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Beijing's Position On the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965-1968
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 05:53:05 +0000
To: vietna-@topica.com
Cold War International History Project
Virtual Archive
Working Paper #18: Beijing's Position on the Vietnam Peace Talks,
1965-68: New Evidence from Chinese Sources, by Qiang Zhai
By Qiang Zhai
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=465
9
Beijing's Position On the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965-1968
New Evidence from Chinese Sources
By Qiang Zhai
Auburn University
The Johnson administration's escalation of the war in Vietnam
in 1965 triggered strong domestic criticism. Responding to public
pressure, President Johnson made a number of peace overtures to Hanoi.
The escalating conflict in Indochina also drew serious attention around
the world. Efforts were made by various countries to promote a peaceful
solution to the Indochina conflict. Thus, the war in Vietnam was
intertwined with a series of peace initiatives made not only by
Washington but also by Moscow, London, Paris, and a number of British
commonwealth capitals. How did leaders in Beijing perceive these
initiatives? Why were they so consistent and firm in opposing them? What
were the repercussions of China's policy in the world? This paper uses
newly released Chinese sources to answer these questions. It seeks to
link China's opposition to Vietnam peace talks to Mao's complex
calculations of establishing Beijing's leadership position within the
Third World national liberation movement, limiting Soviet influence in
Indochina, and mobilizing domestic support for his social and political
programs.
China's Objection to Peace Negotiations
Between 1965 and 1968, Beijing strongly opposed peace talks
between Hanoi and Washington and rejected a number of international
initiatives designed to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam
conflict, including the Soviet proposal for an international conference
on Vietnam, the British call for an international meeting on Cambodia
that would provide an opportunity for "corridor contact" between the
United States and the Communist powers on the Vietnam question, the
Indian suggestion for a cease-fire along the 17th parallel supervised by
an "Afro-Asian Force," the Ghanaian mission to mediate between Hanoi and
Washington, the French "neutralization of Indochina" plan, and the
Polish initiatives to bring the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and
the United States to the negotiating table.
The collective leadership which succeeded Khrushchev was more
forthcoming in support of the DRV. On 7-9 February 1965, Soviet Premier
Aleksei Kosygin visited Hanoi, where he called for a total U.S.
withdrawal from South Vietnam and promised Soviet material aid for the
DRV. R. B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War: Volume
III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66 (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1991), p. 54.
While providing increased moral and material support for Hanoi, For a
detailed description of Soviet assistance to Hanoi during the Vietnam
War, see Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996).
the Soviet leadership was more interested in a political settlement of
the Indochina conflict. During his visit to Beijing on February 11
after his trip to Hanoi, Kosygin asked the Chinese to help the United
States to "find a way out of Vietnam." Chinese leaders warned the
Russians not to use the Vietnam issue to bargain with the Americans. Xie
Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shiqi,
1949-1979 [A Diplomatic History of China: The Period of the People's
Republic of China, 1949-1979] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988),
p. 344.
After returning to Moscow, Kosygin on February 16 proposed to the DRV
and China an international conference on Indochina. The Chinese
condemned the Soviet move, asserting that Moscow wanted to cut a deal
with Washington on the Vietnam issue. Chinese Foreign Ministry memo, "A
Conversation Outline: Refuting the Argument that 'China blocked the
Soviet Aid to Vietnam,'" 1 April 1965. [Q]uanzonghao 3124, [J]uanhao
235, [J]iangsu [P]rovincial [A]rchives, Nanjing. This memo was
distributed by the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council on 6
April 1965 to provincial foreign affairs committees as an explanation of
China's position on the Vietnam question.
In the wake of President Johnson's escalation of the U.S.
military involvement in Vietnam, the protest against the war was growing
in the United States. The anti-war campaign built on and merged with
both the civil rights and student movements in late 1964 and early 1965.
Responding to the widespread domestic anxiety about Vietnam, Johnson on
25 March 1965 declared his willingness to "go anywhere at any time, and
meet with anyone whenever there is promise of progress toward an
honorable peace." In fact, the president's statement was purely
rhetoric, for none of his close aides had seriously considered either
the form or the substance of the talks Johnson claimed to be prepared to
conduct anywhere with anyone. Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars,
1945-1990, (New York: HarperPerennial, 1991), p. 153.
The British Labor government was eager to encourage peace talks
on Vietnam. Three days after Johnson made his remarks, Prime Minister
Harold Wilson sent Patrick Gordon Walker, a former foreign secretary, as
his personal emissary to Southeast Asia to promote discussion of the
Vietnam problem among the countries concerned. Both Beijing and Hanoi
refused to receive Walker. According to a biographer of Harold Wilson,
the Walker trip was designed "to distract attention from Britain's
continuing support for the United States." The prime minister had a
penchant for "activity" as opposed to real executive "action." Austen
Morgan, Harold Wilson (London: Pluto Press, 1992), p. 277.
In a meeting with Algerian President Ben Bella in Algiers on March 30,
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai blamed the United States for the fighting in
Vietnam and criticized the British effort at peacemaking. Zhou claimed
that "the American invasion has prevented the realization of the
peaceful unification of South and North Vietnam. At present the United
States intends to intimidate Vietnam through expanding the war and to
use bombing to force Vietnam to submit and agree to conduct 'peace
negotiations.' The United States is promoting peace talks through such
countries as the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. The United States
wants to gain through peace talks what it has failed to gain on the
battleground." The various peacemaking activities conducted by Britain,
Zhou concluded, were "either directly or indirectly instigated by the
United States." The Diplomatic History Research Office of the PRC
Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975
(Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975) (Beijing:
Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), p. 444.
On April 1 and 2, the British Office of the Charge d'Affaires
presented diplomatic notes twice to the Chinese Foreign Ministry with
the suggestion that London send a special representative to Beijing to
talk with the Chinese government about the Vietnam issue. In a reply on
April 12, the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that it was
"inappropriate and unwelcome" for the British government to send a
special envoy to China to discuss the Indochina question. The British
government, the Chinese reply continued, had not condemned U.S.
aggression in Vietnam and thus had betrayed its obligations as a
co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference. Xie, Zhongguo waijiao shi, p.
340.
Despite the refusal of Beijing and Hanoi to welcome him, Gordon
Walker began his journey in mid-April. By this time the thought of
promoting an international conference on Cambodia preoccupied him.
Prince Norodom Sihanouk had first shown interest in such a meeting in
March 1965 after sponsoring the Indochinese Peoples' Conference in Phnom
Penh. He had proposed to reconvene the Geneva Conference of 1954 to
allow the participants to reaffirm their guarantee of Cambodian
neutrality and territorial integrity. The Soviets endorsed Sihanouk's
proposal in early April, as did the British who viewed it as a possible
channel to promote informal discussions on Vietnam. Although U.S.
officials were reluctant to be too closely linked with Gordon Walker's
initiatives for fear of alienating the Thai government because Thailand
had a border dispute with Cambodia, they expressed support for the
conference, nevertheless, partly to avoid pushing Cambodia further into
the arms of China and North Vietnam and partly to demonstrate the
sincerity of Washington's commitment to peace in Indochina. Beijing
supported an international conference on Cambodia but rejected any
discussions at all on Vietnam. After a meeting with Zhou Enlai and Pham
Van Dong on April 17-18 in Indonesia during the celebration of the
Bandung Conference anniversary, Sihanouk announced that he would not
participate in a gathering that was not restricted to discussion of
Cambodia. Gordon Walker's visit to Cambodia on April 26-27 proved
fruitless. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War: Volume
III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66, pp. 60-61, 105-109; George
C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The
Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1983), p. 829. The idea of convening an international
conference on Cambodia dated back to 1962; in the wake of the border
dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, Sihanouk wanted such a conference
to guarantee the borders of Cambodia as defined on French maps of the
19th century. While China supported Sihanouk's proposal, the United
States, Thailand, and South Vietnam opposed it. See Michael Leifer,
"Cambodia and China: Neutralism, 'Neutrality,' and National Security,"
in A. M. Halpern, ed., Policies toward China: Views from Sin Continent
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 345.
In a banquet in honor of a Ghanaian government delegation led by
Foreign Minister Kojo Botsio in Beijing on April 29, Zhou Enlai praised
Sihanouk for his "wisdom in seeing through the American plot regarding
an international conference on Cambodia." The Chinese premier pointed
out that the real reason for "the Johnson Administration's great
interest in convening such a conference lies not in really guaranteeing
the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia but in continuing
the plot of intimidating the Vietnamese people into submission."
Diplomatic History Research Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry, ed, Zhou
Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, p. 450.
To silence domestic and international criticism of U.S.
escalation of the war, President Johnson delivered a much-publicized
speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, in which he emphasized
U.S. resolve to prevail in Vietnam, but he added his readiness to
conduct "unconditional discussions" with Hanoi. Premier Pham Van Dong
responded with his Four Points peace formula on April 8, which demanded
that the United States withdraw its forces from Vietnam and cease its
acts of war; called for neutralization of both Vietnams pending
unification; proposed a settlement of the internal affairs of South
Vietnam in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front;
and insisted that reunification must be arranged by the Vietnamese
people without outside interference. Herring, The Secret Diplomacy of
the Vietnam War, p. 46. Robert S. McNamara recalled that except for
the third point the administration found Hanoi's terms acceptable. See
Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam
(New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 181-182.
Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech triggered renewed efforts at
peacemaking by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the
Indian government. U Thant, U. N. Secretary General, in early April
stated that he wanted to visit China and the DRV to "explore the
possibility of realizing a negotiated settlement in Vietnam." In an
editorial on April 12, the Renmin ribao (People's Daily) pointed out
that the Vietnam question had nothing to do with the United Nations and
that the 1954 Geneva Agreement was concluded outside the U.N.
framework. The United Nations, the editorial went on, had never taken a
just stand on Vietnam, had never condemned U.S. aggression, and thus
had no authority to intervene in Indochina affairs. Xie, Zhongguo
waijiao shi, pp. 338-339.
On April 24, Indian President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan called
for a termination of the bombing of North Vietnam, a cessation of the
fighting in South Vietnam, and the deployment of an Afro-Asian police
force along the border and at critical points in South Vietnam to
supervise the cease-fire. While the United States considered the
proposal favorably, China denounced it as a "plot." Herring, The Secret
Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 49, 831; Xie, Zhongguo waijiao shi,
p.339.
Although the Johns Hopkins address silenced his critics
temporarily, Johnson soon realized that some additional conciliatory
move was necessary. In May, the president decided to suspend the
bombing of North Vietnam for a brief period of time both as a feeler to
see if Hanoi had any interest in negotiations and as a gesture to his
domestic and international critics. The bombing pause lasted from May
13 to 17. The operation was given the code name "MAYFLOWER." Herring,
The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 45-47. The Chinese
asserted that the bombing pause was a "hoax" to lure the Vietnamese into
"unconditional discussions" with the United States and that by
"unconditional discussions" Washington wanted Hanoi to recognize the
U.S. occupation of South Vietnam.
Jin Qiu, "The Vietnamese People Do Not Believe in 'Nice Words' and Do
Not Fear Intimidation," Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge), No. 11, (June
10, 1965), pp. 5-8. For Hanoi's response to the MAYFLOWER initiative,
see Robert K. Brigham, "Vietnamese-American Peace Negotiations: The
Failed 1965 Initiatives," The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 4
(Winter 1995), pp. 377-395.
The failure of the Gordon Walker mission did not dampen Wilson's
enthusiasm for activity on Vietnam. At the June 1965 Commonwealth
conference, the prime minister, after consulting President Johnson,
proposed a Commonwealth Peace Mission to include the leaders of Britain,
Nigeria, Ghana, and Trinidad. President Nyerere of Tanzania refused
membership. The mission was instructed to bring an end to U.S. bombing
of North Vietnam, to persuade Hanoi to stop sending men and materials to
South Vietnam, and to work out a cease-fire in the South to pave the way
for an international conference which would secure the withdrawal of all
foreign troops from Vietnam and establish an international force to
maintain the peace. Washington supported the British initiative because
it embodied most of the objectives the United States had been pursuing.
Xie, Zhongguo waijiao shi, pp. 340-341; Smith, An International History
of the Vietnam War: Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66, p.
154; Morgan, Harold Wilson, p. 277.
On June 22, Xiong Xianghui, Chinese Charge d'Affaires to
Britain, met in London with Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, who was
selected to participate in the Commonwealth mission because of his good
relationship with both Hanoi and Beijing. In accordance with the
Chinese government's general policy of opposing peace talks, Xiong told
Nkrumah that the British commonwealth peace mission would only be
"beneficial to U.S. imperialism" and that China would not welcome it.
Two days later, the Chinese Foreign Ministry approved Xiong's position.
Xiong Xianghui, Lishi de Zhujiao: Huiyi Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai ji
Silaoshuai [Historical Footnotes: Remembering Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai as
well as Four Old Marshals] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao
chubanshe, 1995), pp. 151-157.
In a message to the British government on June 25, Beijing officially
rejected the Commonwealth mission, claiming that the root of the Vietnam
problem and tensions in Southeast Asia was the U.S. violation of the
Geneva Agreement. Xie, Zhongguo waijiao shi, p. 341.
Having failed to persuade the Chinese to receive the mission,
Nkrumah did not give up. He wanted to visit the DRV personally to
promote peace. The North Vietnamese insisted that Nkrumah come to Hanoi
not as a member of the Commonwealth mission, but as president of Ghana.
Preoccupied with domestic economic problems, Nkrumah immediately
dispatched a delegation headed by Kwesi Armah to Hanoi to try to prepare
the way for negotiations. W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy,
1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969), pp. 409-411.
Chinese leaders opposed the mission sent by Nkrumah. They
believed that "the proposal made by the Ghanaian mission to the
Vietnamese represents the old plot of unconditional peace negotiations
advanced several times in the past by the imperialists, revisionists,
and reactionaries." They felt that the idea of using Afro-Asian
countries as mediators was in reality intended to bypass the Geneva
Accords to facilitate a direct negotiation between the Americans and the
Vietnamese. The Chinese government notified the Vietnamese of Beijing's
objection to the Ghanaian mission before its arrival in Hanoi. Chinese
Foreign Ministry circular, "Talks between the Ghanaian Mission and the
Vietnamese," 3 August 1965, Q 3124, J 123, JPA. This circular, along
with two other circulars quoted later in the text, was distributed by
the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to its regional bureaus
and provincial committees on 24 August 1965 as an instruction of China's
position regarding peace negotiations over Vietnam.
In Vietnam the Ghanaian visitors told Vietnamese officials that
Ghana supported Hanoi's Four Points as well as the Five Points peace
formula pronounced by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam
(NLF) on 22 March 1965. Claiming that the current moment was the best
time for peace negotiations because the position of the United States
was not too different from that of North and South Vietnam, the
Ghanaians proposed that Afro-Asian countries serve as mediators in
American-Vietnamese talks. The Vietnamese leaders contended that they
had a better understanding of their enemy than Ghana and that the
Vietnamese people, determined to win a complete victory, "would not be
taken in by Johnson's carrot" policy. The struggle of the Vietnamese
people, they went on, constituted part of the anti-imperialist struggle
waged by the Afro-Asian peoples, who should unite against imperialism.
Ghana should mobilize Afro-Asian nations to force the United States to
accept the demands made by the NLF rather than promote a conference
between the United States and Vietnam. Chinese Foreign Ministry
circular, "Talks between the Ghanaian Mission and the Vietnamese." The
circular's summary of the Vietnamese position during the discussions
with the Ghanaian mission was based on a Vietnamese report.
Ho Chi Minh told the delegation that negotiations were irrelevant and
undesirable because victory might arrive before the end of the rainy
season, but that he would be pleased to receive Nkrumah. Ho then added
that he worried about the safety of the Ghanaian president because of
the American bombing of North Vietnam. Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy,
p. 411.
Ho's last point may be interpreted as a polite and indirect rejection
of a visit by Nkrumah.
On July 10, a Chinese commentator wrote in Shijie zhishi, a
bi-weekly journal reflecting the views of the Chinese Foreign Ministry,
condemning Britain's peace initiatives on Vietnam: "an old colonial
power is collaborating with a new colonial power. The Labor Party is
backing the United States' Vietnam policy in order to win American
support for Malaysia, a neo-colonial product created by Britain." The
commentary attributed Wilson's peacemaking effort to his desire to win
votes before the British election and to please the Americans because
London depended on Washington economically. Yao Niangeng, "The British
Labor Party: A Lackey in American Aggression against Vietnam," Shijie
zhishi, No. 13 (10 July 1965), pp. 10-12.
While condemning the British role in promoting peace talks,
Chinese officials stressed that Washington was the real instigator
behind the African peace initiatives. They believed that the Americans
had two goals in their "peace hoax": first, to take advantage of the
ignorance of African countries about the Vietnam issue and their fear of
an expansion of war to drive a wedge into their relationship with China;
second, to divide China and the DRV by emphasizing Beijing as the
barrier to peace negotiations. Chinese Foreign Ministry circular, "On
'Peace Talk' Activities over Vietnam," 19 August 1965, Q 3124, J 123,
JPA.
On July 19, French Minister of State Andre Malraux arrived in
Beijing as a special envoy of President de Gaulle. Among the topics
covered in his discussions with Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai was
Vietnam. Malraux proposed to Zhou a "neutralization of Indochina" plan,
which would redraw the boundaries of Vietnam. According to the plan,
Vietnam would be divided along the Truong Son Ra mountain. The area
east of the mountain, including Saigon, would belong to the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam or the NLF; the area west of the mountain as well as
Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand would be "neutralized." Malraux also asked
the Chinese whether it was possible to conduct negotiations if the
United States "promised" to withdraw troops from Vietnam. Zhou
immediately rejected Malraux's "neutralization" plan, claiming that the
boundaries in Indochinese countries had long been established and that
the independence and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos should be respected
on the basis of the Geneva Agreements. As to the intentions of
Washington, the Chinese premier believed that the United States did not
want to leave Vietnam. He told the French visitor that China would
firmly support the Vietnamese struggle against the United States.
Chinese Foreign Ministry circular, "Malraux's Visit to China," 12
August 1965. Q 3124, J 123, JPA. For Malraux's account of his visit to
China in 1965, see Andre Malraux, Anti-memoirs (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1968), pp. 325-380. But the book makes no mention of
Malraux's suggestion of redividing Vietnam. In the words of French
scholar Jean Lacouture, Malraux's proposal was "the most wildly
improbable idea that ever emerged from the brain of a novelist." See
Jean Lacouture, Andre Malraux (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), p. 431.
At the Vietnamese National Day reception given by Tran Tu Binh,
North Vietnamese ambassador to China, Zhou Enlai condemned what he
viewed as U.S. "peace talks hoax": "The very aim of the peace talks
plot hatched by the United States is to bring about negotiations by
cajolery so as to consolidate its position in South Vietnam. As long as
the United States does not withdraw its troops, it can carry on endless
talks with you so that it may hang on there indefinitely." Peking
Review, 3 September 1965, pp. 5-6.
During the 21st General Assembly of the United Nations in late
September, U.S. and Soviet officials discussed the Vietnam question
with U Thant. The Chinese media immediately denounced this activity.
Renmin ribao contended that the peace talk proposals by the United
States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations demonstrated that
Washington and Moscow had gone "a step further in their collusion over
Vietnam" and that "the Soviet revisionist leading group" had taken
"another step . . . in becoming an accomplice of U.S. imperialism."
Ibid., 30 September 1965, pp. 29-31.
While condemning what they described as the Soviet-American
"peace talks hoax," Chinese officials applauded the actions of those
countries which refused to serve as a peace broker in the Indochina
conflict. This was clearly demonstrated in Beijing's attitude toward
Sihanouk. On 22 September 1965, the Cambodian leader came to China to
attend the October 1 National Day celebration. He first arrived in
Chengdu, where Vice Premier Chen Yi accompanied him in sightseeing. Two
days later, Zhou Enlai flew to Chongqing to meet Sihanouk and they
traveled together on a Yangtze River ship ride to Wuhan. On board the
ship, Sihanouk told the Chinese premier that if the United States
expanded the war to Cambodia, his people would evacuate from the cities
and go to the countryside and forests to wage a guerrilla war. He also
notified Zhou that he had received a letter from Tito of Yugoslavia who,
together with Lal Bahadur Shastri of India and Gamal Abdul Nasser of
Egypt, urged him to promote negotiations between the United States and
North Vietnam and that he had rejected their proposal. Sihanouk
criticized Washington's rigid position on Vietnam: "De Gaulle has shown
the foresight of a statesman on the Algerian question, and he has
advised the United States not to follow the old path of France but
Johnson would not listen to him." The Chinese hosts were very impressed
by Sihanouk's resolute position on Vietnam. When Sihanouk reached
Beijing, both Mao and Liu Shaoqi met with him. Calling Cambodia "an
anti-American country," Mao told Sihanouk: "You have not only rejected
American aid and separated relations with the United States but also
opposed American imperialism openly not covertly. I once worried that
after you had rejected American assistance you might not be able to pass
the test." Sihanouk replied: "We rejected American aid the way we ended
drug addiction. Just as Chairman Liu Shaoqi has put it, 'American aid
is like opium. When you have developed an addiction, it is very
difficult to stop using it at first. But after a few months of non-use,
you are gradually back to normal conditions.' We have already gradually
returned to normal conditions." Mao said: "That is very good. That is
not an easy thing to do."
Kang Daisha, "My Days in Cambodia," in Cheng Xiangjun, ed., Nu
waijiaoguan [Women Diplomats] (Beijing: Renmin tiyu chubanshe, 1995),
pp. 477-478. Kang Daisha is the wife of Chen Shuliang, who was the
Chinese ambassador to Cambodia between 1962-1967.
As a public relations ploy, President Johnson initiated a
bombing pause over the 1965 Christmas holiday. He also launched a
well-publicized "peace offensive" by sending such aides as Averell
Harriman and Vice President Hubert Humphrey across the globe to spread
the message that the United States was ready to negotiate without
conditions. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States
and Vietnam, 1950-1975 2nd ed., (New York: Mcgraw and Hill, 1986), pp.
165-166.
In Warsaw, Harriman delivered a 14-Point peace plan (including
immediate face-to-face negotiations) to the Poles, requesting that it be
forwarded to Hanoi. Jerzy Michalowski, a high-ranking official in the
Polish Foreign Ministry, set off for the DRV. On his way to Hanoi he
stopped in Moscow and Beijing. In the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko voiced support for the mission but warned against China's
objection. In Beijing, the Polish diplomat met with Deputy Foreign
Minister Wang Bingnan, who denounced the notion of peace negotiations
and insisted that the United States should be kept deeply involved in
the war and that any attempt to prevent Ho Chi Minh from achieving
victory would be a betrayal of the Vietnamese cause. Jerzy Michalowski,
"Polish Secret Peace Initiatives in Vietnam," Cold War International
History Project Bulletin Issues 6-7 (Winter 1995-1996), pp. 241,
258-259; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War pp. 83-84; Janos
Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, & Diplomatic
One-Upmanship in Vietnam (South Bend, Indiana: Gateway Editions,
Limited, 1978), pp. 125-126.
In Hanoi, Pham Van Dong told Michalowski that the DRV was sure
to win the war against the United States and that President Johnson was
aware of this, which was why he wanted negotiations--to try to win at
the negotiating table what he had failed to win on the battleground.
Dong concluded that peace talks would not be in the best interests of
Hanoi, at least not at this moment. Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality, pp.
126-127.
It was possible that the Vietnamese leaders' own calculations of the
military situation made them brush aside the suggestion of negotiation.
It was also possible that Beijing's pressure forced Hanoi to reject
negotiations.
Possibly as an effort to coordinate with the American "peace
offensive," Soviet Politburo member Alexander Shelepin visited Hanoi in
January 1966 and presumably discussed with North Vietnamese officials
the question of negotiations with the United States. Like Michalowski,
Shelepin failed (if he indeed tried) to persuade the North Vietnamese to
accept the U.S. peace proposals. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the
Vietnam War, p. 84. No details have been revealed from either the
Russian or Vietnamese archives regarding Shelepin's talks with the North
Vietnamese. On this issue, Janos Radvanyi wrote: "there was. . .
complete agreement between the Soviet and Vietnamese negotiators
regarding the American peace proposal. When this question came up
during negotiations, Ho Chi Minh explained . . . that the military
situation in the South was not yet considered favorable for a start of
negotiations with the Americans. He did not discount the possibility of
future negotiations: he viewed diplomatic maneuvering as but another
form of revolutionary fighting . . . and he hinted that possibly in
two or three years the DRV might be ready to . . . start
negotiations. Shelepin made no attempt to modify the Vietnamese
position. . . . he completely agreed with Ho." Radvanyi, Delusion
and Reality, p. 165. Radvanyi based his account on reports by the
Hungarian embassy in Hanoi as well as information Budapest received from
Moscow through party channels.
Suspicious of Soviet intentions in the DRV, Chinese commentators
referred to Shelepin's visit as "a new proof of the Soviet guilt in
colluding with the Americans" and called the trip "not an accident" as
it came right after the announcement of the U.S. 14-Point Plan. Shijie
zhishi, Nos., 2-3, (10 February 1966), pp. 4-5.
When Shelepin visited Beijing after his Hanoi tour, Mao only
sent Li Xiannian, a deputy premier, to talk with him despite Shelepin's
high position within the Soviet Politburo. Mao purposefully gave
Shelepin a cold reception to show his displeasure with the Soviet policy
toward the United States. Wang Bingnan's speech at the National
Conference on foreign affairs, 11 February 1966, Q 3124, J 270, JPA.
Wang was a deputy foreign minister, who participated in the Li-Shelepin
talks.
Shelepin again proposed a Sino-Soviet united action to assist the DRV.
Rejecting the proposal, Li asked the Soviet Union to put military
pressure on the United States in Berlin and West Germany. Shelepin
called the Chinese idea unrealistic. Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality, p.
167.
The demand on Moscow to turn up the heat on the Americans in
Europe in order to support the struggle in Vietnam was a consistent
Chinese practice in their conversations with fraternal parties during
this period. In the discussions with the Japanese Communist Party
delegation in March, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping urged the Soviet Union
to "resort to brinkmanship" and create "greater tension in the west" to
counter Washington's expansion of the Vietnam War while Peng Zhen stated
emphatically: "If the Soviet Union were really desiring to support
Vietnam in the struggle, it would create a tenser situation in West
Berlin, to stop the United States boldly withdrawing its troops from
West Germany to send them to Vietnam. This would be more effective than
missiles." Masaru Kojima ed., The Record of the Talks Between the
Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China: How Mao
Zedong Scrapped the Joint Communiqu=E9 (Tokyo: The Central Committee of
the Japanese Communist Party, 1980), pp. 156-157. So far no Chinese
material has been disclosed to shed light on the talks between the
Chinese and Japanese Communist Party delegations in Beijing in early
1966.
Throughout the summer and fall of 1966, third parties continued
to search for a common ground for Vietnam peace talks. After shuttling
between Hanoi and Saigon, the Polish diplomat Januscz Lewandowski put
forward a ten-point proposal for settlement of the war. Although the
Johnson Administration had serious reservations about some points in
Lewandowski's draft, it decided to accept the plan as a basis for
negotiations in order not to appear intransigent. At Lewandowski's
request, Washington also drafted a two-track formula to respond to
Hanoi's opposition to mutual de-escalation. The United States would
terminate the air assaults in return for a confidential promise that the
DRV would end infiltration into key areas of South Vietnam within a
reasonable period. Once North Vietnam had moved, the United States
would stop increasing its combat forces and peace negotiations could
open. The Polish initiative was code-named MARIGOLD. Herring, America's
Longest War, p. 184.
Between October and November 1966, in the middle of MARIGOLD, Le
Duan visited Beijing and talked with Chinese leaders. Zhou Enlai urged
North Vietnam to continue the war, at least until 1968. Although Le
Duan made no promises to the Chinese Premier, he told him that Hanoi
intended to end the conflict with "maximum advantages for itself."
Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, p. 109. The official
chronicle of Zhou Enlai's diplomacy does not mention his talk with Le
Duan in October-November 1966.
MARIGOLD was a failure because several days before the planned opening
of the negotiations, American aircraft bombed railway yards near Hanoi,
inflicting heavy damages to civilian lives and properties. Insisting
that they would not negotiate under pressure, the North Vietnamese
quickly ended the contact. Herring, America's Longest War, pp. 184-185.
Reacting to international and, in the case of Washington,
domestic pressures, both the DRV and the United States modified the
rigid stances they had taken earlier. Hanoi dropped its demand for
acceptance of its Four Points, including a total withdrawal of U.S.
forces, as a precondition for talks, insisting merely that the bombing
be stopped without condition. North Vietnam also softened its
conditions for a settlement, pointing out, among other things, that
reunification could happen over a long span of time. The United States
no longer insisted that Hanoi must withdraw its forces from South
Vietnam in return for termination of bombing, demanding only that
additional infiltration must be ended. Ibid, p. 185.
The Beijing leadership expressed concerned with the recent
conciliatory moves made by Hanoi. During his talks with Pham Van Dong
and Vo Nguyen Giap in Beijing in April 1967, Zhou Enlai warned his
Vietnamese colleagues that the United States might expand the war in the
near future. "The law of war," the Chinese Premier contended, "often
does not follow the will of people. . . . Since war follows its own
rule, the enemy would continue the fighting even if it wishes to end it.
Therefore, for the sake of our future, we should be prepared for the
continuation and expansion of the war. . . . The enemy may blockade
the Vietnamese coast" Throughout the conversations, Zhou praised Hanoi's
military performance and advised the North Vietnamese to carry the war
to the end, giving not the slightest encouragement to a negotiated
settlement. He also inveighed against the Soviet Union, claiming that
Moscow would only jeopardize the cause of the DRV. Zhou's talks with
Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, 7, 10, and 11 April 1967, Diplomatic
History Research Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai
waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, pp. 509-511.
China's vehement hostility to peace talks sometimes inhibited
potential third parties from proposing new peace proposals. In
conversations with Polish Ambassador to the United States Jerzy
Michalowski on 13-14 December 1967, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, noted that "there might
possibly be some attractiveness to considering negotiations in the
framework of a renewed Geneva Conference." Michalowski expressed doubt
about the idea, asserting that "this could only be feasible if agreement
had been reached in advance by the United States and the principal
interested parties. If this were not the case, a reconvened Geneva
Conference would simply be a shambles in which the intransigent views of
the Chinese would predominate." Memo of conversation between Stoessel
and Michalowski, 13 and 14 December 1967, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1964-1968, vol. 17, Eastern Europe, (Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 359-360.
Explaining China's Opposition to Peace Talks
Why was China so persistent in opposing peace talks in Vietnam?
Beijing's objection to peace negotiations was related to Mao's complex
calculations of preserving China's international position and mobilizing
internal support for his radical social and economic programs at home.
First of all, Mao and his associates wanted the North Vietnamese to wage
a protracted war to tie the United States down in Vietnam. In their
calculation, the continued conflict in Vietnam could not only serve as a
model of national liberation war that, if successful, would prove the
correctness of Beijing's militant approach, but also bog the United
States down and drain American resources so that Washington would find
it difficult to send troops to suppress liberation movements elsewhere.
In a conversation with Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere on 4 June
1965, Zhou Enlai contended that "the more U.S. forces were tied down in
Vietnam, the more beneficial it would be for national independence
movements. China is willing to do its utmost to assist Vietnam on every
front. The U.S. distraction in Vietnam is beneficial to the people of
the world. Although the American power is great, it loses its strength
when it is divided."
Zhou's conversation with Nyerere, June 4, 1965, the Diplomatic History
Research Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao
huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, p. 460.
In addition to keeping the United States mired in Vietnam, Mao
also desired to limit the influence of the Soviet Union in Southeast
Asia. He reasoned that any peace meeting on Vietnam would be dominated
by the two superpowers with a further isolation of China and that a
compromise settlement in Vietnam would constitute a victory for Moscow.
He feared that if Moscow and Washington succeeded in working together to
achieve a settlement of the Vietnam conflict, they might be encouraged
to cooperate to deal with other thorny issues in Asia, thus further
diminishing China's influence in the region. The prospect of a joint
Soviet-American rule of the world was Mao's strategic nightmare. Thus,
the desire to preserve China's international position and to forestall
what he perceived to be Soviet-American "collision" against China may
have been Mao's overriding concern in opposing Vietnam peace talks. For
a discussion of Mao's fear of Soviet-American domination of the world
between 1963-1969, see John Garver, "The Tet Offensive and
Sino-Vietnamese Relations," in Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head,
eds., The Tet Offensive (Westport: Praeger, 1996), pp. 55-59.
By 1965, the Sino-Soviet split had reached the point of no
return. Mao believed that Khrushchev's successors in the Kremlin had no
intention to change the policy of peaceful coexistence with the United
States. By downplaying Soviet assistance to Hanoi and portraying the
Soviet Union as an opportunist player seeking a bargain with the
Americans at the expense of Vietnam, Mao hoped to discredit Moscow and
strengthen Beijing's anti-imperialist credentials both within the
international Communist movement and among Third World countries. Mao
rejected a negotiated settlement because he believed that the present
course of the war validated his ideological position on "armed
revolutionary struggle."
Throughout 1966 and 1967, Chinese leaders would seize every
opportunity, whether in talks with foreign visitors or on the platforms
of international meetings, to denounce Moscow's cooperation with the
U.S. "peace talk scheme" in Vietnam. At a mass rally welcoming an
Albanian delegation in Beijing on 30 April 1966, Zhou Enlai condemned
the "counter-revolutionary dual tactics" of the Kremlin, which was
following "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" in its efforts to endorse a
peace solution in Vietnam. The Diplomatic History Research Office of the
PRC Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji,
1949-1975, p. 493; Ronald Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 158.
In 1967, the Chinese government accused the Permanent Secretariat of
the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization of succumbing to Soviet
revisionism and of failing to criticize Soviet-American collaboration in
Vietnam. Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, p. 157.
Finally, Mao found the continued confrontation in Southeast Asia
useful in mobilizing domestic support for his social and political
agendas. By branding American and Soviet peace proposals as "hoax" and
"collusion" and emphasizing the danger of compromise with the enemy, Mao
reminded the Chinese population that they should not slacken their
vigilance on class struggle and that the Cultural Revolution was
necessary to prevent China from turning revisionist.
Sino-Vietnamese Differences over Peace Talks
While providing extensive assistance to the DRV in terms of
weapons, equipment, and support troops, For detailed discussions of
China's assistance to Hanoi during the Vietnam War, see Qiang Zhai,
"Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," in
Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7 (Winter
1995-1996), pp. 233-250; Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam
War, 1965-1969," The China Quarterly, No. 142 (June 1995), pp.
357-387.
Chinese leaders opposed Hanoi's strategy of fighting while negotiating.
A clear gap developed between Beijing and Hanoi regarding the role of
negotiations in the war.
Realizing that Vietnam was a small and underdeveloped country
facing an industrialized foreign power and that the resistance could not
end in a total military victory over the enemy, leaders in Hanoi had to
accept negotiations with the enemy as a fact of life and an integral
component of their struggle for national reunification. They needed
periods of peace in which to consolidate military and political
strength. To them, negotiations were an extension of warfare rather
than an alternative to it. What they sought in direct negotiations with
Washington was a way to improve its chance of winning the war, not a way
of preventing or ending it. Negotiations served as a tactic of warfare.
For further discussions of Hanoi's approach to negotiations, see Gareth
Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris
Agreement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), pp. 1-33;
Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated
Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1978), pp. 11-12.
Chinese leaders, however, failed to appreciate the importance of
negotiations in Hanoi's strategy. In private communications, Foreign
Ministry officials recognized the difference between Beijing's and
Hanoi's approaches to peace talks. In an internal circular prepared on
19 August 1965, they wrote that "the Vietnamese practice on peace talks
is different from ours. The DRV has never completely closed the door on
peace negotiations, thus creating an opportunity for the imperialists,
the revisionists, and the reactionaries and increasing their illusions
about pressing Vietnam into peace talks." Chinese Foreign Ministry
circular, "On 'Peace Talk' Activities over Vietnam," August 19, 1965, Q
3124, J 123, JPA.
Beijing kept urging the DRV to wage a protracted war against the
United States. In a conversation with the DRV party and government
delegation led by Pham Van Dong on 20 October 1965, Mao made clear his
disapproval of negotiations and his conviction that the Vietnamese
should continue their struggle against the Americans until the final
victory:
In fact what will solve the problem is the war you are fighting. Of
course you can conduct negotiations. In the past you held negotiations
in Geneva. But the Americans did not honor their promise after the
negotiations. . . . I have not noticed what issues you have
negotiated with the United States. I only pay attention to how you
fight the Americans and how you drive the Americans out. You can have
negotiations at certain times, but you should not lower your tones. You
should raise your tones a little higher. Be prepared that the enemy may
deceive you. . . . We will support you until your final victory.
The confidence in victory comes from the struggle you have made. For
instance, one experience we have is that the Americans can be fought.
We obtained this experience only after fighting the Americans. The
Americans can be fought and can be defeated. The People's Republic of
China Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Communist Party Central
Documentary Research Department, eds., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan
(Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian
chubanshe and Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), pp. 570-573. Pham Van
Dong came to Beijing after completing a visit to Moscow. It is possible
that he had discussed with the Soviets the issue of negotiations and
reported this discussion to Mao and other Chinese leaders.
Clearly, Mao was suspicious of U.S. intentions in peace talks. Still
fresh in his memory was the American refusal to comply with the Geneva
Accords in 1956 when elections were supposed to be held in Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese leadership was divided on the issue of
negotiations with the United States. For a discussion of the internal
debate within the North Vietnamese leadership on the question of war and
peace, see Brigham, "Vietnamese-American Peace Negotiations."
The Chinese were aware of the differences within the politburo of the
Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP). During a conversation with the Japanese
Communist Party delegation led by Miyamoto Kenji on 6 March 1966, Liu
Shaoqi, Vice Chairman of the CCP Central Committee, said that the
Central Committee of the VWP was divided into pro-war and pro-peace
groups and that the Soviet Union supported the latter group. China, Liu
went on, had made its position clear to comrades in Hanoi: "You may wage
the boldest struggle against U.S. imperialism. You need not be afraid
of the expansion of the war, its expansion into China. If the war
expands to China, we will fight shoulder to shoulder with you." Kojima,
ed., The Record of the Talks Between the Japanese Communist Party and
the Communist Party of China, p. 116.
On 3 April 1968, in response to Johnson's dramatic March 31
speech, Hanoi announced its readiness to send a delegation to talk with
the Americans. According to Hoang Van Hoan, after hearing Hanoi's
announcement, Zhou Enlai immediately asked Ho Chi Minh, who was in
Beijing for medical treatment at the moment, about the VWP's decision.
Stunned, Ho said that he knew nothing about it. In making the decision
to begin negotiations with the United States, Le Duan had neither
reported to Ho in Beijing nor consulted with the Chinese. Hoang Van
Hoan, Canghai yisu: Hoang Van Hoan geming huiyilu (A Drop in the Ocean:
Hoang Van Hoan's Revolutionary Reminiscences) (Beijing: Jiefangjun
chubanshe, 1987), p. 308.
Clearly Le Duan now dominated the Politburo of the VWP and Ho Chi Minh,
because of his increasingly deteriorating health, was no longer involved
in decision making.
Between April 13 and 20, Pham Van Dong visited Beijing and held
four discussions with Zhou Enlai. The Diplomatic History Research Office
of the PRC Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji,
1949-1975, p. 523. This source only lists Zhou's four talks with Pham
Van Dong but provides no detail about the discussions. According to
this same volume, Pham Van Dong left Beijing on April 20 for the Soviet
Union. He returned to Beijing on April 29, briefing Zhou Enlai about
his trip to Moscow. Again no detail is given about this meeting. Ibid,
pp. 523-524.
While the contents of these talks are not known, it is very likely that
the two sides exchanged views about the forthcoming negotiation between
Hanoi and Washington. On May 7, Zhou discussed with Xuan Thuy, Minister
of International Liaison of the VWP, China's attitude toward the peace
talks. Zhou said: "We feel that you have responded too quickly and too
impatiently, perhaps giving the Americans a misperception that you are
eager to negotiate. Comrade Mao Zedong has told Comrade Pham Van Dong
that negotiation is all right but you must assume a high posture."
Contending that what counted most was victory on the battleground, Zhou
advised the Vietnamese envoy that Hanoi should not let the Americans
obtain through negotiations what they had failed to obtain in the
battlefield. Zhou's conversation with Xuan Thuy, May 7, 1968, in the
Diplomatic History Research Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry, ed.,
Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, p. 524.
The Chinese leaders were clearly unenthusiastic about the talks
between the DRV and the United States. Between May and October 1968,
the Chinese media remained silent about the Paris discussions. Chinese
newspapers criticized France for providing a place for the talks. During
this same period, Hanoi censored China's references to the "peace talks
fraud" and the "bombing halt hoax." See Jay Taylor, China and Southeast
Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements, expanded and
updated edition, (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 61.
Mao very reluctantly approved the talks in November 1968. He told Pham
Van Dong in Beijing on November 17 that he was in favor of Hanoi's
policy of fighting while negotiating. But he cautioned the Vietnamese
that it was difficult to get the United States to withdraw from Vietnam
through negotiations and that the Americans did not keep their word.
The People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry and the Chinese
Communist Party Central Documentary Research Department, eds., Mao
Zedong waijiao wenxuan, pp 580-583.
Hanoi's unilateral decision to proceed with negotiations with
the Americans demonstrated the decline of China's influence over the
DRV. Clearly Beijing's relations with the DRV were strained with the
opening of the Paris talks. Hanoi was moving closer to the Soviet Union
in waging the war against the United States and the Saigon regime.
Effects of China's Actions
Without access to Vietnamese archives, it is difficult to judge
the actual effects of Chinese policy on Hanoi's attitude toward peace
talks. Given the existence of pro-war and pro-peace groups within the
VWP's politburo, however, it is plausible to argue that Beijing's
opposition to peace negotiations strengthened the hands of the pro-war
group and alienated the pro-peace group.According to Robert Brigham, the
hard-liners within the VWP leadership included Nguyen Chi Thanh, a cadre
from the South and almost everyone in the NLF supported his
anti-negotiations position in 1965. See Brigham, "Vietnamese-American
Peace Negotiations: The Failed 1965 Initiatives."
According to Soviet sources, after the DRV opened talks with Washington
in 1968, Beijing began to bypass Hanoi and increase contacts with the
NLF, encouraging it to continue protracted guerrilla war. China also
tried to organize units of the local Chinese population in South Vietnam
to intensify military actions there. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the
Vietnam War, p. 169.
China's objection to peace talks complicated its relations with
Hanoi. That the North Vietnamese had greater confidence in Moscow than
in Beijing was suggested by Kissinger, who wrote in his memoirs that the
Soviets "often flaunted their knowledge" of the secret talks between him
and Le Duc Tho while Zhou Enlai "professed to be unaware of them." Henry
Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 749.
Between 1969-1972, Soviet diplomats in Paris met regularly with the DRV
delegation to discuss developments in the peace negotiations. The North
Vietnamese kept Moscow informed not only of the official sessions but
also of private meetings between Xuan Thuy, Le Duc Tho, and Kissinger.
Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, p. 221.
China's uncompromising position on Vietnam peace talks
contributed to the distrust of its foreign policy by countries in the
"Two Intermediate Zones," which China was supposed to unite. Countries
like Britain, France, India, Yugoslavia, Ghana, and Poland wanted to
bring about a peaceful solution to the Vietnam conflict but found
China's opposition frustrating and objectionable. Beijing's rejection
of the United Nations in Indochinese affairs alienated small neutral
countries who viewed the international organization as an important
platform. The contradictions and rigidity in Chinese foreign policy
served to undermine Mao's united front strategy, leaving China isolated
throughout the second half of the 1960s.
China's rejection of the Soviet call for "joint action" in
supporting Vietnam and its unrelenting attacks on the so-called Soviet
revisionism confirmed the Kremlin's worst assumptions about the
intentions of Chinese leaders and the impossibility of reviving past
friendship. In 1966, Moscow began to deploy troops along both the
Soviet and Mongolian borders with China. The Sino-Soviet relationship
would eventually deteriorate to a direct military confrontation in 1969.
Beijing's support for Hanoi's war against the United States and
its denunciation of various peace proposals reinforced the American
image of China as an irresponsible, aggressive, and dangerous player in
international politics. Although Mao's diplomatic initiatives in the
Afro-Asian world suffered major setbacks in 1965, policy-makers in
Washington concentrated only on what they perceived as Beijing's
expansionist intentions and belligerent rhetoric. China's encouragement
of violent revolution frightened many moderate African and Asian
governments, leading a number of them to sever diplomatic relations with
the PRC. In June, Ben Bella was overthrown, leading the Afro-Asian
movement to lean in a more pro-Soviet direction due to the influence of
India and Yugoslavia. The fall of Ben Bella frustrated Mao's bid for
leadership in the Afro-Asian world through the holding of the "second
Bandung" conference. In September, a war broke out between India and
Pakistan, a Chinese ally, over the territory of Kashmir. China's effort
to deter India's advance failed and New Delhi won its conflict with
Pakistan. The net result, strategically, was a gain for Moscow and a
loss for Beijing. On September 30, Indonesian leader Sukarno was
toppled in a right-wing counter coup, derailing Mao's plan to maintain a
militant "Beijing-Jakarta" axis. For further discussions of the Chinese
foreign policy setbacks in 1965 and their impact on China's internal
development, see John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's
Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993),
pp. 152-157.
Top officials in the Johnson administration, however, failed to
attach importance to these setbacks in China's diplomacy. As Robert
McNamara recently noted in his memoirs, "[i]n retrospect, one can see
the events of autumn 1965 as clear setbacks for China, which contributed
to its turn inward and the Cultural Revolution the following year. . .
. But, blinded by our assumptions and preoccupied with a rapidly
growing war, we--like most other Western leaders--continued to view
China as a serious threat in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world."
McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 214-215. That misperception, in turn, may
have constituted a missed opportunity to re-evaluate prior assumptions
about the consequences of a US defeat in Vietnam for the rest of
Southeast Asia (i.e., the Domino Theory)--and thus to reconsider the
American commitment to "pay any price" to assure the survival of a
non-communist South Vietnam.
Appendix
Documents on China and Vietnam Peace Talks
By Qiang Zhai
Documents 1: Chinese Foreign Ministry Circular, "Talks Between the
Ghanaian Mission and the DRV," August 3, 1965. This circular was
dispatched to Chinese embassies abroad on August 3, 1965. The Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CC CCP) on August 24, 1965
sent this document to its regional bureaus, provincial committees as
well as the ministries of the State Council and the General Political
Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
The Ghanaian mission has concluded its visit to the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on July 30. The mission has failed in its
effort on behalf of the Anglo-American "peace talk" plot to lobby the
DRV.
1. The following is a description of the Ghanaian-Vietnamese
talks as provided by the DRV:
The Ghanaian mission stated that Ghana supported the Four-Point
Proposal of the DRV On April 8, 1965, Pham Van Dong announced the DRV's
Four-Point Proposal, which demanded that the United States withdraw its
forces from Vietnam and cease its acts of war; called for neutralization
of both Vietnams pending unification; proposed a settlement of the
internal affairs of South Vietnam in accordance with the program of the
NLF; and insisted that reunification must be arranged by the Vietnamese
people without outside interference.
and the Five-Point Formula of the National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam (NLF) The NLF's Five-Point Formula was set forth on March 22,
1965. Among other things, it called for implementation of the Geneva
Accords, withdrawal of U.S. troops, and the unification of the two
Vietnams. For the text of the NLF's March 22, 1965, proclamation, with
annotations indicating how the DRV moderated the tone of the original
statement broadcast over Liberation Radio, see Marcus G. Raskin and
Bernard B. Fall, eds., The Viet-Nam Reader, rev. ed., (New York: Random
House, 1967), pp. 232-252. See also Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy
of the Vietnam War, p. 832.
and was interested in the NLF's proposal to establish a National
Coalition Government and implement peace and neutrality. The purpose of
Nkrumah Kwame Nkrumah was President of Ghana.'s participation in the
British Commonwealth "peace mission" was to serve the interests of the
Vietnamese people. The condition for his participation was the
recognition of the NLF as the representative of South Vietnam. Ghana was
no longer associated with this mission now. At present, the American
position was not much different from the positions of South and North
Vietnam. The United States was willing to implement the Geneva Accords
and withdraw its forces from South Vietnam. The United States believed
that the unification of Vietnam should be decided by the Vietnamese
people themselves. Where the United States differed from North Vietnam
and the NLF was just the demand on neutralization of entire Vietnam. The
current moment was the best time to begin peace talks. Ghana suggested
that Afro-Asian countries serve as mediators to promote peace talks. It
was the hope of Afro-Asian countries to restore peace in Vietnam. The
DRV must unite with Afro-Asian countries in order to realize its goals.
Disunity meant weakness.
The Vietnamese side exposed the American 'peace talk' plot. It
maintained that Ghana was far away from Vietnam geographically and that
the DRV had a better understanding of its rival. The Vietnamese people
were determined to fight until final victory and would not be taken in
by Johnson's carrot. Armed struggle would not necessarily pay a higher
price than political struggle. The struggle of the Vietnamese people
constituted part of the anti-imperialist struggle of the Afro-Asian
peoples, who should unite against imperialism. Ghana should mobilize
Afro-Asian countries to carry out struggle, forcing U.S. imperialism to
accept the demands of the NLF. Ghana should not attend a conference that
pitted the United States against Afro-Asian countries. The DRV could not
receive the visit of Nkrumah as a member of the British Commonwealth
"peace mission." Even if Nkrumah planned to visit the DRV not as a
member of the British Commonwealth "peace mission," the current moment
was not appropriate because the DRV could not guarantee his safety.
2. The proposal made by the Ghanaian mission to the Vietnamese
represents the old plot of unconditional peace negotiations advanced
several times in the past by the imperialists, revisionists, and
reactionaries. The idea that "Afro-Asian countries served as mediators"
is designed in reality to bypass the Geneva Accords to get the United
States and the DRV into direct talks while countries like Ghana help the
United States by pressuring the DRV. Before the visit of the Ghanaian
mission to Hanoi, we had notified the DRV of our position on the
attempts of Nkrumah and the mission to visit China. After this contact,
the DRV concluded that a large gap existed between the DRV and Ghana and
that the DRV would not benefit from the visit. Therefore, the DRV
rejected the Ghanaian proposal and postponed the visit of Nkrumah to the
DRV.
Imperialism, revisionism, and reactionaries are hatching new
peace talk plots. But the contradiction between the DRV and American
imperialism is irreconcilable. Both the NLF and the DRV are fighting
extremely well. Imperialism, revisionism, and reactionaries will further
serve as negative teachers. It can be predicted that new peace talk
plots will be bound to failure.
3. There have been numerous reports and speculations in the
world about the visit of the Ghanaian mission to the DRV. The Vietnamese
reply to the mission mentioned above is excellent. You (embassies)
should handle the case according to the following principles:
(1). In talking with socialist countries, primarily Romania and
other left fraternal socialist countries, you might inform them of the
Ghanaian mission's visit to the DRV in accordance with the reply of the
DRV.
(2). In talking with friendly Afro-Asian countries, if you are
asked (about the Ghanaian mission), you should explain properly in
accordance with the DRV reply so that those countries will have a
correct understanding of the current situation in Vietnam.
(3). In talking with left elements and friends who show concern
about Vietnam, if you are asked (about the Ghanaian mission), you might
also inform them of the DRV reply.
4. When the Ghanaian mission stopped in Beijing on July 30 on
its way home, we only provided transit assistance. Neither did they
propose to talk about any issues, nor did we. As to Nkrumah's request to
visit China, Premier Zhou will reply shortly to decline the request. The
contents of this reply will be in agreement with the DRV reply to the
Ghanaian mission.
August 3, 1965.
Source: [Q]uanzonghao (Record Group) 3124, [D]uanqi (Short-term),
[J]uanhao (File) 123, [J]iangsu [P]rovincial [A]rchives, Nanjing. Q 3124
contains the collection of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Jiangsu
Provincial People's Government. The collection is divided into three
categories: Yongjiu (permanent), Changqi (long-term), and Duanqi
(short-term).
Document 2: Chinese Foreign Ministry Circular, "Malraux's Visit to
China," August 12, 1965. The CC CCP on August 24, 1965 sent this
circular to its regional bureaus, provincial committees as well as the
ministries of the State Council and the General Political Department of
the PLA.
Between July 19 and August 6 (1965), French Minister of State
(Andre) Malraux visited China as special envoy of de Gaulle. At first,
the French government indicated that Malraux would come to China as a
private visitor. It did so for three reasons: to protect France's
prestige as a "big power" and not to appear that it needed our help; to
prevent the prospect that we would reject Malraux's visit because he
served as a peace broker on Vietnam; and not to irritate the United
States. After Malraux's arrival in China, the French government worried
that our leaders would not receive him. As a result, it stressed that de
Gaulle wanted to conduct talks with our leaders and that Malraux was
making an official visit. But in public statements the French government
still insisted that Malraux was making a private trip. We expressed our
dissatisfaction with the unclear identity of Malraux and the trick
played by the French government. Later, the French government delivered
a letter of introduction from de Gaulle to Chairman Liu (Shaoqi),
authorizing Malraux to "thoroughly exchange views" with China on
"significant issues concerning both China and France as well as the
future of the world." It also expressed apologies to us. To exploit
Franco-American contradictions and to woo de Gaulle, Chairman Mao,
Chairman Liu, Premier Zhou, and Deputy Premier Chen (Yi) all received
Malraux and discussed with him the following issues:
(1) Vietnam and Indochina
The Vietnam question was a primary issue that Malraux wanted to
discuss. Rather than raising the issue directly, he chose to sound us
out indirectly. Deputy Premier Chen asked Malraux whether he carried any
specific proposals on Vietnam from de Gaulle, he replied no, saying that
France would not initiate any proposal without obtaining China's
agreement. During his meeting with Premier (Zhou), Malraux indirectly
advanced the "Indochina neutralization" plan: to divide Vietnam along
the Truong Son Ra mountain. The area east of the mountain, including
Saigon, would belong to the DRV or the NLF; the area west of the
mountain as well as Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand would be "neutralized."
Malraux also asked whether it was possible to open negotiations when the
United States "promised" to withdraw troops. Premier immediately
repudiated Malraux's plan, pointing out that the boundaries in Indochina
had long been established and that what needed to be discussed at the
moment was the respect for the independence and neutrality of Cambodia
and Laos on the basis of the Geneva Accords. Premier also explained our
position on Vietnam and expressed our firm support for the anti-American
patriotic struggle of the Vietnamese people. He contended that the
United States, rather than seeking to preserve its prestige and
disengage, desired to stay in Vietnam.
(2) Opposing American-Soviet Hegemony (not translated).
(3) Reform of the United Nations (not translated).
(4) Sino-French Relations (not translated).
(5) Chinese Domestic Issues (not translated).
August 12, 1965.
Source: Q 3124, D, J123, JPA.
Document 3: Chinese Foreign Ministry Circular, "Vietnam 'Peace Talk'
Activities," August 19, 1965. The CC CCP on August 24, 1965 sent this
circular to its regional bureaus, provincial committees as well as the
ministries of the State Council and the General Political Department of
the PLA.
On the question of Vietnam, in order to extract itself
politically from the predicament and to win breathing time militarily,
the United States has made a number of "peace" gestures recently,
actively promoting peace talk activities from all sides. This time, the
peace talk activities are covering broader aspects and the conditions
proposed for peace talks are more deceptive. The situation is very
complex and we must pay attention to it.
Johnson sent (Averell) Harriman to the Soviet Union to conduct
strategic reconnaissance and to find out the Soviet position. Johnson
might even receive intelligence about the DRV intentions from the Soviet
Union. On July 28, drawing on Harriman's report of his talks with Soviet
leaders and the results of (Robert) McNamara's on-the-spot survey of
South Vietnam, Johnson, while announcing that the United States would
send more troops to South Vietnam, increase military spending on
Vietnam, and continue to bomb North Vietnam, said that the United States
was ready to "discuss Hanoi's proposals" and that the issue of the NLF's
participation in negotiations "is not an unresolvable difficulty."
Johnson also officially requested the intervention of the United Nations
in the Vietnam question. President Johnson made this speech at a news
conference at the White House on July 28, 1965. For the text of
Johnson's speech, see The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, No.
1364 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 16, 1965),
pp. 262-265. There is, however, no such sentence as the issue of the
NLF's participation in negotiations "is not an unresolvable difficulty"
in the original statement. After returning home and reporting to
Johnson, Harriman further announced that the DRV's Four Points Formula
"can become the basis of United Stated-North Vietnam negotiations."
Because of the American gesture and encouragement, activities to
promote peace talks from all sides have immediately become active.
Despite being turned down by the DRV, Nkrumah has continued to pester,
requesting a visit to the DRV and China. This is the continuation of the
peace talk activities by the British Commonwealth "peace mission."
Directed by Harriman, India and Yugoslavia have conducted discussions
and are at present actively establishing contact with other non-aligned
countries, particularly the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Uganda and
other African countries. Zambia has asked Ethiopia to join in its appeal
to China, the United States, and the Soviet Union for a peaceful
settlement of the Vietnam question. Zambia has also indicated that it
wants to take the issue to the African Summit Meeting. De Gaulle has
sent Malraux to visit China to examine our position. Although the Soviet
revisionists dare not openly participate in peace talk activities, the
Soviet government has privately colluded with the United States. The
Soviet media is openly echoing the American peace talk plots. The
activities of India and Yugoslavia have obviously received the promotion
and blessing of the Soviet revisionists.
In comparison with the "Seventeen-Country Appeal," the first
round of peace talk activities after the announcement of the American
"unconditional discussions" proposal, and the second round of peace talk
activities in the wake of the formation of the British Commonwealth
"peace mission," this round of peace talk activities has the following
unusual characteristics:
(1) Conditions for Peace Talks Are More Deceptive.
After the United States has made the gesture of "lowering" its
conditions for peace talks, countries interested in promoting peace
talks have advanced many plans, such as the call for a suspension of the
bombardment of North Vietnam and a ceasefire, the inclusion of the NLF
in negotiations, the settlement of the Vietnam issue on the basis of the
1954 Geneva Accords. These proposals can be traced to the same origins
of the American gesture. On the surface, they appear to offer more
compromises to the DRV and ask the United States to make concessions
first.
(2) The Modes of Peace Talk Activities Are More Diversified with
the Purpose of Creating an Atmosphere and Pressing the DRV into Peace
Talks.
The number of countries involved in this round of peace talk
activities has increased from the previous two rounds. The motivations
for these countries vary. Some countries work for the United States in
order to receive American aid. Some are afraid of war. Some combine both
of these considerations. Others want to cut a deal with the United
States over Vietnam and still others desire to weaken American influence
in Southeast Asia. The mode of peace talk activities this time also
vary. Some countries operate on their own while others work
collectively. Some act openly while others function secretly. It is to
be expected that in the various international meetings forthcoming in
the next few months, such as the United Nations, the African Summit
Meeting, the Afro-Asian Conference, the Vietnam question will be
discussed officially or unofficially.
It is especially notable that the United States this time is
striving, through India and Yugoslavia, to encourage some African
countries to make initiatives. By doing so, the United States is
exploiting the ignorance and the fear of war expansion on the part of
the African countries. A more important consideration behind the U.S.
effort is the American desire to take advantage of the recent anti-China
movement by right-wing states in Africa to drive a wedge between China
and African countries.
(3) (The United States) Is Even More Flagrantly Sowing Discord
Between China and the DRV.
The United States is on the one hand forcing the DRV into peace
talks through blackmail and deception and on the other flagrantly sowing
dissension between China and the DRV. It claims that the DRV's position
on peace negotiations has moderated and that China represents the only
obstacle. On this score, the Soviet revisionists, India, Yugoslavia, and
other reactionaries are collaborating closely with the United States.
A fundamental fact is that the DRV's struggle against the United
States is resolute and that it will not stop its fight to liberate the
South. But on the treatment of Soviet revisionism, the DRV's position
differs from ours. On the issue of peace talks, the DRV's practice also
diverges from ours. The DRV has never completely closed the door on
peace talks, thus creating an opportunity for imperialism, revisionism,
and reactionaries and increasing their illusions to pressure the DRV to
open peace negotiations.
Judging by the developments mentioned above, the peace talk
activities this time are complicated and the struggle to oppose peace
talk hoaxes will be more arduous. Although the United States has made
some gestures, none of them includes any substantive concession. This
reality will become clear to all countries in the world after the peace
talk activities have progressed for a period of time.
In contact with foreigners, if circumstances are necessary, you
can cite our government's statement of August 7 and the points made in
the recent editorials and commentaries in the People's Daily to lay bare
the American policy of real expansion of war and sham gestures of peace
talks, expose the Soviet revisionist collaboration with the United
States, and express our determination to support the Vietnamese struggle
through to the end. But you do not need to initiate conversations on
Vietnam peace talks unnecessarily. In this regard, bear in mind that we
are cooperating with the Vietnamese comrades. Do not appear over
enthusiastic and do not take the Vietnamese job into our hands. Do not
highlight our role. Especially in talking with the Vietnamese comrades,
be careful not to give the impression that we are imposing our views on
them.
August 19, 1965.
Source: Q 3124, D, J 123, JPA.
Document 4: Zhou Enlai's Talk with E. H. K. Mudenda, Agricultural
Minister of Zambia, in Beijing, August 20, 1965.
The U.S. proposal for "unconditional discussions" is a plot.
Conducting negotiations at this moment is nothing but a betrayal of the
Vietnamese people, who have insisted on U.S. withdrawal of troops from
Vietnam as the first step toward the settlement of the Vietnam problem.
It the war continues in the present manner, the Vietnamese people can
hold to their position. The war may not expand into a world war, but
that probability will not be totally decided by the wish of people. If
the United States wants war with China, it will not win over China.
China will not ask other countries to participate in the war. Our
position boils down to four sentences: (1) China will not initiate war;
(2) the Chinese mean what they say; (3) China is prepared; (4) if the
war breaks out, there will be no boundaries.
Source: The Diplomatic History Research Office of the People's Republic
of China Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji,
1949-1975 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975)
(Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), p. 474.
Document 5: Zhou Enlai's Talk with Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of Romania, in Beijing, October 5, 1966.
1. On the issue of Vietnam, the Chinese and Soviet positions are
absolutely opposite and united action is out of the question. 2. In time
negotiations will be inevitably held on the Vietnam question, but the
key issues are on what conditions and at what time should negotiations
be conducted, and who decides the terms and timing of negotiations. The
decision on negotiations lies in the DRV. 3. For those people who were
asked by the Soviet Union and the United States to go to the DRV to
exert pressure, we have allowed them to pass through China so long as
the DRV has extended them invitations. But there is one exception: if U
Thant wants to go to the DRV, we will think about whether to let him
pass through China. As to the passage of aid-Vietnam materials through
China, we will act according to agreements. On this issue there is no
possibility of united action.
Source: Ibid., p. 505.
Document 6: Zhou Enlai's Talk with Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap in
Beijing, April 10, 1967.
In considering the prospect of the war, we should include two or
three possibilities. One possibility is that the war will continue and
expand. The law of war is often not decided by the will of people,
neither by our will nor by the enemy's will. War has its own law. Even
if the enemy wants to stop the war, it may not be able to do so.
Therefore, for the sake of the future, we must prepare for the
continuation and expansion of the war. Another possibility is that the
enemy will blockade your coast. If the enemy wages a total blockade,
then it is very likely that it intends to expand the hostilities into a
total war. If the enemy just wants to force you into compromise by
blockading your coast and if you refuse to compromise, then what will
the enemy do? The enemy must have a follow-up plan. A total blockade of
the coast will not be a simple matter. It will involve the deployment of
many fleets. It will be a major operation. It will strain the enemy's
relations with other countries. A third possibility is what the two of
you have just mentioned: the crucial moment will be the dry season next
year. You may defeat the enemy, forcing it to admit its failure and
withdraw from Vietnam. As to the likelihood that the war will neither
end nor expand but simply wear on, that is inconceivable. The war will
end inevitably and the question is when. It is impossible that the war
will wear on forever without a result. Concerning the issue of political
struggle, it is without doubt that political struggle should be carried
out at any time. War is the highest form of the development of political
struggle. It is impossible that war will not involve political struggle.
Things like strengthening international propaganda, winning sympathy,
weakening and dividing enemies, and exploiting contradictions between
them all fall into the category of political struggle. You have done
those things in the past and you must continue doing so in the future.
Source: Ibid., p. 510.
Document 7: Zhou Enlai's Talk with Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap in
Beijing, April 11, 1967.
China has a popular saying: the 90-mile mark is the half point
of a 100-mile journey. It means that a traveler has walked 90 miles and
has 10 miles to finish. The remaining 10 miles are the most difficult
for the traveler. The same thing is true in climbing mountains. Take the
climbing of the Himalayas for instance, the last stretch of the climbing
is the most difficult. We believe that you will surely win the final
victory. We will mobilize the people of the whole world to support you
to achieve victory. The Soviet Union, however, surely wants you to stop
halfway. It has done such a thing during the Stalin period. After the
surrender of Japan in 1945, the United States supported Chiang Kai-shek.
At that time, the Soviet Union had suffered a great deal in the war. It
concluded the Yalta agreement, dividing spheres of influence with the
United States. The Yalta agreement is wrong. As a tactic, the agreement
is all right; but as a policy, it is incorrect. The explosion of the two
atomic bombs in particular shocked the Soviet Union. The Soviets were
eager to sign an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, recognizing the fact
that the United States enjoyed the greatest sphere of influence in
China. The Soviet Union in return wanted to maintain Russian special
interests in the Northeast and Xinjiang and keep the People's Republic
of Mongolia. At the time, Stalin fired off a cable to Comrade Mao Zedong
stating that the Chinese Communist Party should cooperate with
Guomindang instead of starting a civil war and that if the Chinese
Communist Party launched a civil war, the Chinese nation would be
destroyed. Clearly the Soviet Union had been intimidated by the atomic
bomb. We say that Stalin was still worthy of being a Marxist-Leninist
because he was capable of recognizing his own errors. After the
liberation of Shanghai, Liu Shaoqi went to Moscow, where Stalin
implicitly made a self-criticism. He asked whether the telegram he sent
to Comrade Mao Zedong in August 1945 had undermined the progress of
China's liberation war. Liu Shaoqi replied that it had not. Certainly it
did not. Once during a banquet, Stalin offered a toast, claiming that he
was old and very afraid that after his death those comrades (referring
to Voroshilov, Molotov, Khrushchev, and others who were present) would
be scared by imperialism. Now we can see that Stalin's predictions have
proved true.
Source: Ibid., pp. 510-511.
Document 8: Zhou Enlai's Talk with Xuan Thuy, Director of the
International Liaison Department of the VWP, in Beijing, May 7, 1968.
The conditions of the Korean (armistice) negotiations at that
time are different from your conditions now. The Korean talks then
concerned only half of Korea while you are now dealing with the
unification of Vietnam. The issue of half Vietnam was discussed fourteen
years ago. Comrade Mao Zedong told Chairman Ho Chi Minh last time that
the Geneva Accords at that time might have been signed erroneously.
After the conclusion of the Accords, many soldiers in South Vietnam were
withdrawn to the North. At the time, the United States was unwilling to
sign the Accords. We also had reasons not to sign the Accords. Chairman
Ho said that the conclusion of the Accords had its advantages. The South
Vietnamese went through a difficult period of arrest, incarceration, and
suppression by Ngo Dinh Diem and suffered over two hundred thousand
deaths. With this bitter lesson, the people in South Vietnam have risen
up spontaneously to make revolution and achieve the situation they have
today. Therefore, the situation of the Korean negotiations was similar
to the situation of the 1954 Geneva Conference. The Korean negotiations
were conducted on the battle ground. The war lasted for nearly three
years and the negotiations two years. But when the 1954 Geneva
Conference began to discuss the Korean question, nothing was achieved
because the war had ended. No matter what we argued, they (the
Americans) would not listen. As a result, the Korean negotiations only
achieved an armistice agreement but failed to reach any political
settlement. It (the United States) refused to discuss the issue of troop
withdraw. When we withdrew our troops in 1958, it (the United States)
refused to withdraw its forces. This time you encounter a different
situation. You are beginning talks with the United States in stages. It
is all right to do so. Watch while you are proceeding. But the
fundamental issue is this: no matter what happens, you should not let
the enemy gain from negotiations what it has failed to gain in the
battlefield. It was because of the battle of Dien Bien Phu that the
Geneva Conference was able to reach a result and settle on the
Seventeenth Parallel. When he returned home, Comrade Pham Van Dong may
have already informed you of our attitude. We feel that you have
responded too quickly and too impatiently, perhaps giving the Americans
a misperception that you are eager to negotiate. Comrade Mao Zedong has
told Comrade Pham Van Dong that negotiations are all right but you must
assume a high posture. Secondly, the United States, the vassal
countries, and South Vietnam at present have a force of one million.
Without breaking their backbones or cutting five to six of their ten
fingers, they will not acknowledge their defeat and withdraw.
Source: Ibid, p. 524.
Document 9: Zhou Enlai's Talk with Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of Romania, in Beijing, September 7, 1969. Maurer
was leading a Romanian Party and government delegation to attend Ho Chi
Minh's funeral in Hanoi. He made a stopover in Beijing on September 7,
1969.
Although we have different views, it is helpful to exchange
opinions. As to the Vietnam question, whether the DRV continues the
resistance war or conducts the Paris talks, it is the business of the
Vietnamese Party themselves. When we exchange views with the Vietnamese
comrades, we primarily discuss the conditions of the anti-American war
in Vietnam. We want to support them and learn from their experience in
carrying out the people's war. With regard to the Paris talks, we have
never intervened partly because the DRV makes decisions and partly
because the Soviet Union has intervened. (Because of the Soviet factor),
We are even more unwilling to intervene. We have not paid attention to
the progress of the talks. The Soviet Union is using the Vietnam issue,
the Middle East issue, the West Berlin issue, and the China issue as
trump cards in its bargaining with the United States. All these issues
have been subordinated to their foreign policies. Their international
policies are nothing but the unity of the two superpowers to dominate
the world.
Source: Ibid, pp. 538-539.
Document 10: Zhou Enlai's Talk with Xuan Thuy, Director of the
International Liaison Department of the VWP and Head of the DRV
Delegation to the Paris Talks, in Beijing, July 7, 1972.
Xuan Thuy: The DRV is prepared for two possibilities: on the one
hand to be ready for the continuation of the war and on the other hand
not to miss any opportunity to achieve a negotiated settlement on a
reasonable basis.
Zhou: Whether the Vietnam War will continue or end in a
negotiated settlement because of the concessions form the United States,
the four months from July to October this year will be a crucial period.
Source: Ibid, p. 636.
Document 11: Zhou Enlai's Talk with Le Duc Tho, Politburo Member of the
VWP and Special Adviser to Xuan Thuy at the Paris Talks, in Beijing,
July 12, 1972.
In 1945 Chairman Mao went to Chongqing to negotiate with Chiang
Kai-shek. Before his departure, he asked the liberation areas to prepare
for war and not to worry about his safety. At that time, many of our
comrades in the liberation areas disapproved Chairman Mao's trip because
they were afraid that Chiang Kai-shek would imprison Chairman Mao.
Stalin sent us a telegram and Chairman Ho was aware of this matter.
Stalin said that we must go to Chongqing to negotiate; otherwise the
Chinese nation faced the danger of being destroyed. He was frightened by
the two atomic bombs of the United States. The telegram was not signed
with Stalin's name. In the end, both Chairman Mao and I went. Chairman
Mao told me that we must be ready to be imprisoned and that imprisonment
would give us time to read books. We cabled the liberation areas that if
Chiang Kai-shek attacked you, you should resist him resolutely. While we
were negotiating, our forces annihilated one division of Chiang
Kai-shek's troops in North China. As a result, Chairman Mao returned to
Yanan safely.
Source: Ibid, p. 637.
Document 12: Zhou Enlai's Talk with Truong Chinh, Politburo Member of
the VWP and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly
of the DRV, in Beijing, December 31, 1972.
Nixon does intend to disengage. Therefore this time you should
approach negotiations sincerely in order to achieve results. Of course,
the negotiations might fail and there might be setbacks in the talks.
Source: Ibid, p. 659.
Document 13: Zhou Enlai's Talk with Le Duc Tho, Politburo Member of the
VWP and Special Adviser to Xuan Thuy at the Paris Talks, in Beijing,
January 3, 1973.
The U. S. effort to exert pressure through bombing has failed.
Nixon is facing many international and domestic problems. It seems that
he intends to retreat from Vietnam and Indochina. During the
negotiations, you should both adhere to principles and show necessary
flexibility. Let the Americans leave as quickly as possible. In half a
year or one year the situation will change.
Source: Ibid, p. 660.
About the Author:
Qiang Zhai is associate professor of history at Auburn
University at Montgomery. He is the author of The Dragon, the Lion, and
the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (1994). He is
currently working on a manuscript on Beijing-Hanoi relations during the
Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975.
This paper is derived from my on-going project tentatively titled "China
and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975." An early version of the paper was
presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in
Chicago on March 14, 1997. I thank David Anderson, Xiaoming Zhang, and
Carlyle Thayer for providing helpful comments.
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