charades.
? And, fifth, Russia wants NATO's summit in effect to
loosen, or even break in some respects, the linkage between
the fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments and the
ratification of the CFE Treaty. Specifically, it wants the
NATO summit to call for the treaty's ratification and
Baltic accession to it, while tacitly accepting Moscow's
four wishes that would massively breach the Istanbul
Commitments.
In sum, Mr. Putin is playing to win on both the Baltic and
the Southern fronts; in what might be termed the mother of
all zero-sum games. No part of this agenda, no fraction of
this price is worth conceding for the dubious honor of
securing Mr. Putin's presence at NATO's summit.
GEORGIA TARGETS CONSOLIDATION
Washington Times, 16 Mar 04, Editorial
The tense standoff between Georgia and one of its
breakaway regions could put the United States in a tricky
position. Surely, Washington wants to support the
pro-American Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili in his
efforts to reinforce the territorial integrity of his
country. But an armed clash between central authority in
Tbilisi and the rebellious region of Adjara could spread,
possibly engulfing areas with strong Islamic sentiments.
Instability would threaten an oil pipeline project that
seeks to connect the Caspian basin with the Turkish
Mediterranean. Also, Washington doesn't want to get caught
between Tbilisi and Moscow on the dispute.
Yesterday, Mr. Saakashvili ordered an economic blockade
around Adjara, after armed supporters of the region's
leader, Aslan Abashidze, prevented him from entering. The
Georgian president has vowed to bring the region under
Tbilisi's control by the March 28 parliamentary elections.
So far, the United States has wisely struck a
supportive but neutral position, offering to help mediate
the crisis. Washington should bolster its private dialogue
with Mr. Saakashvili and propose that Moscow be given a
mediating role. Formally involving Russian officials could
minimize the shadowy role they are likely to take in the
conflict.
Adjara, which is on the Black Sea coast and benefits
from trade and custom's revenue, provides higher living
standards than most of Georgia. Mr. Abashidze has been a
popular leader in the area for more than a decade, due in
part to the de facto independence he has been able to
secure from Tbilisi. His democratic credentials are
ambiguous, but Mr. Abashidze has not declared outright
independence for Adjara in the way other rebellious leaders
in Georgia have. If Mr. Saakashvili wants to negotiate a
consolidation of Georgia, then Mr. Abashidze is the leader
to start talks with.
What Mr. Saakashvili could offer Mr. Abashidze is
formal independence, since the Georgian constitution is
vague on self-rule for these regions. Mr. Saakashvili also
could offer Mr. Abashidze the prospect of becoming both a
regional and national political figure, by campaigning for
parliament.
The question remains, though, does Mr. Saakashvili want
to negotiate. The young and charismatic leader may believe
that he can spark a revolution in Adjara like the kind that
won him power in Tbilisi, noted Nikolas Gvosdev, a senior
fellow with the Nixon Center. But this is unlikely, since
Mr. Saakashvili is widely seen in Adjara as coercively
enforcing Tbilisi's will.
U.S. officials should ensure that they are speaking in
unison on policy toward Georgia, and that Mr. Saakashvili
hasn't misconstrued America's statements of support for
military backing. Armed volatility in the Caucuses is the
last thing Washington, Moscow and Tbilisi need right now.
ADZHARIA NEEDS COOL HEADS
The Moscow Times, 16 Mar 04, by Pavel Felgenhauer *
* Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst
The day after being re-elected President Vladimir Putin
faced a serious crisis in Georgia, involving Russian
interests and Russian troops. A long-simmering
confrontation between the Georgian government, now led by
President Mikheil Saakashvili, and the tiny autonomous
Adzharian Republic in southwest Georgia seems to be edging
towards an armed confrontation.
Moscow has supported the separatist leaders of autonomous
republics in Georgia since the country became independent.
During an armed confrontation in South Ossetia in 1991-92,
and a war in Abkhazia in 1992-93, the Russian military
supplied separatists in both regions with arms and
munitions, and provided them with artillery and air
support.
Officially the Russian authorities never acknowledged these
facts, but in private Defense Ministry officials admitted
the high level of Russian involvement. In 1994 in Abkhazia,
a Russian Hind Mi-24 attack helicopter pilot said, "In
1993, we were given orders to cover the Russian insignia of
our aircraft with dirt. We did bomb the Georgians."
The Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts ended with the
Georgians defeated and cease-fires brokered by Moscow.
Russian troops were deployed to ensure that these regions
stayed separate from Georgia. Constant low-level guerrilla
warfare has since continued on the Abkhaz-Georgian
cease-fire line, while South Ossetia has been peaceful.
There are no proper border guards or customs posts on the
Georgian side of South Ossetia, because Tbilisi regards the
area as part of its sovereign territory. This has
facilitated a massive trade in contraband going through the
Rokhsky tunnel highway connecting South Ossetia in Georgia
and North Ossetia in Russia. The North Ossetian
authorities, who believe South Ossetia to be an integral
part of the Ossetian nation, allow more or less free
transit of goods and people at the northern end of the
tunnel without proper visas or customs controls.
The Ossetians (unlike most North Caucasian nationalities)
are Christians and have historically been enemies of the
Muslim Chechens and Ingush. But while the Ossetians have
strongly supported the Russian war in Chechnya, most
foreign volunteers (or mercenaries, as the Russian
authorities call them) reach Chechnya through Georgia and
then through Ossetia and the Rokhsky tunnel -- through a
hole in the border Moscow itself helped create.
All attempts at a political solution to the separatist
problems of Georgia have failed during the last decade and
now Adzharia is also becoming an issue. While wars ravaged
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, civil war raged inside Georgia
proper and hundreds of thousands of ethnic Georgians were
evicted from Abkhazia, Adzharia was peaceful.
The local population considers itself Georgian and does not
aspire to independence, though under centuries of Turkish
rule most were converted to Islam. Adzharia has been ruled
by Aslan Abashidze, the scion of a dynasty of princes that
were the traditional rulers of Adzharia for centuries.
While Tbilisi has often been in conflict with Moscow over
the last decade, Abashidze developed a good relationship
with the Russian military and the authorities in Moscow.
The Russian military keep a garrison in the Adzharian
capital, Batumi -- the rundown remains of a Soviet
motorized rifle division, now just over 3,000 men (mostly
local Adzharian recruits) and a couple of hundred pieces of
heavy equipment (tanks, armored personnel carriers and
artillery). Batumi port, fully controlled by Abashidze, is
used to supply other Russian troops in Georgia and Armenia.
Moscow also fostered Abashidze as a possible pro-Moscow
Georgian national leader to replace Eduard Shevardnadze.
The sudden rise to power of Saakashvili foiled the
ambitions of the nationalist siloviki clan in the Kremlin
to install "our man" in Tbilisi, and has put Abashidze's
future in jeopardy.
This week Abashidze's private army barred Saakashvili from
entering Adzharia. Saakashvili, in turn, demanded that
Abashidze's forces lay down their arms and that control of
Batumi port and customs be handed over to Tbilisi. Over the
coming days, Putin must act promptly to stop Abashidze and
his allies in Moscow provoking an armed conflict, while
also pressing Saakashvili to refrain from drastic action.
A war in Adzharia and the consequent destabilization of
Georgia are not in Russia's national interests, a fact that
some of Putin's cohorts do not seem to understand.
THE WEST IS FAR TOO KIND TO UZBEKISTAN'S TYRANT
A REPRESSIVE REGIME
International Herald Tribune, 16 Mar 04, by Andrew
Stroehlein *
* Andrew Stroehlein, director of media for the
International Crisis Group, previously trained journalists
in Uzbekistan.
"I didn't want to leave my home," a friend e-mailed me a
few weeks ago, "but Uzbekistan doesn't give me a choice."
After the police got rough and threatened to arrest him, he
decided it would be best to leave the country right away.
Given that torture by the law enforcement agencies in
Uzbekistan is "systematic" - to borrow a word from the
United Nations special rapporteur on torture, Theo van
Boven - my friend, a journalist who had tried to
investigate police abuses for an international news agency,
was wise to get out while he could.
Kind treatment, however, has been the approach of the
international community toward the Uzbek regime. Despite
having promised in recent years that it would mend its
ways, the government of Uzbekistan has not made any
improvements to its appalling human rights record or
undertaken any substantial reforms to fix the deteriorating
economy. Yet visiting officials - from the United States,
the European Union, the United Nations, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, and the International
Monetary Fund - seem to believe that Uzbekistan is making
progress when it clearly is not.
The human rights situation is particularly disturbing. In
addition to engaging in systematic torture, the police
regularly harass journalists, nongovernment workers, human
rights activists and those brave or foolish enough to try
to develop opposition political parties. Media freedom is
nil; more than a dozen journalists are in prison on a
variety of unlikely charges.
It is safe to say those charges are fabricated, because so
many charges in the Uzbek courts are. To fulfill absurd
crime-solving quotas, the police will haul in any poor soul
who happens to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. The
police often use false allegations simply to elicit bribes
from the hapless, who have no choice but to pay up or face
jail.
As the Uzbek economy declines, the police are increasing
their demands for bribes, pushing many into utter penury.
While a few people close to President Islam Karimov enjoy a
near economic monopoly, 80 percent of the country lives in
poverty. The average salary is equivalent to $40 dollars a
month, the lowest in the former Soviet republics of Central
Asia.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
the IMF established benchmarks for Uzbekistan to reform its
economy, but these have been rejected, ignored or only
superficially implemented. The regime's commitments to
political and economic liberalization in bilateral
agreements with the United States and other Western
countries have also come to nothing. It is time for the
international community to drop its ineffective soft
approach and get more hard-edged in dealing with
Uzbekistan.
The State Department needs to say unequivocally to Congress
that it can no longer certify Uzbekistan's progress toward
political liberalization and human rights improvements
under the Foreign Operations Act. It should also outline
steps that the Uzbek government would need to take to
ensure a renewal of aid by December 2004, including
determined and public action against torture, the
participation of independent political parties in
parliamentary elections in December, and an end to media
harassment and censorship.
In the meantime, Washington should suspend American aid to
Uzbek security and law enforcement agencies, which amounted
to $79 million in 2002 and more than $30 million in 2003,
except where vital for international security.
A new approach to Uzbekistan may at first glance appear
problematic for Washington. Karimov is seen as a U.S. ally
in the war on terrorism and there are U.S. bases in
Uzbekistan. But cozying up to the repressive regime in
Uzbekistan is doing serious long-term damage to the image
of the United States in this important, predominantly
Muslim region. At the same time, the deteriorating
socio-economic environment is provoking a rising tide of
popular frustration, which fosters support for radical
Islamist groups.
A U.S. shift of gears is urgently needed. The situation in
Uzbekistan took a turn for the worse late last year, and
harassment of those the regime feels are its enemies has
increased. Uzbeks look on with increasing incomprehension
as the United States, the most powerful democracy in the
world, continues to support and praise the repressive
regime they live under.
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